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ABSTRACT
The U.S. government and others around the world have been exploring strategies to
respond to climate change for nearly two decades. Consideration of these efforts as
well as the 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, the 2011 nuclear accident at
Fukushima Daichi, and improved shale gas recovery methods are spurring debate
on energy policy options. An important focus of this debate is the role of innovation
in reducing carbon emissions while also maintaining the affordability of energy
supplies.
The scale of the required transition to a low-carbon energy system is large. A
simple calculation scheme based on the Kaya identity is used to evaluate this
transition and to estimate the magnitude of the changes that would be required.
The recent performance of the U.S. economy with respect to decarbonization and
energy intensity is shown to fall far short of future needs in low-carbon scenarios.
The MARKAL model is used to estimate the magnitude of the capital investment
required to transform the U.S. electric power sector.
A comprehensive treatment of the innovation process must consider not only
research and development but also the 'downstream' stages of demonstration, early
adoption, and evolutionary post-commercialization improvements. Under
greenhouse gas reduction scenarios, investments will be needed in low-carbon
technologies when there is still considerable uncertainty and risk associated with
their performance, and when they may not be competitive with incumbent energy
systems. No less than investments in research and development, these are
investments in innovation. A two-stage model of the innovation process is used to
estimate the investment needed to bring a new technology to a competitive cost
level. The model is used to explore the contributions of early-stage and later-stage
investments in innovation, and illustrates the importance of the technological
learning process.
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A case study of innovation in the nuclear energy industry is used to evaluate the
effectiveness of alternative policies for driving investment in energy technologies
more generally. The case study reveals a pattern of erratic policy that discouraged
private investment. The use of technology-push rather than market-pull policy
tools is found to have encouraged technology lock-in and discouraged market-driven
innovation.
Thesis Supervisor: Richard K. Lester
Title: Japan Steel Industry Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering;
Department Head
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Dissertation Summary
The threat of climate change, thought to be caused largely by anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions, is currently a major focus of attention around the world.
The United States will have a crucial role in any successful global greenhouse gas
reduction strategy, even as it seeks to increase energy security, ensure the
affordability and reliability of energy supplies, and minimize other environmental
impacts of energy supply and use. Achieving these goals will require the
development and deployment of new energy technologies, as well as improvements
in the cost, reliability, and other aspects of performance of technologies currently in
use. Innovation will thus be a part of any effective U.S. strategy, and the scale of
the innovation requirement can be estimated. Here we estimate the changes in the
U.S. energy supply mix implied by a low-carbon goal, focusing on the electric power
system. We then assess the electric generation capital investment requirements
associated with such a transition compared with business-as-usual. We develop a
model for segregating that investment between high-risk innovation-related
investments and lower-risk traditional capital investments, and we estimate the
innovation investment requirement for electric generation in a low-carbon scenario.
Finally, we examine the history of nuclear energy development in the U.S. to
identify strengths and weaknesses of previous approaches to energy innovation
policy and to aid in future policy design.
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The Energy Innovation Process
We introduce the simple model of the energy innovation process shown in Figure
156. This divides the process into four stages.1 First, "option creation," which
encompasses basic R&D, the preliminary exploration of new possibilities for
products, services, and processes, and the development of early prototypes and
demonstrations. Second, "Demonstrating Viability," in which the objective is to
ascertain the viability of the technology in the marketplace. This includes activities
like full-scale demonstration projects, as well as assessments of the regulatory and
the market environment. Third, "Early Adoption," in which a new technology is
first deployed in the marketplace. And fourth, "Improvements-in-Use," which
typically continues over the life of the technology in the marketplace, and involves
evolutionary improvements, learning-by-doing, and cost reductions. It is important
to note that developments at each stage can influence all of the others, and that the
process is consequently non-linear. It is also important to note that this model does
not correspond exactly to the conventional taxonomy of research, development,
demonstration, and deployment. R&D, for example, is closely associated with
creating options, but can also be a major contributor to the other stages of the
process, including improvements-in-use (Lester & Hart 2012).
1 For a fuller description of this four-stage model of the energy innovation process, see Unlocking
Energy Innovation: How America Can Build a Low-Cost, Low-Carbon Energy System By Richard K.
Lester and David M. Hart. The MIT Press, 2012.
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Many studies use R&D spending as a proxy for investment in innovation (see, for
example, Cohen 1995; Lanjouw and Schankerman 1999; Margolis and Kammen
1999; Popp 1999; Botazzi and Peri 2003; Ulku 2007). However, investment in
innovation does not end with R&D, as we have discussed. A new technology, for our
purposes, must successfully enter the market to qualify as an innovation (Fri 2003).
The current literature on investment in innovation shows that R&D is used too
casually to represent innovation investment, and that it is insufficient for predicting
the success of bringing a technology from the lab to the market (See, for example:
Jarzelski et. al., 2005; Wolff 2007; and Drake et. al., 2006). Some work has been
done on identifying the other components of innovation investment, and it is clear
8
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that this should include the pre-commercial, deployment, and learning-by-doing
stages. Wide deployment of technologies may also require significant investment in
other areas, possibly including training, manufacturing, transport, and engineering
the integration of the technology into existing infrastructure. Learning-by-doing is
also a crucial step in the innovative process through which costs are reduced and
manufacturing, installation, and usage procedures can be standardized (Sagar and
van der Zwaan 2005).
To understand the scale of the deployment stage, we developed a framework to
estimate future changes in electric power generation capacity. We use this
framework in the next section to pose some hypothetical paths to carbon emission
reduction and to explore their implications.
Quantifying the Impact of Proposed Carbon Emission Reductions on the
U.S. Energy Infrastructure
Here we examine the implications for the U.S. energy infrastructure of the targets
for greenhouse gas emission reductions recently considered by the U.S. government.
We focus primarily on the electric power sector. The Waxman-Markey legislation
passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in 2009 called for U.S. carbon
emissions to decline 83% from their level in 2005 by 2050.2 At various times
2 H.R. 2454: American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, Section 702
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President Obama has similarly called for emission reductions of over 80% by mid-
century, and in July 2010 the President agreed with the other G8 leaders that the
developed countries, including the U.S., should reduce their emissions 80% by 2050.
These targets are loosely derived from integrated scientific and economic
assessments of the consequences for the earth's climate of elevated atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases. The problem of mitigating greenhouse gas
emissions will affect all countries. Here we examine the scale of what would be
required for the U.S. to achieve carbon emission reductions in this general range.
We take as the target for aggregate U.S. energy-related carbon emissions in 2050 an
85% reduction relative to the 2005 level.
There are two essential elements of any strategy for reducing energy-related carbon
emissions: first, reducing the 'energy intensity' of the economy; and second,
'decarbonizing' the nation's energy supply infrastructure - that is, reducing the
carbon intensity of the energy system by moving away from primary reliance on
petroleum for transportation and high carbon fuels for electricity generation
towards alternative transportation fuels and low or zero-carbon electricity
generating technologies. These two elements of an overall strategy are
interdependent. The more rapid the transition to low carbon energy supplies, the
less we will need to rely on energy end-use efficiency gains to achieve a given
emission reduction target, and vice versa.
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There is in fact a fixed relationship between these two elements if a target for
economic output is specified together with the carbon reduction goal. The
relationship between these four factors - carbon emissions, carbon intensity of the
energy system, energy intensity of the economy, and economic output - is given by
the Kaya Identity3
C=(1)
where C = carbon emitted in a given time period, E = energy consumed in that time
period, Y = economic output in that period, and P = population, and where, for
convenience, economic output is expressed as output per capita. This ratio, Y/P, is
the broadest measure of productivity in an economy, and in the long run is the
single most important determinant of national prosperity. Equation (1) applies to
any specified geographical unit, from a small region to a country to the world as a
whole. The differential form of the identity relates the fractional rate of change of
carbon emissions to the rate of change of each of the four factors, i.e., carbon
intensity, energy intensity, economic productivity, and population.
3
The relationship between these factors was first pointed out by the Japanese engineer Yoichi Kaya
(Kaya, Y., "Impact of Carbon Dioxide Emission Control on GNP Growth: Interpretation of Proposed
Scenarios", Paper presented to the IPCC Energy and Industry Subgroup, Response Strategies Working
Group, Paris, 1990 (mimeo).)
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The Kaya identity demonstrates the complementary nature of reductions in the
energy intensity of the economy and in the carbon intensity of the energy supply
system, and we were able to illustrate some possible scenarios for CO 2 reduction
and identify the scale of the changes that would be required in each. We found that
even with very optimistic assumptions about low-carbon technology installations (at
rates that are unprecedented even for fossil fuel plants), business-as-usual energy
intensity reductions of roughly 2% per year would require the rate of growth of GDP
per capita to decline to 1% per year in an 85% CO 2 reduction scenario.4 To achieve
2% annual per capita GDP growth through 2050 with the same optimistic supply-
side assumptions, energy intensity would have to decline at an annual rate of about
3%. If the rate of decarbonization of energy supplies is further constrained, energy
intensity must fall even more quickly.
Figure 3728 shows the historical rates of decarbonization and energy intensity
reductions as well as the rates required by three increasingly constrained carbon
reduction scenarios.
An 85% reduction relative to 2005 levels to be achieved by 2050.
12
0.00%
-0.50%
-1.00%
-1.50%
-2.00%
-2.50%
-3.00%
-3.50%
-4.00%
-4.50%
-5.00%
~.58%0
-3.05
-4.03%
-0 M
I A 7rQ4
Rate of change of carbon
content of energy supply
Rate of change of energy
intensity of the economy
Figure 2: Rates of decarbonization
required by each scenario
and energy intensity improvements
In the "All Hands on Deck" scenario, which implements greater supply-side changes
than the other cases with a correspondingly smaller rate of reduction in energy
intensity, implied annual capacity additions are estimated at 120 GWe. This is
nearly twice the capacity added during the peak year for new electric power
capacity in the past decade, and would require unusually high levels of investment
in the industry.
The implication of these results is clear: the past performance of the U.S. energy
sector with respect to both energy efficiency gains and decarbonization falls far
short of what will be required in the future. It will be impossible to achieve the
mid-century carbon emission reduction goal while at the same time maintaining
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even a modest rate of economic growth without major advances in both dimensions
of performance relative to past trends. The results from the simple Kaya identity
framework beg the question: how much will this cost and can it be done?
Capital Investment Requirements in the Electric Power Sector
Converting the energy supply capital stock in the U.S. from a GHG-intensive to a
low-GHG emitting system is a major transition that will require large capital
investments in low-carbon energy sources. The availability of adequate capital is a
necessary requirement for such a transition, and this is neither a trivial concern nor
is it independent of other government policies. In any policy or non-policy scenario,
significant capital investments will be made in the energy supply system through
2050. It is informative to look at the impacts of climate change mitigation strategies
on the magnitude of those investments.
To explore this topic, we considered many of the available modeling software for
energy supply and consumption under emission constraints. We found that the
MARKAL energy economy model used by the International Energy Agency would
best suit our needs, due to its detailed technology specifications and cost
information. We used the U.S. EPA single-region United States database for
MARKAL as the basis for our inputs. A comparison of investment requirements in
the base case with those in reduced-carbon cases is informative, and we used nine
scenarios to illustrate those variations. The scenarios differed in CO 2 reduction
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targets and energy demand levels. We then performed sensitivity analyses to
explore the impact of changes in capital costs for wind and nuclear power and
changes in the domestic natural gas resource base in one of the nine scenarios.
These variables were chosen to reflect current uncertainty about the capital costs of
nuclear and wind plants, and to reflect uncertainty about the size and importance of
the domestic shale gas resources. Because nuclear, wind, natural gas, and coal with
CCS substitute for one another as their relative costs fluctuate in the model,
varying three of these captures much of the uncertainty surrounding their
competitive relationship in future electricity markets.
The MARKAL model (named for MARket ALlocation) is a bottom-up, dynamic,
linear programming model of energy supply and demand subject to economic
optimization within an overall economy.5 It was originally developed at
Brookhaven National Laboratory and was selected as the primary energy supply
and demand modeling system by the International Energy Agency (IEA) in 1978. It
is now used by more than 40 countries for planning purposes. The MARKAL model
is highly data-driven, and as such the results are very dependent on the quality of
the input database. The U.S. EPA has developed a nine-region database for use in
modeling the United States' energy system in MARKAL, and has derived from that
a single-region model that is essentially a summation of the nine-region model (with
some subtle adjustments where needed) (EPA 2008). The 2010 database is used in
5 For a detailed description of MARKAL, see the ETSAP MARKAL users manual at
http://www.etsap.org/documentation.asp
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this analysis because it is the most up-to-date national database available at this
time. We made several adjustments and updates to the database.
The user can define constraints, including limits on particular technology
capacities, limits on emissions, and many other items. The MARKAL model then
calculates the least-cost solution to satisfy both energy demand and the user-
specified constraints. Outputs include the installed capacity of each technology in
each 5-year time interval, emissions of GHGs and other pollutants, investments
made in each technology during each time interval, and many other data points.
In the EPA base case there is no restriction on CO 2 emissions, so for comparison we
created two additional CO 2 emission scenarios. The first is referred to as "Low CO2"
and incorporates a carbon cap that mimics that of H.R. 2454, the American Clean
Energy and Security Act of 2009. This includes a reduction in CO 2 emissions of 17%
of 2005 emissions by 2020, 42% of 2005 emissions by 2030, and 83% of 2005
emissions by 2050. In the intervening years, we assume a linear decrease in CO 2
emissions. The next scenario, "Mid C02" includes an intermediate carbon
constraint. CO 2 emissions are limited to 50% of 2005 emissions by 2050, linearly
decreasing from 2010.
One set of scenarios was run with business-as-usual energy demand, as specified in
the EPA database, and based on the Annual Energy Outlook for 2010 (AE02010)
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demand projections. Two other sets were run with reduced demand scenarios. The
two reduced demand scenarios were chosen to correspond to the lower and upper
reduced-demand cases in the "All Hands on Deck" and "Additionally Constrained"
Kaya framework scenarios, respectively, and are referred to as "Mid Demand" and
"Low Demand." The end-use energy services demand for each scenario is given in
Figure 4435.
120
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Figure 3: Total end-use energy for each demand scenario6
Because they drive the electric power investment requirements, several of the
particularly interesting results from the MARKAL modeling are the electric power
capacity present in 2050 in each case, and the mix of technologies contributing to
that total. Figure 4536 presents those results for the BAU demand cases and for
the starting year, 2010. Looking first at the technologies present, we can see that
the difference between the 2010 mix and the 2050 mix in the BAU C02 case is
6 The demand value for 2010 is taken from the EPA database for the MARKAL model. It was a
projection at the time it was recorded, not a historical data point, so there may be some discrepancy
with actual 2010 demand.
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largely an increase in natural gas, and a decrease in coal and nuclear capacity due
to exogenously imposed retirements. All of the scenarios include an initial residual
nuclear power LWR capacity of 105.8 GWe, and that capacity is fully retired by
2050.' In the BAU C02 cases, no additional nuclear plants are installed to replace
the retired capacity. Once a 50% CO 2 reduction is imposed (Mid C02), a large
amount of wind (213 GWe), nuclear (155 GWe), and natural gas with CCS (170
GWe) capacity is added, along with 35 GWe of coal with CCS. This indicates the
need for a significant increase in low-carbon baseload capacity. Sensitivity cases
showed that which technologies are deployed is largely dependent on their relative
costs. It would be reasonable at this high level of analysis to consider any baseload
low-carbon plant being built in place of another. This really comes down to cost and
other practicalities that are not very predictable, especially decades out. In the Low
C02 case, low-carbon baseload increases further, with 669 GWe of coal with CCS,
647 GWe of nuclear, and 213 GWe of wind.
Residual capacity is present at the beginning of the modeling timeframe. It has no associated
initial investment requirements and can be retired or can continue in service.
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Figure 4: Electric generation capacity by technology for BAU demand
cases in 2050 with varying C02 and for 2010
In both of the constrained CO 2 cases, natural gas capacity is cut back compared
with the BAU C02 case in order to accommodate the carbon goal. The model
results do not account for the recent discoveries of increased shale gas resources in
the U.S., but sensitivity cases addressed this, and showed that in a carbon
constrained scenario, the availability of greater natural gas resources had minimal
impact on the capacity mix.
BAU Demand Low C02 is the most challenging supply side case, and thus shows
the most radical changes in electric power generation. Figure 5142 shows the
generation mix. The large increase in electricity generation is notable, and
corroborates the finding from the Kaya framework that in such a constrained case
there is a need for widespread electrification of energy supply. The supply is
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derived almost exclusively from nuclear and coal with CCS, with contributions from
wind and from hydroelectric power.
Figure 5: Electricity generation by technology for BAU
2010-2050
Demand Low C02,
In the mid demand cases, total electricity generation actually declines over the
modeling period. With the reduced demand, conventional coal is largely phased out
and there is an increase in natural gas and wind generation.
The BAU Demand Low C02 case has a total investment requirement of $7.5 trillion
(in 2000 dollars) for the electric power sector, compared with BAU Demand BAU
C02 at just $1.0 trillion.8 The BAU Demand Mid C02 scenario has a somewhat
less daunting figure of $3.0 trillion and the Mid Demand Low C02 scenario requires
8 In a general equilibrium modeling framework we might expect that this very large incremental
investment would not occur; rather, the higher energy prices associated with the additional
investment would be expected to act as a brake on economic activity and energy demand. The
MARKAL modeling framework does not enable these feedback effects.
20
8,000 Conv Coal
7,000 N
-- NG
-26,000
* C Nuclear
0 2 5,000
m5 * Hydro
0 4,000
. e Wind
- 3,00Other
.M 2,000 -
* Solar
1,000
Coal with CCS
0 -
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
investment of $3.5 trillion. The other reduced demand cases have lower electric
power investment requirements than business as usual. By simply dividing the
cumulative investments by 40 years, we calculate the average annual investment
requirement for the same cases. These results are shown in Figure 5849.
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in electric power for each scenario,
By way of comparison, we can look to some historical data. The Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) provides capital flow tables that catalogue the investments in new
equipment, software, and structures by a selection of industries. The most recent
data available are from 1997. In that year, the power generation and supply
industry invested only $18 billion in structures and $25 billion in equipment and
software. Only a fraction of the $25 billion might have been for new capacity, but
that level of detail is not available. Even assuming that all $43 billion was invested
in new capacity, it would still be less than a quarter of the required investment in
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the BAU Demand Low C02 case and well below the requirement for the BAU
Demand Mid C02 case.
Investments in Innovation
We have estimated the capital investment requirements for the build-out of new
generating capacity in a clean energy transition. Those investments will be
influenced by many external risks, including uncertainties over the future price of
energy, the regulatory regime, and the adoption of policy tools like carbon caps and
other restrictions. Under greenhouse gas reduction scenarios, much of that
investment will need to be made in low-carbon technologies that are not competitive
in the marketplace today, and that cannot, at least initially, be built at the cost
assumed in most models. These technologies will require additional investments to
resolve technological risks, to generate more information about performance, to
develop complementary resources such as supply chain capabilities, new workforce
skills, and regulatory systems, and to exploit learning phenomena to bring costs
down to a competitive level. Typically these investments will be made at a time
when there is still considerable uncertainty and risk associated with the
performance of the new technologies, and when they may not be competitive with
the incumbent energy systems. No less than investments in research and
development, these are investments in innovation. Here we present a method for
estimating the magnitude of the innovation investments required to bring a generic
technology to a competitive cost level. (In the remainder of this paper, we use the
term 'innovation investment' specifically to refer to the investment required to bring
22
a technology with demonstrated technical viability to the point at which it is able to
compete in the marketplace.)
Just as the private sector is not strongly inclined to invest in fundamental research
at the option-creation stage (Griliches 1992), in the absence of long-term policy
stability it is unlikely to invest in major high-risk efforts at the demonstration
stage. Public funding is made available for fundamental research to compensate for
the lack of private funding; but the stages of demonstrating viability and of early
adoption often have investment requirements that exceed the financial capabilities
of government agencies in terms of project cost and size (as well creating demands
for knowledge of the marketplace that public policymakers may not have), so cost-
sharing and joint decision-making with industry, at a minimum, is necessary. The
next stage, improvements-in-use, can only progress if a technology is being
consistently deployed in the market.
Little is currently known about how to balance investments, public or private,
among these various stages of innovation. There is consensus about the need to
invest in all stages, but when it comes to optimizing the distribution or timing, or
even modeling the impact of investments at a given stage versus those at another,
current analytical tools are underdeveloped. Ultimately, innovation investment
decisions would benefit most from a comprehensive model of the effects of
investments at each stage and for different technologies over time. This would
enable decision makers in business and in government to weigh the costs and
23
benefits of all options before making investment commitments, thus enabling the
most efficient use of scarce resources. The reduced uncertainty that would come
from this modeling capability would also encourage total investments in energy
technology to grow, and would enable policymakers to design more efficient policies.
With the long-term goal of a comprehensive innovation investment model in mind,
here we take a first step with a highly simplified model. We begin with a stylized
two-stage model of the innovation process, illustrated in Figure 7162.
Front-End Innovation Lenrning-Based Innnentin
& Leaming by doing
* Prototying * Evolutionary advancements
T System integstion se* M'a ket d arlopment, etc.
*Demonstration, etc.
Equivalent to a combination of Equivalent to a combination of "Eariy
"Creating Options" and "Demonsprating Adoption" and "Improvements-in-use"
Viability" from Lester & Hart, 2012. from Lester & Hart, 2012.
Figure 7: Simplified two-stage model of the innovation process
The first stage represents those 'front-end innovation' activities that are aimed at
reducing the cost and increasing the viability of a technology before its practical
introduction. It is equivalent to the combination of those efforts made in the first
two steps of the innovation process presented in Figure 156 and in Unlocking
Energy Innovation: How America Can Build a Low-Cost, Low-Carbon Energy
System (Lester & Hart, 2012).
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In this stylized first step, substantial up-front investments are made with the
expectation of improving the technology substantially long before it is able to
generate any income in the marketplace. These investments carry a large risk, but
are not nearly the magnitude of those in the following stylized step of 'learning-
based innovation'. This latter step is equivalent to a combination of the latter two
stages in Lester & Hart: "early adoption" and "improvements-in-use." In this stage,
technology is improved and costs are reduced through experience gained, learning
and efficiencies achieved, and economies of scale.
Our model simulates the progress of one pre-commercial technology through the
two-step innovation process illustrated in Figure 7162. The primary purpose of this
model is to provide a tool for policymakers to understand the cost of incentivizing
that innovation under different circumstances. The model consists of three states
and two process phases, with three investment types. A schematic representation
of the model is given in Figure 7263. The "Initial State" is the state of the
technology at the beginning of the modeling time period. For our use here, this will
be 2012. The technology has an initial capital cost, CCInit, and an initial installed
capacity, IC(O). For our use here, we take initial installed capacity to be zero. A
technology in this state is technically ready for deployment, but is uneconomic.
From this initial state, the technology enters the "Front-end Innovation" phase. In
this phase, resources are optionally invested in research and development aimed at
reducing the capital cost prior to deployment. The abbreviation "RS," for Research
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Subsidy, denotes these investments. Here, as in the MARKAL modeling above, the
capital costs include engineering, procurement, and construction costs, owner's
costs, contingency costs, and construction interest, so reductions in any of these
factors will serve to reduce the capital cost. The technology next enters an interim
"pre-market introduction" state which is subsequent to capital-cost-reducing R&D
but prior to commercial deployment. In this state, the technology has a capital cost
of CC1, and still has an installed capacity of IC(O). If the Research Subsidy is equal
to zero, CC1 will equal CCInit. In general, CC1 is still too high for the technology to
be competitive with the incumbents.
PS
Initial State Front End n Comte
CCinitnoo CC1 Innovaton CCFin, LCc,
IC() >C(0) > PR, CCn >CFIC(O)L
IC(t), LCn
RS PRS
Figure 8: Innovation investment model schematic
The technology now enters the second phase of innovation, the learning-based (or
"learning") phase, during which costs can be reduced as a result of learning,
evolutionary advancement, and market development that take place during the
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early period of deployment. At the same time, since the technology is still
uncompetitive with the incumbents, we assume that a "Production Subsidy" PS is
required to incentivize deployment of the technology. The total production subsidy,
summed over all subsidized units, is the amount needed to reduce the cost of the
technology to the level that is competitive in the market. We conjecture that
without this subsidy private industry would be unwilling to invest in the high-risk
technology, although in some cases industry might be willing to suffer short-term
losses with the expectation of long-term profitability. The total innovation
investment includes the private funds that are also invested in these plants, and
our model can yield that information as well, but since the primary motivation for
the model is to develop tools to aid policymakers, our focus is on the subsidy costs of
incentivizing private expenditures and the decisions affecting those public funds.
We define the PS for each plant built in terms of the Levelized Cost of Electricity
(LCOE). The LCOE for the subsidized plant is derived from the capital (and fuel
and operating and maintenance) costs of the technology. The competitive LCOE is
that at which the plant produces electricity that is competitively priced relative to
the incumbent generation technologies. The capital cost that corresponds to the
competitive LCOE is what we will refer to as the competitive capital cost. In our
simplified model, only capital costs decline during the learning period; other
components of LCOE remain constant. The required production subsidy for each
megawatt-hour generated is the difference between the LCOE of the subsidized unit
and the competitive LCOE (in $/MWhr). The production subsidy is assumed to be
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required for each MWhr produced by a subsidized unit for a 20-year period. If the
long-term trend in competitive LCOE is increasing, this will be an overestimate,
and it is possible that policies would be designed to account for this effect. (Twenty
years is chosen as a likely capital recovery period; after all of the initial capital is
recovered, we assume the production subsidy is no longer necessary.) The
payments begin when the plant begins generating electricity.
The literature on learning curves provides a method for exploring this later stage of
innovation. In many applications, including electricity generation, cost reductions
related to experience are approximated by learning curves, which describe the cost
reduction as a function of cumulative installed capacity according to the
relationship:
q()((t))
P(t) = P(0)
(q(0))
Where:
P(t) = cost of technology at time t
q(t) = cumulative production at time t
b = learning coefficient
and
Progress Ratio = PR = 2
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For each doubling of cumulative installed capacity, the cost decreases by a factor of
(1-PR). For a more in-depth description of learning curves and their application to
energy technologies see Jamasb 2007 and IAEA 2000.
In our model, learning leads to a reduction in capital cost over time. In future work,
the learning process could be disaggregated so that different contributors to cost
reduction could be varied independently. This refinement would be valuable if a
relationship between specific investments and specific cost reduction mechanisms
could be established. Here we posit that some general but unspecified innovation
investment in the form of a "Progress Ratio Subsidy" (PRS) could improve (i.e.,
reduce) the progress ratio. The possibilities for achieving this will be discussed
later. Investment in the PRS is made primarily during the time period
encompassing the time of initial deployment. It would likely begin slightly before
deployment, peak with the first several projects, and then decrease over time. Here
we approximate it as an investment made at the point of initial deployment. We
will also refer to the PRS as a "learning subsidy."
To demonstrate its application, we use the two-stage innovation investment model
to investigate a topic of current interest. Positing a choice between a policy that
commits innovation investment to gigawatt-scale ALWRs or to Light Water Small
Modular Reactors (LWSMRs), we explore some characteristics of the options.
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The ALWR modeled here has CCInit = $6,000/kWe and a unit size of 1 GWe. For a
generic LWSMR we assume a 200MWe unit size and CCInit = $8,000/kWe. Here,
as in the MARKAL modeling above, the capital costs are not overnight costs; they
include engineering, procurement, and construction costs, owner's costs,
contingency costs, and construction interest, so reductions in any of these factors
will serve to reduce this capital cost. For simplicity, we assume that in both cases,
the reactors must reach a unit cost of $3440/kWe by 2025. While in general
overnight costs are likely to be lower for a larger AWR, LWRSMRs may be capable
of reaching a cost that is as low as that of an ALWR when owner's, contingency, and
construction interest costs are included due to their shorter construction times and
perhaps lower risk premiums and contingency factors.
The number of installed units required to reach the competitive cost through
learning is larger for LWRSMRs because they have a higher starting cost.
However, since they are only 200 MWe in size, the total installed capacity in GWe is
just one-fifth the number of units. To achieve a given degree of learning (doubling
of number of units, for example), the LWSMR thus requires lower total investment.
Some LWSMRs are proposed in module sizes of 50 MWe or less, and these smaller
plants would see even greater effect from their small size, requiring even lower total
capacity than our 200 MWe version if they were starting at the same CCl.
However, smaller units may have even higher capital costs per kWe, offsetting,
more or less, the benefit of their size.
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As one basis for comparing the learning phase of the LWSMR and the ALWR, we
take the capital costs at the beginning of learning phase, CC1, to be equal to CCInit
($6000/kWe for the ALWR and $8000/kWe for the LWSMR). Figure 8475 gives the
total production subsidy required to reduce the cost of each technology to
$3440/kWe as a function of the progress ratio. For these starting cost conditions,
we find that for progress ratios above 0.88, the ALWR production subsidy is less
costly, but for lower progress ratios (faster learning), the LWSMR has a lower
production subsidy. The starting capital costs and the size of each plant unit will
affect this intersection point.
180,000
160,000
9 140,000
120,000 - - LWSMR CC1
10 ,= $8000/kWe
~,80,000
-- ALWR CC1 =
60,000 $6000/kWe
40,000
20,000
0
0.91 0.89 0.87 0.85 0.83 0.81 0.79 0.77 0.75
Progress Ratio
Figure 9: Total production subsidy for LWSMR and ALWR as a function of
progress ratio
Because LWSMRs are designed to be modular, factory-built, and completely
standardized, many expect to see faster learning from LWSMRs than from ALWRs.
If this bears out, we might expect that if, say, the ALWR progress ratio is 0.90, then
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the LWSMR progress ratio might be 0.89 or less. In this case, the LWSMR
production subsidy would be lower than that for the ALWR. This result is
particularly important because it suggests that there are circumstances where
policies supporting a higher initial cost technology might be less costly over time
than those supporting a lower initial cost technology. This directly challenges a
pattern of policymaking evident during the development of nuclear power in the
U.S.; policymakers who were motivated by the goal of controlling spending and
budgets repeatedly chose only to fund demonstrations of the lowest-cost (at that
time) technologies, i.e., LWRs. At the same time, other technologies were relegated
to design studies and other conceptual efforts. While we cannot know how a
different strategy would have unfolded in that particular case, the evidence shown
in Figure 8475 suggests that in some cases, higher unit-cost technologies may
benefit more from learning-based innovation investment, while technologies that
are closer to commercially competitive costs may benefit most from R&D aimed at
reducing initial cost.
When it can be combined with relationships describing the effectiveness of
investments in RD&D and in enhanced learning on costs, a model like the one
developed here will be a powerful tool for assessing policies aimed at bringing the
costs of novel technologies to a competitive level. It will allow policymakers to
estimate the total costs of supporting one technology versus another, and of using
one mechanism versus another, or a mix of mechanisms. Such a model will also
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allow policymakers to study the timing of investment requirements, and the
distribution of the innovation investment burden. If, for example, a production
subsidy is to be provided through ratepayer funding, with those costs thus falling on
the ratepayer, policymakers might wish to cap those costs, and then determine how
to control them, either through providing an appropriate RD&D subsidy and/or
learning subsidy from another source.
This model also draws attention to an important topic for future research: learning
rate improvement. The model demonstrates the large potential savings associated
with an improved progress ratio, and suggests that efforts to improve learning could
be quite valuable. There is some evidence that policies can impact the slope of
learning curves that describe energy efficiency for demand-side technologies, but
currently there is no proof that progress ratios for production (or capital) costs can
be affected by large infusions of public resources into RD&D (Junginger et al. 2008).
However, neither is there proof to the contrary, and not all RD&D can be
characterized as an effort to enhance learning capacity. Indeed, most RD&D is not
explicitly intended to achieve that goal. Possible mechanisms for improving the
progress ratio might include developing institutions to enable better collaboration
on lessons learned without compromising commercially sensitive information. The
Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) provides a template for such an
institution. Other ways to enhance learning might be to build a coherent education
and training plan on a national level to support a growing technology, to provide
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standards and regulations earlier in the innovation process to promote
concentration of efforts to meet requirements, and to provide common experimental
space for industry use. Investments in such efforts or other creative learning
enhancements are learning investments, and it is important to determine what
options are available, to study their effectiveness, and to work to develop new
options that might be even more effective. The energy innovation system is the
vehicle for moving learning enhancements forward, and so the improvement and
cohesion of that system will assist this effort
In this work we have substantiated several characteristics of a low-carbon energy
supply transition:
1. Without unprecedented improvements in energy efficiency, the burden on the
energy supply system is massive, but strong improvements in efficiency can
do much to alleviate that.
2. Meeting low-carbon electric power demand requires large amounts of low-
carbon baseload power.
3. Total investments in the Low C02 BAU demand scenario are much higher
than anything the power industry has approached in the past, but in low
demand cases they are manageable.
4. Some portion of the investment requirement is high-risk. These are atypical
investments for the electric power industry and will demand some other
source of funds or source of risk reduction.
5. The level of high-risk investment is heavily influenced by the speed of the
learning process and by the initial cost of the low-carbon technologies.
6. Technological learning is a valuable mechanism for cost reduction and efforts
should be made to understand this phenomenon and how the energy
innovation system can impact it.
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These findings, and particularly the last two, validate our assertion that innovation
will play a crucial role in enabling a reduction in carbon emissions and,
importantly, in making that reduction affordable. The more effectively the energy
innovation system works, the more it will help to reduce the costs of meeting policy
goals. The government, then, has a strong interest in seeing the energy innovation
system operate effectively, and since the government plays a significant role in that
system it also has opportunities to influence the outcome.
U.S. Nuclear Energy Innovation Policy: Lessons from History and
Recommendations for the Future
To examine how the government can help to strengthen the energy innovation
system we reviewed U.S. energy innovation policy as it has related to nuclear
power. We identified the successes and failures, and suggested some improvements
that are both possible and necessary moving forward. Having previously assessed
the scope of the transition and the possible investment implications, here we use a
historical perspective to identify concrete actions that can be taken.
We find that a destructive pattern of erratic policy and funding discouraged private
investments and stifled innovation in the nuclear energy industry in the past. In
particular, during the earlier years, the competing priorities of military readiness
and reactor development were at odds, and military matters took precedence.
35
Later, an ideological debate between public power and private power advocates was
played out in a volley of nuclear power policies that favored first one side, then the
other, but hampered overall technology and industry development.
We find that successful and unsuccessful demonstration projects showed clear
differences. The Shippingport reactor was built successfully by just a few entities
with central management, and had a single goal - to demonstrate successful
operation of a civilian nuclear electric power plant. This simplicity of organization
and clear and focused objectives were key elements of success. The unsuccessful
and costly Clinch River Breeder Reactor project, by contrast, was organizationally
complex, with 77 utilities and three manufacturers involved. It was also saddled
with goals touching every aspect of uncertainty reduction. It was expected to
demonstrate liquid metal fast breeder reactor technology, to show that the LMFBR
was commercially competitive, to show that industry was capable of handling such a
large and complex project, and to demonstrate the feasibility of licensing the new
technology under new environmental regulations. (In the hearings, the objective
was stated as: "demonstrate the technical performance, reliability, maintainability,
safety, environmental acceptability and economic feasibility in a utility
environment of an LMFBR central electric power station (Cohen & Noll 1991)." The
success of demonstration projects in the future will be more likely when projects are
narrowly defined.
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We find that the tendency to use technology-push rather than market-pull policy
tools encouraged technology lock-in, discouraged market-driven innovation, and
generally excluded customers from the process of identifying the most promising
technologies for continued development. We recommend that rather than Congress
directing energy RD&D projects, a group of experts, customers (especially utilities),
and other stakeholders could be tasked with allocating support to projects from a
nuclear energy RD&D fund. Such a fund could be started with an electricity user
fee or some other mechanism. There has been an absence of clear goals in nuclear
energy policy, and the policy process has not been effective in generating consensus.
Most of these issues have not yet been corrected, and many can be readily
generalized to characterize the energy innovation system as a whole.
Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented four different approaches to understanding the behavior and
performance of the current energy innovation system, what it must achieve in the
future, and how it can be improved to better serve current goals. The tools
developed here can be used to judge the impacts and effectiveness of different policy
options, and they can be improved and extended in several ways.
First, to increase the value and utility of Kaya framework outputs, the development
of a way to translate the energy intensity reduction requirements implied by the
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Kaya identity into concrete changes would allow one to compare the trade-offs
between efficiency improvement and supply-side decarbonization more easily. Next,
concerning the MARKAL model, valuable future work would include developing
scenarios in which efficiency improvements can be achieved without exogenous
specification of demand reductions. It would also be worthwhile to explore
investment requirements using other modeling platforms, particularly Computable
General Equilibrium (CGE) models like the MIT Joint Program on the Science and
Policy of Global Change's Integrated Global System Modeling Framework (IGSM).
Our two-stage innovation investment model is only a modest first step at a much
larger effort, and it can benefit from many improvements, but also draws our
attention to related areas of future research. Possible improvements to the model
include the addition of discounting effects, the introduction of additional steps to the
model's simplified innovation process, greater disaggregation of subsidy options and
cost reduction mechanisms, inclusion of a more complex cost structure for the
technology in question, and better handling of the uncertainty of future electric
power markets. Further work that is highlighted by the model includes developing
models to describe the relationships between different innovation investments and
cost reduction outcomes, and studying the impacts of policies and other factors on
the learning rate in an effort to better understand learning and whether or how it
can be influenced by policies or initiatives. This research has focused primarily on
the electric power sector. Future work could extend this by looking closely at the
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transportation and industrial sectors. Expanding the historical case studies to
include coal or wind power would also be useful.
In addition to augmenting the set of tools available for energy innovation policy
analysis, we hope that this work has persuaded the reader that meeting ambitious
energy policy goals will demand innovation on a massive scale, that the bulk of the
near-term needs will require additional focus on the later stages of the innovation
process, and that both the total investment requirement and the specific need for
investment in high-risk, early post-commercialization projects will not be met
without new mechanisms that reduce policy volatility and increase market-based
incentives.
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0 Introduction
The United States government and other governments around the world have been
actively debating strategies to respond to climate change for nearly two decades.
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
produced in 1992, first formalized the international cooperation, and the Kyoto
Protocol of 1997 established the first set of concrete goals for emission reduction. In
the U.S., which did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the most concrete action came in
2008 when the House of Representatives passed the Waxman-Markey Bill (H.R.
2454).9 That legislation called for U.S. carbon emissions to decline 83% from their
level in 2005 by 2050 and for the implementation of a 'cap-and-trade' scheme to
achieve that goal. At various times President Obama has similarly called for
emission reductions of over 80% by mid-century, and in July 2009 the President
agreed with the other G8 leaders that the developed countries, including the U.S.,
should reduce their emissions 80% by 2050. These targets are loosely derived from
integrated scientific and economic assessments of the consequences of elevated
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases.
This dissertation focuses on the role of technological innovation in responding to the
climate change problem. Any major technological transition in the energy system
9 H.R. 2454: American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, Section 702. The bill did not pass the
Senate.
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will require innovation on a large scale and will thus demand large capital
expenditures associated with the innovation process. Investments will be needed
simultaneously in all stages of the innovation process for many technologies, from
basic R&D to market deployment at scale, as we discuss further in Chapter 1. The
forms that those investments will take in each case, including who will make them,
how large they will need to be, and when they will be required, are open questions.
Since energy security, climate change, energy resource depletion and major accident
consequences all involve the consideration of externalities and public goods, it is
inevitable that governments will play a role and will therefore impact investment
choices and the innovation process. The nature of government involvement can
range widely and includes direct funding of basic research and development, cost-
sharing demonstration projects with industry, enacting regulations and standards,
providing tax incentives to manufacturers, distributors, or consumers of new
products, and many other varieties of policy. The U.S. government has a mixed
track record in this area, with some well-known successes like those in satellites,
gas turbines, and jet engines, but also infamous failures like Synfuels, the Clinch
River Breeder Reactor, and most recently, the Solyndra loan guarantee (Cohen and
Noll 1991; Stephens and Leonig 2011). High-profile failures make many leaders
hesitant to lend their support to new government innovation investments; the
ability to carry out due diligence and to see where the investments fit into the
bigger picture is important for building effective policies that will garner consensus.
Government cannot innovate alone; private entities are crucial to the U.S.
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innovation system, and the additional constraints imposed on both public and
private spending by the current economic climate bolster the importance of careful
analysis of innovation policy choices.
A central aim of this dissertation is to advance the debate around energy innovation
and the response to climate change. The focus of the dissertation is on the role of
innovation in strengthening the competitiveness of low-carbon energy supply
technologies as well as technologies for improving the efficiency of energy use. One
goal is to estimate the scale, scope, and timeframe of the innovation challenge
related to climate change. The dissertation presents a broad view of the innovation
process that is not limited to the early stages of research and development but also
considers the later or 'downstream' stages of the process.
The first chapter draws on evidence from the innovation literature to argue the
need for a broad view of innovation, highlighting the importance of those steps that
follow basic R&D. The chapter also presents data on energy research, development,
and demonstration funding in the U.S. and the effectiveness of that spending.
The next three chapters contribute to the development of an analytical foundation
for energy innovation policymaking, each using a different approach that yields its
own insights and information. Chapter Two uses a simple framework based on the
Kaya Identity to explore possible pathways towards achieving the various emission
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reduction goals and to reveal the scale of the change needed to reach them. Chapter
Three Part I uses a more sophisticated energy supply and demand model to look at
similar pathways under more realistic constraints to gain insights into the capital
investment requirements implied by those goals. Chapter Three Part II introduces
an original model that simulates innovation investment in a two-stage innovation
process. It then demonstrates the operation of the model as a tool to estimate total
innovation investment requirements and to compare the relative value of "front-
end" innovation investments and later stage learning-focused investments. It uses
several stylized examples involving new nuclear power reactors. Chapter Four
takes the approach of historical analogy, using a case study of innovation policy in
the U.S. nuclear power industry to draw insights for policymaking in our current
context.
The combination of these three approaches provides a richer understanding and
foundation for thinking about energy and climate policy than any one alone can
provide.
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1 Chapter 1: Background
This chapter provides the background needed to support one of the central premises
of this dissertation - that innovation in energy technologies involves much more
than organized research and development, and that a broad view of the innovation
process is needed for effective policymaking in this area. The tendency to emphasize
R&D is reflected in the data available to measure innovation investments; spending
data on R&D are widely available, while attempts to quantify the spending in post-
R&D innovation are few. This chapter discusses the attempts that have been made,
and also provides funding trends for energy research, development, demonstration,
and venture capital in the U.S. to lend some context to the subsequent chapters.
We begin by looking at the United States innovation system as a whole, as
illustrated in Figure 101. The figure shows the wide range of participants and
institutions that contribute to innovation (Lester 2010). The public sector plays a
role in driving innovation in many instances. Innovation has greater social benefits
than benefits that accrue to the innovator, so it is in society's interest, broadly, to
promote innovation (Griliches 1958; Arrow 1962; Cohen & Noll 1991; Botazzi & Peri
2002).
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Figure 10: Components of the innovation system (Source: "An Innovation
Systems Approach," Presentation by Richard K. Lester, MIT Europe Conference October
12, 2010)
1.1 The Energy Innovation System
The U.S. energy innovation system includes all participants in both the supply of
energy and the use or consumption of energy. This thesis focuses on the players on
the energy supply side and their role in the innovation process, but the demand side
players (i.e., users) are equally important to innovation, so this chapter outlines
that group as well.
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1.1.1 The U.S. Energy Supply Industry
In describing the U.S. Energy Supply industry, a useful starting point is the U.S.
Energy Information Administration (EIA) energy flow diagram for the U.S.
economy. The flow diagram for 2009 is shown in Figure 112. The figure shows that
total U.S. energy consumption in that year was about 95 Quadrillion Btu (Quads),
about 19% of world energy consumption, and over 80% of that is derived from fossil
fuels. Coal and natural gas contribute 21% and 25% to total consumption,
respectively, and petroleum contributes 37%. Nuclear energy and renewables
contribute about 9% and 8%, respectively. Just over 30% of energy supply is
imported, and about 7% is exported. Total consumption is divided among
residential, commercial, industrial, and transportation sectors, which account for
22%, 19%, 30%, and 29% of consumption, respectively. Total consumption is the
sum of primary energy consumption, retail electricity sales, and electrical system
losses (EIA 2009).
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Includes lease condensate. 10 Includes 0.02 quadrillion Btu of coal coke net exports.
2 Natural gas plant liquids. Includes 0.12 quadrillion Btu of electricity net imports.3 Conventional hydroelectric power, biomass, geothermal, solar/photovoltaic, and wind. " Total energy consumption, which is the sum of primary energy consumption, electricity retail
4 Crude oil and petroleum products. Includes imports into the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. sales, and electrical system energy losses. Losses are allocated to the end-use sectors in
5 Natural gas, coal, coal coke, biofuels, and electricity. proportion to each sector's share of total electricity retail sales. See Note, "Electrical Systems
6Adjustments, losses, and unaccounted for. Energy Losses," at end of Section 2.
7 autnts, le , and nt for. Notes: Data are preliminary. Values are derived from source data prior to rounding for
Coal, nural gas c e elctr, a buels. publication. Totals may not equal sum of components due to independent rounding.8Natural gas only; excludes supplemental gaseous fuels. Sources: Tables 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and 2.1a.
9 Petroleum products, including natural gas plant liquids, and crude oil burned as fuel.
Figure 11: U.S. energy flow in quadrillion Btu, 2009 (Source: U.S. EIA Annual
Energy Review 2009)
Looking next at Figure 123, one can see the destination sectors for each fuel. Not
surprisingly, most petroleum goes to the transportation sector, and the
transportation sector is fueled almost exclusively by petroleum (94%). Nearly all
coal is used in the electric power sector, as is 100% of nuclear power. Renewables
contribute mostly to the electric power and industrial sectors, but impact the other
sectors as well. Natural gas is used heavily in the industrial and electric power
sectors, and provides most of the residential and commercial sectors' non-electric
needs. The electric power sector is fueled by 48% coal, 22% nuclear, 18% natural
gas, and 11% renewables, of which over 7% is hydroelectric (2009).
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Total = 94.6
Demand Sectors
I Does not include biofuels that have been blended with petroleum-biofuels are included in
"Renewable Energy."
Excludes supplemental gaseous fuels.
Includes less than 0.1 quadrillion Btu of coal coke net exports.
Conventional hydroelectric power, geothermal, solar/PV, wind, and biomass.
Includes industrial combined-heat-and-power (CHP) and industrial electricity-only plants.
6 Includes commercial combined-heat-and-power (CHP) and commercial electricity-only
plants.
' Electricity-only and combined-heat-and-power (CHP) plants whose primary business is to
sell electricity, or electricity and heat, to the public.
Note: Sum of components may not equal total due to independent rounding.
Sources: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 2009, Tables 1.3,
2.1b-2.1f, 10.3, and 10.4.
Figure 12: U.S. primary energy flow by source and sector in quadrillion
Btu, 2009 (Source: U.S. EIA Annual Energy Review 2009)
Figure 134 provides the distribution of end use electric power among the demand
sectors in the U.S. in 2009. The residential and commercial sectors consume the
most electricity, with the industrial sector close behind, but the transportation
sector is notably inconsequential.
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Figure 13: U.S. electric power generation to end use flow in billion
kilowattliours, 2009 (Source: U.S. EIA Annual Energy Review 2009)
To identify the major players in the energy system, it is necessary to look at the
structure of the electric power sector more closely. Subsequently we will examine
the resource -recovery oriented segments of the energy supply system, including the
coal, oil, natural gas, and uranium mining industries.
1. 1. 1.1 The Electric Power Sector
Before the 1990s, the U.S. electric power sector was "regulated." In this system,
Investor Owned Utilities (IOUs) primarily held regional vertically integrated
monopolies on the power market. The IOU in a region was responsible for
generation, transmission, and distribution for its service area, and consumer
electricity rates were determined by a Public Utility Commission (PUC) that
allowed the IOU to recoup its operating expenses and collect a set rate of return on
investments. Some wholesale generation also existed, and IOUs would purchase
power from wholesale generators under the regulation of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC).
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Beginning in the 1990s, in an effort to reduce electricity prices, many electricity
markets in the U.S. underwent full or partial deregulation. Some states remain
regulated, and operate as before. Others now have some form of a competitive
power market in which generation, transmission, and distribution duties are
separated, and generation is dispatched approximately in order of least cost.
Independent Power Producers (IPPs), which only generate power and do not operate
transmission or distribution, are major contributors to competitive markets. IOUs
exist either as non-generation entities that operate transmission and distribution,
or as generators on a much smaller scale than their regulated counterparts. The
transmission may be owned by an IOU, but its operation and maintenance is
generally under the control or supervision of an Independent System Operator
(ISO) or a Regional Transmission Operator (RTO) who, in the absence of a
regulated IOU, becomes the party responsible for ensuring that power supplies are
adequate and reliable (EIA 2007).
Today, IOUs generate 42% of U.S. electric power, publicly owned utilities generate
9%, cooperative utilities and federal utilities each generate 4%, and the balance is
generated by small generating companies, combined heat and power plants, and
IPPs (EIA 2007). Generating capacity in 2007 was similarly distributed among the
various power producing entities. As shown in Figure 145, 571 gigawatts of
capacity were held by utilities and 424 gigawatts by non-utilities. Of the non-utility
57
generators, "qualifying facilities" represent the very small generating plants and
combined heat and power plants. "Non-qualifying facilities," which are the IPPs,
represent the bulk of the capacity with 376 GWe (EIA Form EIA-860).
400 375 376
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m 250 - Generating Capacity:
995 GWe
0 200
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Figure 14: Total industry net summer capacity by ownership type, 2007
(Source: Energy Information Administration, Form EIA-860, "Annual Electric Generator
Report")
The system of wires and stations through which the power travels is called the
electric power grid or "the grid." It is segmented into three separate parts: the
Eastern Interconnect, the Western Interconnect, and the Texas Interconnect. There
is limited capacity to transmit power among the interconnects, so they are nearly
separate power grids. The reliability of the system and the coordination of the three
separate interconnects are planned by the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC). Regionally, ISOs and RTOs play a role in this as well.
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As for regulatory oversight, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
regulates interstate trade of electricity, while the states and their PUCs (where
they exist) regulate electric power within the state. As a result of the Energy Policy
Act of 2005, the FERC has limited authority to permit new transmission facilities.
The FERC determines whether mergers and acquisitions in the electric power
sector are permissible, oversees the development of reliability standards, and
monitors NERC, among other responsibilities (FERC 2011). The Federal Trade
Commission also plays a role in regulating financial transactions in the electric
power sector.
Environmental issues relating to electric power are regulated primarily by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Major relevant legislation includes the
Clean Air Act and The Clean Water Act. One exception lies in nuclear power, where
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is primarily responsible for permitting
new sites, licensing new plants, and monitoring the safety of operations.
1.1.1.2 Other Energy Supply Participants and Stakeholders
Other participants in the energy supply system include the companies that explore,
develop, extract, and transport coal, oil, gas, and uranium. Most of U.S. coal is
produced in Wyoming, West Virginia, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Montana (EIA
Quarterly Coal Report 2011). Most domestic oil is produced in the Gulf Coast
region, with significant amounts also produced in the Midwest, West, and Alaska.
(Most imported oil comes from Canada, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Venezuela, and
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Nigeria.) The largest natural gas-producing states are Texas, Wyoming, Oklahoma,
Louisiana, New Mexico, and Colorado. The Gulf of Mexico is another large source
(EIA Natural Gas Annual 2010). If the Marcellus shale resource becomes a major
production center, then New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia could
become significant natural gas-producing states. The U.S. has large uranium
resources, but at recent prices it has not been economical to mine. Thus, only a
small amount of the uranium used for U.S. nuclear power is domestic, with most of
it coming from Russia, Canada, Australia, and Kazakhstan (EIA 2010 Uranium
Marketing Annual Report). Several agencies and offices in the federal government
regulate mining and drilling, including the Bureau of Land Management, the Office
of Surface Mining, and the EPA. Each state also has its own regulatory regime.
Manufacturers and builders/installers of energy equipment, components and
infrastructure are also participants in the energy system. These range from solar
manufacturers and installers to the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers and
the Utility Workers Union of America. Private companies, academia, the
Department of Energy (DOE), and government laboratories all contribute to the
research and development side of the energy industry. Policymakers play a key role
as well, by incentivizing certain activities and providing policy direction and
regulations.
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1.1.2 U.S. Energy Demand Side Participants
The end users of energy are also an important part of the energy system. Their
demand drives many supply decisions and influences the development of devices
that convert energy into useful services. The energy supply side exists to serve the
end users and must conform to their needs. These users include residential,
commercial, industrial, and transportation sector entities, and the U.S. government,
particularly the Department of Defense (DOD). One of the aspects of the demand
side that makes it so vast, though, is the fact that all of the devices that are used to
consume or conserve energy are part of the system: lighting, insulation, heating and
cooling, appliances, electronics, vehicles of all kinds, industrial processes and
machines, and many others. All of the entities involved in the R&D,
manufacturing, and installation of these products are part of the demand side of the
energy system. Regulations play a very important role, and include building codes
(often unique to a town or county), Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
standards, and other energy efficiency rules. The Energy Star program is an
example of a policy action that has impacted demand-side energy use. The DOE and
EPA are both involved in this sort of action, and federal, state, and local
policymakers all contribute to setting regulations and standards that impact
consumer choices. The U.S. energy system interacts with international players as
well; we have simplified this description to domestic players, although many are
multi-national corporations.
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All of the participants mentioned above are part of the vast energy innovation
system. Within the supply side, any of the direct actors who acquire the raw
materials of energy, who refine or convert it to a useful form, and who then
transport it to the end user can drive innovations, as can the many indirect
participants like academia, research labs and organizations, and regulators. Within
the demand side, technology manufacturers, developers, researchers, and regulators
can all similarly drive innovation. Many innovations, though, and especially the
transformative innovations that are needed to radically reduce carbon emissions,
involve interaction and cooperation among the supply technology side, the demand
technology side, and the end users. Electrification of transportation, for example,
would require upgrades and major changes to the way electricity is distributed. It
would require changes to the way most vehicles are made and changes to
regulations and tax structure (a gasoline tax will not support highway maintenance
if cars don't use gasoline). And in addition, all of those changes must work for the
end user, without whose adoption the new technology can have no impact. This
complex interplay forms the energy innovation system; the energy innovation
process is laid out in more detail in the next section.
1.2 The Energy Innovation Process
The preceding sections described most of the major participants in the energy
innovation system. Here we will look at the process of energy innovation, and
simplify the picture to the innovation process shown in Figure 156. This breaks the
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process down into four steps.1 4 First, "Creating Options," which encompasses basic
R&D, the preliminary exploration of new possibilities for products, services, and
processes, and early prototypes and demonstrations. Second, "Demonstrating
Viability," which includes pre-commercial activities like full-scale demonstration
projects, assessing the regulatory environment and the market environment, and
reducing the risks of investing in the new technologies. Third, "Early Adoption,"
the phase in which a product is first deployed in a market setting. And fourth,
"Improvements-in-Use," a phase that may continue for the life of the technology,
and involves evolutionary improvements, learning-by-doing, and cost reductions.
This linear model is a simplification, and it is important to note that developments
in each stage can influence all of the others through feedback. It is also important
to note that this model does not correspond exactly to the usual taxonomy of
research, development, demonstration, and deployment. R&D, for example, is
closely associated with creating options, but can also be a major contributor to the
other stages of the process, including improvements-in-use (Lester & Hart 2012).
10 For a fuller description of this four-stage model of the energy innovation process, see Unlocking
Energy Innovation: How America Can Build a Low-Cost, Low-Carbon Energy System By Richard K.
Lester and David M. Hart. The MIT Press, 2012.
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Creating options Demonstrating Early adoption Improvements-
"Ideation" viability Market/regulatory In-use
Laboratory Market testing development Continued cost
research Debugging Manufacturing reductions
Development and System integration Complementary Unrestricted
proof of concept Risk reduction infrastructure competition
Prototyping deployment Leaming-by-doing/Demonstration at Lusing
Pilot-scale commercial scale mptiton Carbon pricing
Seed stage Scale: Learning-by-doing/ Evolutionary
Scale: $10M-1B using advances
$10OK-100M Economies of scale Sae Up to
Scale: up to $100. of billions
$10s of billions
Figure 15: Steps in the energy innovation process (Source: Lester & Hart 2012)
Another important characteristic of the innovation process is the increasing level of
investment required in each stage. In the first stage, the risks are quite high, but
the amount of money involved is relatively small, and the public sector is able to
fund projects that are large enough to have a substantial impact on technological
progress. The second and third stages are the most difficult to fund. They are very
high risk in many cases, and the investment required is often larger than most
energy companies' total balance sheet. The public sector generally does not fully
fund many projects in these stages due to limited availability of funds and
disagreement over appropriate use of tax revenue. Some demonstrations might be
possible, but the government is more likely to be able to supplement and try to
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attract private investment, rather than substitute for it. The government can also
assist in these stages by providing a stable and navigable regulatory system. In the
fourth stage, much of the focus is on cost reduction, and the risks are reduced
compared with the other stages (Lester & Hart 2012). In the realm of low-carbon
energy technologies that are generally more costly than their fossil fueled
competitors, the key risk at this stage (and which exists in all stages) is unstable
government policy. If a technology relies on a particular market incentive, like a
carbon price, and there is a lack of confidence in the longevity of that policy, then
there is necessarily a lack of confidence in the continuing competitiveness of that
technology.
The large scale of the deployment stage is the subject of the next chapter. There we
use a simple framework to explore the new capacity that would need to be installed
to meet certain GHG reduction goals, with a focus on the electric power sector. The
third chapter assesses the investment requirements for early adoption and large-
scale deployment of electricity generation technologies. First, though, a review of
the relevant literature will examine the role of those 'downstream' stages in the
innovation process. Also, a review of the recent investment in energy research,
development, and demonstration (RD&D) in the U.S. will set the stage for exploring
the costs of early adoption and improvements-in-use.
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1.3 Innovation Investment Beyond R&D
Many studies use R&D spending as a proxy for investment in innovation (see, for
example, Cohen 1995; Lanjouw and Schankerman 1999; Margolis and Kammen
1999; Popp 1999; Botazzi and Peri 2003; Ulku 2007). However, investment in
innovation does not end with R&D. A new technology, for our purposes, must
successfully enter the market to qualify as an innovation (Fri 2003). This means
that after research and development, the technology must be demonstrated
commercially and then deployed at scale in the marketplace. Wide deployment of
technologies also requires significant investment in any number of areas, possibly
including training, manufacturing, transport, and engineering the integration of the
technology into existing infrastructure. Learning-by-doing is also a crucial step in
the innovative process through which costs are reduced and manufacturing,
installation, and usage procedures can be standardized (Sagar and van der Zwaan
2005).
Nabil Sakkab, in Research Technology Management (2006) argues that the spending
on R&D does not accurately reflect the investment in innovation because the costs
of development and commercialization must be included to show the whole picture.
Sakkab also describes the importance of the open innovation model in bringing
about results. In the open innovation model, innovative ideas are acquired
externally in addition to internally. Joint ventures become more important,
technologies are licensed and purchased, and networks are maximally exploited for
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ideas and technologies (Chesbrough 2006). This overlaps with the concept of
technology leveraging, which is also a part of modern business innovation
strategies. Investments in external innovation may not be reflected in R&D
budgets, but should be considered investment in innovation (Drake et al. 2006).
In the same article, Ronald Jonash of Innovation Management Incorporated
explores what constitutes business innovation investment. He contends that
components of innovation investment include:
- "Product development projects"
- "Strategic innovation platform investments"
- "New venture and business model investments"
- "New technology or IP investments"
- "Investments in new partners and sources"
- "Collaborative investments"
Jonash does not list all components, but states broadly that "business innovation is
defined best as a system that incorporates both value creation and value capture
(through new products and services, new technologies and market applications, and
new processes and business models), and that operates from concept to customer
across the extended enterprise (Drake et al. 2006)." One major flaw in associating
innovation investment with R&D spending is that the latter does not carry the
innovation from concept to customer. It may cover concept to prototype, or concept
to demonstration, but a large gap still remains from that point to the customer.
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Another flaw in the method is that it does not account for external sources of
innovation or technology leveraging.
Here we treat research, development, demonstration, commercial introduction, and
learning-by-doing as fundamental parts of the innovation process. All of these are
needed to bring an innovation to scale in the marketplace. Thus, investments in all
of these stages contribute to innovation, and R&D investments are but a fraction of
the total.
1.4 Ineffectiveness of Spending on R&D Alone
1.4.1 In General
R&D spending data are collected by governments worldwide, and thus are a very
convenient proxy for spending on innovation. As a predictor of innovation
productivity, however, R&D spending often comes up short. The Booz Allen
Hamilton 2005 Global Innovation 1,000 survey and study found no correlation
between R&D spending and growth, profitability, or shareholder returns
(Jaruzelski et al., 2005). The study of firms that spend the most on R&D revealed
that companies with the highest and lowest R&D-to-sales ratios were generally less
successful than those in the middle of the pack. Thus, it is possible to spend too
much or too little on R&D, and other factors play an important role in innovation
success. The authors found that the key attributes of the most successful
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innovators were that they had an innovation program that aligned well with their
overall corporate strategy and that they were more focused on their customers and
on market needs than other innovators. Companies that directly involved their
customers in their product development process had two times the return on assets
of other companies in the survey. Since all survey participants were selected for
their high R&D investments, this finding suggests that companies that do not
achieve high returns on their R&D investments are not adequately emphasizing the
needs of the market and the commercialization of their products (Jaruzelski et al.
2005). This lesson will be key to successful innovation of energy technologies.
Another study of 160 firms over nine years found similarly that R&D expenditures
did not correlate well with business success (Wolff 2007). On the other hand,
research by the Monitor Group and Innovation Management Inc. (IMI) showed that
there is a correlation between the level of innovation investment and earnings
growth and shareholder returns (Drake et al., 2006). To estimate innovation
investment and reach this conclusion, the authors looked to product development
projects, new venture and business model investments, new technology and IP
investments, and investments in new partners and sources, among other things.
1.4.2 In Energy
Since our interest lies specifically in energy innovation, it is instructive to look at
previous studies of R&D not only in general, but also in energy technologies. Sagar
and van der Zwaan (2005) studied the effect of public R&D in improving energy
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efficiency and reducing carbon intensity of energy in seven countries from 1975-
1999. The authors do not find that a higher R&D intensity results in better energy
efficiency or carbon intensity improvements. The authors argue that this is not
surprising, though, in light of the fact that energy R&D was not focused on either of
those goals for most of the time period in question. In the early years, energy
efficiency was a significant goal for R&D, and in recent years CO 2 reduction has
been a significant goal, but over the 25-year period, neither has been the dominant
goal of research. The authors offer the alternative explanation that public R&D has
little impact on the energy markets, but indicate that they see this as the less likely
explanation.
The authors use their results to explore the importance of non-R&D factors in the
innovation process. They point out that bringing a new energy technology to the
market often requires the elimination or mitigation of significant market barriers
that are not faced in many sectors. For energy technology, the authors consider this
action a part of the deployment step, and suggest that government action may well
be necessary. The authors then look at the process of learning-by-doing, pointing
out that cost reductions can be achieved through learning-by-manufacturing,
learning-by-copying (other firms), learning-by-operating, and learning-by-
implementing. Using photovoltaic (PV) technology as an example, they illustrate
each type of learning. The authors conclude that investments in learning are
crucial to successful market penetration, and that resources need to be divided
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between R&D and deployment or learning, not simply allocated solely to R&D. A
small increase in the learning rate can lead to large savings, and so the R&D and
learning-by-doing processes should be in good communication to maximize
feedbacks (Sagar and van der Zwaan 2005).
Foxon, et al. (2005) undertook the task of identifying the innovation systems for
renewable energy technologies in the UK. The authors found that innovation in
onshore wind is largely through learning-by-doing and international knowledge-
sharing networks. Offshore wind, on the other hand, is in a pre-commercial stage,
and so funding and support for demonstration projects are the primary drivers of
innovation. Innovation in marine power is still mainly in the R&D phase, but some
work towards demonstration has been initiated. The authors found that the
demonstration investment system seems to be stalling, and companies are finding
themselves "stuck" in the R&D phase without enough private financing to move
forward. In the PV industry, innovation is through learning-by-doing, except for
novel PV materials such as thin films and roof tiles, which are still undergoing basic
and applied R&D. Innovation in the biomass sector is focused on the development
of cleaner-burning fuels and techniques, and is mostly concentrated in the
demonstration phase, with some early commercial activities. Hydrogen fuel for
vehicles is still in the R&D stage, and new combined heat and power applications
are in demonstration and commercial phases (Foxon et al., 2005).
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The current literature on investment in innovation clearly show that R&D is used
too casually as a proxy for innovation investment, and that it is insufficient for
predicting the success of bringing a technology from the lab to the market. Some
work has been done on identifying the other components of innovation investment,
and it is clear that this should include the pre-commercial, deployment, and
learning-by-doing stages. It will also be necessary to include investments in
external innovation sources, such as licensing, venture capital and joint ventures,
the purchase of IP, and idea networks.
1.5 Recent RD&D Funding Trends in the United States
All of this is not to diminish the importance of basic and applied research and
development. Though not sufficient on its own, it is a crucial part of the process. It
is useful to have an understanding of the past trends in R&D spending to gain some
perspective on the current levels. The next several sections provide an overview of
energy research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) funding over the last
thirty years. The overview of energy RD&D funding begins with a description of the
changing budget of the Department of Energy, followed by a detailing of what is
known about the RD&D funding of private industry, and finally a summary of the
contribution of venture capital. In each of these cases we are referring to the source
of funding, not necessarily to the party performing the work. The DOE budget is
funding provided by the DOE, but some of it is transferred to private industry and
academia. These funds are not part of the industry-funding figure, which only
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captures what industry directly funds. Industry and DOE funding should capture
well over 90% of the funding for energy RD&D.1" The remainder is split among non-
profit organizations, universities, and state and local governments. While that
spending may be the object of future information-gathering, it is outside the scope of
this effort. We include venture capital in this discussion because it also contributes
to innovation. Some VC funding is used for R&D, but it is also used for
demonstration and commercialization efforts that are key parts of the innovation
process.
1.5.1 Federal RD&D Funding Trends
Total federal spending on research and development has been increasing since the
1950s. However, over that period the fraction of federal spending dedicated to
energy RD&D has varied widely. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, energy
spending rose to an all-time high of about 12% of total federal RD&D, and
subsequently fell to its lowest-ever share of 1% of total RD&D spending in 2010.
Meanwhile, spending on defense RD&D has maintained a fairly steady portion of
total funding of between 50% and 70% since the 1960's, while health RD&D has
increased dramatically from 3% of the total in the 1950's to as high as 24% in the
early 2000's. Energy RD&D spending has been slowly increasing since 2000, and
may increase further if the U.S. redoubles its efforts to reduce greenhouse gas
" Overall, the federal government and industry provide more than 90% of R&D funding. In the
1950's and 60's, they provided 98%. In 2000, that had fallen to 94%. By 2004, universities and non-
profits each accounted for 3% of funds ($8.2 billion and $8.6 billion respectively), with state and local
governments providing 1% (National Science Foundation 2012).
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emissions and to increase energy security. Figure 167 through Figure 2011
illustrate these trends.
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Figure 16: Federal RD&D spending: total and energy,
National Science Foundation, 2010)
1955 to 201112
12 2009 figure is preliminary, 2010 is proposed. Excludes 2009 funding from the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA).
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Since 1977, cumulative federal spending on energy RD&D has favored fossil fuels,
which have captured 27% of the funding, followed by renewables with 20%, fission
with 19%, fusion with 16%, and efficiency with 15% as shown in Figure 189
(Gallagher et al. 2010). "
13 2009 figure is preliminary, 2010 is proposed. Excludes 2009 funding from the ARRA.
1 Throughout this section on RD&D spending, monetary values are in constant dollars of-the year
2000 unless noted otherwise. Inflation adjustments have been made using the GDP deflator
provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm.
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15 Excludes 2009 funding from the ARRA
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Energy's share of the total federal RD&D budget tripled between 1971 and 1979
during the administrations of Nixon, Ford, and Carter (GAO 1987). The Reagan
administration adopted the philosophy that as energy technologies approach
commercialization, private businesses should take on a progressively larger share of
the funding requirement. While the federal government supported the full range of
activities from basic research through commercialization of energy technologies
during the 1970s, the 1980s saw a shift towards supporting "long-term, high-risk,
high-payoff' projects in the earlier stages of RD&D. This shift was not applied
uniformly across technologies, most notably being abandoned for nuclear fission,
but on the whole there was increased spending in Basic Energy Sciences and a
16 Excludes 2009 funding from the ARRA
17 Excludes 2009 funding from the ARRA
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significant reduction in support for demonstration projects. In the 1980s, the DOE's
synthetic fuels program was absorbed into the Synthetic Fuels Corporation, but
funding for the Synthetic Fuels Corporation was eliminated in 1984. Coal research
shifted towards advanced technologies, and shale oil demonstration projects were
canceled in favor of "fundamental research and experiments (GAO 1987)."
Geothermal, wind, and solar funding also showed this distinct shift towards longer-
term projects of a more fundamental nature as the DOE phased out demonstration
projects in the areas of renewable energy and conservation (GAO 1987).
Nuclear energy appears to have been treated differently. Once Congress
terminated the Clinch River Breeder Reactor project in 1984, nuclear fission
research was actually focused more on near-term issues while advanced technology
RD&D was scaled back. Light Water Reactor (LWR) safety research was given a
high priority, partially in response to concerns following the nuclear accident at
Three Mile Island in 1979. Additionally, increasing fuel burn-up and improving the
licensing process were major portions of the LWR RD&D program (GAO/RCED-87-
26 Energy R&D).
Energy RD&D spending fell during the Clinton administration and reached its
lowest point in 1998. Between 1990 and 1998, spending on nuclear fission RD&D
was cut by more than 98%, only leaving support for university reactors. At the
same time, fossil funding was cut by 79%. This was accomplished primarily by
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cutting coal RD&D and eliminating the Clean Coal Technology demonstration
program. Funding for petroleum and natural gas, on the other hand, actually
increased during the same period. Basic Energy Sciences (BES) were cut by only
3%, but total energy technology RD&D was cut by 48%. From 1990 to 1999, fusion
RD&D was cut by 43%, but efficiency and renewable energy funding were both
increased by 111%. Renewable funding increases were seen primarily in biomass
and wind (Gallagher 2010).
Since 1998, funding for energy RD&D has been increasing steadily and has
rebounded to 1980s-era funding levels (approximately equal to the 1983 budget in
energy technology), but with a mix that includes more funding for basic energy
sciences, renewables, efficiency, hydrogen, and fossil technologies, and relatively
reduced funding for nuclear fission and fusion. In the 2011 DOE Budget request,
BES funding is up 218% from its 1983 level, and 95% from its 1988 level. Nuclear
fission funding is 55% lower than the 1983 level and fusion is 58% lower, while
efficiency funding is up 196%, renewables are up 56%, and fossil is up 36%.
Electricity Transmission and Distribution is a new program, as are the hydrogen
program and the Advanced Research Projects Authority - Energy (ARPA-E).
Relative to 1998, energy RD&D funding in all categories is up (Gallagher, 2010).
Compared with 1978 funding, total energy technology RD&D in the 2011 request is
down 49%, with fission, fossil, and renewables down disproportionately by 77%,
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73%, and 45%, respectively. Fusion is down 59%, and efficiency funding has
actually increased by 60% since 1978 (Gallagher, 2010).
The government data show unequivocally that public spending on energy RD&D
has fallen drastically since the last major energy price shock following the Iranian
Revolution in 1979. More recently funding has been on the rise, with efficiency
spending restored to its previous highs and now surpassing them, but total energy
R&D is still quite low, and accounts for only about 1% of the total federal R&D
budget.
An anomaly in energy RD&D funding came with the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), which injected a burst of economic stimulus in
the forms of tax benefits, entitlements, grants, contracts and loans. Of the
estimated cost of $787 Billion, which was increased to $840B in 2011, $43B was
allocated to the Department of Energy for distribution to energy efficiency and
renewable energy research and investment and infrastructure projects. That
amounts to more than the DOE's total annual budget (about $24B in 2008). An
additional estimated $65B was made available in energy-related tax credits, and
more funds were made available for energy loan guarantees. While the ARRA
provided a large spike in funding that continues to be distributed several years
hence, it is one-time a funding initiative that is not expected to be an ongoing source
of support for energy RD&D and investment.
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Whether funding for energy RD&D expands as environmental and security issues
are addressed or contracts in the strained economic climate, efforts should be made
to determine the most effective uses for the funding, and to learn from the successes
and failures of the past.
1.5.2 Private Industry RD&D Funding Trends
Industrial funding for energy RD&D increased with federal funding during the late
70s and early 80s, then fell even more drastically than federal funding, and recently
has begun to rise again. Most industrial sectors with significant energy use will
engage in some energy RD&D, whether it is geared towards improving the final
product or service, or towards improving the manufacturing process used in making
the product. Unfortunately, reporting of RD&D spending is only available for
public companies on 10-k filings, and RD&D is not disaggregated to isolate energy-
related spending. The most comprehensive source for industrial energy RD&D
across all sectors is the National Science Foundation's survey of industrial RD&D.
However, the NSF surveys only a cross-section of companies, and there has been
considerable change over the years in the make-up of that cross-section. In 1991,
the NSF's statistical method was altered significantly so that data taken prior to
1991 cannot be directly compared with data taken after 1991. There is considerable
uncertainty regarding the accuracy of the responses to the surveys overall, and even
more uncertainty regarding reported energy RD&D, since that level of detail is
optional. A recent study at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science
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and International Affairs has laid the groundwork for an improved energy
innovation survey, but a statistically significant sample with full energy innovation
spending data will not be available for some time. It will be most useful once trends
can be observed (Anadon et al. 2011).18 Caveats aside, the NSF data are the best
that are publicly available at this time, and are used widely in the published
literature.
Figure 21: NSF survey res
1973-1991 (Source: NSF 2008)
ults - industry spending on total energy RD&D,
18,"Transforming U.S. Energy Innovation" by Lauren Diaz Anadon, Matthew Bunn, Gabriel Chan,
Melissa Chan, Charles Jones, Ruud Kempener, Audrey Lee, Nathaniel Logar, & Venkatesh
Narayanamurti performed a Survey of Energy Innovation. They surveyed companies involved in
energy to gauge their involvement and investment in energy-related innovation. They found that
16% of businesses are involved in energy innovation and about 10% either perform, fund, or direct
energy innovation. They estimate that this may be an overestimate due to the nature of the sample,
but at least 1.1% to 3.7% of businesses are involved in energy innovation in the U.S.
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Figure 22: NSF survey results - industry spending on total energy RD&D,
1992-2007 (Source: NSF 2008)
As shown in Figure 2112 and Figure 2213, the NSF data show that industry
funding reached its peak in 1980, and subsequently declined (along with DOE
spending) until 1998 when it began to rise again. Interestingly, fossil energy RD&D
spending continued to increase to 1985 before declining until 1989. Spending
increased again during the Clean Coal Technology (CCT) program until government
CCT funding began to decline in 1991. Until 2002, industry spending on fossil
RD&D declined, but has since risen sharply. Industrial RD&D for nuclear energy
has shown a severe drop in funding since the late 1970s, and while the data from
1992 through 2003 are sparse, it is clear that there was no significant increase in
that time period. Beginning in 2005, nuclear energy RD&D began to pick up and
was still increasing in 2007. Industry RD&D spending on Geothermal, Solar,
Conservation and Utilization (GSCU) shows the same general trend in Figure 2718
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and Figure 2819, although the data are even sparser and the recent spike in
spending has not appeared in the case of GSCU.
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Figure 23: NSF survey results - industry spending on fossil energy RD&D,
1973-1991 (Source: NSF 2008)
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Figure 25: NSF survey results - industry spending on nuclear energy
RD&D, 1973-1991 (Source: NSF 2008)
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Figure 26: NSF survey results - industry spending on nuclear energy
RD&D, 1992-2007 (Source: NSF 2008)
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Figure 28: NSF survey results - industry spending on geothermal, solar,
conservation and utilization energy RD&D, 1992-2007 (Source: NSF 2008)
RD&D spending by energy-related companies provides another metric for gauging
the trends in RD&D spending on energy. This measure will miss a large part of
energy RD&D, since many companies in other categories (e.g. consumer goods,
electronics, automotive, manufacturing) also perform RD&D that impacts energy
through conservation, demand and other avenues. However, the RD&D measured
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is essentially purely energy RD&D; very little RD&D performed by energy
companies should pertain to other sectors, and in that sense, it does reliably
illuminate the behavior of a subset of industrial energy RD&D. Each year, the
Energy Information Administration surveys a subset of the major energy-producing
companies in the U.S. for a wide range of financial and production information,
including RD&D expenditures. The reported RD&D spending by companies
surveyed is shown for years 1977-2009 in Figure 2920 below. The trend is similar
to the NSF finding for all industries, and shows a decline even more severe than
that of DOE's energy RD&D spending, though with some recovery after 2004.
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Figure 29: EIA FRS survey results - internal company RD&D for a cross-
section of major U.S. energy producing companies (Source: EIA)
In addition to looking at broad energy industry trends, we can explore data that are
available in several industry segments. First we present RD&D funding trends in
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the utility industry in the U.S. and abroad, and then recent trends in oil and gas
companies.
As shown in Figure 3021, independent utility operators experienced a peak in R&D
spending in the early 1990s that declined in the latter half of the decade.
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Figure 30: Total RD&D expenditures by investor owned utilities from 1989-
1997 (Source: Sanyal and Cohen 2005)
Many studies agree that deregulation of utilities typically has a negative impact on
the research and development spending of utilities (Jamasb and Pollitt 2008;
Sanyal and Cohen 2005; Sterlachinni 2006; Dooley 1997; GAO 1996). According to
a U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, R&D by investor-owned
utilities was level for ten years prior to 1993, but then fell by one-third between
1993 and 1996. According to the report, "in 1992, the National Association of
Regulatory Utility Commissioners recommended that utilities devote 1 percent of
their revenues to R&D (GAO 1996)." In a survey of 112 IOU's that performed 93%
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of all non-federal utility RD&D at the time, the GAO found that only 6 of them
spent as much as 1% on R&D in 1993. In 1994, the average R&D intensity among
the IOU's was 0.3%. The most recent NSF survey data show that the R&D
intensity of utilities in the U.S. has fallen even further, to about 0.1% from 1999
through 2003, except in 2001 when it was less than 0.05%. This marked utilities
with the lowest R&D intensity of any industry surveyed by the NSF. The survey
attempts to represent all for-profit U.S. companies that perform R&D, so the R&D
intensity of the sample is higher than that of the entire economy. The overall
average among the sample companies was 3.2% in 2003, and the industry with the
lowest intensity after utilities was "nonmanufacturing transportation and
warehousing" with a 0.4% R&D intensity in 2003.
The RD&D intensity of utilities in other developed countries has also been
decreasing, although it is not generally as low as in the U.S., as shown in Figure
3122. Kansai Electric Power and Tokyo Electric Power are the two largest
Japanese utilities in a market that has been moving towards limited deregulation,
and Electricity de France is one of the largest utilities in the world and is still 85%
owned by the government of France.
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Figure 31: RD&D intensity of a selection of large global electric utilities
(Source: European Commission Joint Research Center "The 2010 EU Industrial
R&D Investment Scoreboard" 2011)
As illustrated in Figure 3223, in the past fifteen years the RD&D intensity of some
of the world's largest integrated oil and gas companies has also been falling rapidly
until the last year or two when spending increased. Oil service companies and
other energy companies show similar trends. Schlumberger's RD&D intensity has
fallen by more than 50% since 1992 (see Figure 3324) (European Commission Joint
Research Center 2011).
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Figure 32: RD&D intensity of major integrated oil and gas companies
(Source: European Commission Joint Research Center "The 2010 EU Industrial
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Commission Joint Research Center "The 2010 EU Industrial R&D Investment
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While the data on industrial RD&D funding are less comprehensive than the public
spending data, disparate sources show decreasing investment over time in private
energy research with a small increase more recently. Many government policies,
including the RD&D agenda, are set with the hope that they will induce private
spending. Until there is a reliable source of industry data, it will be difficult to
know in the short term whether those policies are having any impact. Thus, an
effort to improve the NSF dataset would be well-founded, and a recent survey
performed at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs contributes to
progress in this area (Anadon et al. 2011)
1.5.3 Venture Capital Funding Trends
Venture Capital (VC) funding in the United States has a relatively short history.
The first VC fund was founded in 1946, but VC funding was very limited until 1979
legislation allowed pension funds to invest in venture capital with some limitations.
Venture capital funding increased in the 1980s and 1990s and has become a major
contributor to innovation funding in the U.S. today. It primarily funds the later
part of the "Creating Options" stage and makes contributions to all aspects of the
"Demonstrating Viability" stage of the energy innovation process. It may extend to
the first parts of "Early Adoption," but generally no further.
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Figure 34: Venture capital fundraising and disbursements (log scale), 1965-
1999 (Source: Kortum and Lerner 2000)
Kortum and Lerner (2000) find that private RD&D funding and venture capital
funding are close to perfect substitutes, so VC funding is treated here as an input to
innovation on equal footing with industry funding. Total venture investment
reached $103 billion in 2000 during the tech boom, and has since fallen
dramatically, with a value of $21.8 billion in 2010. Venture capital investments
have historically been concentrated in electronics, software, life sciences, and
biotechnology, but energy technology is capturing an increasing share of VC
investment on average, reaching 9.4% in 2006 as shown in Figure 3526. In the
same year, total VC funding for energy rose above $2.4 billion - more than the total
energy technology RD&D budget for the DOE in the same year.
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Figure 35: U.S. venture capital investments in energy (Source: Nth Power, LLC
and Clean Edge, Inc.)
While energy VC investment data could not be found for the years after 2006,
'clean-tech' data are available. Since clean-tech is largely energy-related, it is
informative
Figure 36:
to look at the most recent trends shown in Figure 3627.
Clean-Tech venture capital investments in U.S.-based
companies (Source: Clean Edge "Clean Energy Trends 2011")
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Venture capital support for new energy technologies is a new entrant in the area of
energy RD&D, but it has quickly become a large source of funding. The unique
management structure and versatility of venture capital firms make them a group
that should be given close consideration when energy policies are being fashioned.
This chapter has established that the later stages of the innovation process should
not be neglected. But in order to understand the task for the "early adoption" and
"improvements-in-use" stages of the innovation system, one needs to understand
the scale of the energy transition required to meet CO 2 reduction goals. The next
chapter will provide that context using a simple framework of energy supply and
demand. We know that the later stages of innovation inherently require more
spending than the earlier stages (see Figure 156). While we have some
understanding of the costs of R&D, it is instructive to look at the investment
requirements of the energy transition. Chapter 3 informs that discussion.
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2 Chapter 2: Quantifying the Impact of Proposed
Carbon Emission Reductions on the U.S. Energy
Infrastructure
2.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the implications for the U.S. energy infrastructure of the
targets for greenhouse gas emission reductions recently considered by the U.S.
government. The Waxman-Markey legislation passed by the U.S. House of
Representatives in 2009 called for U.S. carbon emissions to decline 83% from their
level in 2005 by 2050.19 At various times President Obama has similarly called for
emission reductions of over 80% by mid-century, and in July 2010 the President
agreed with the other G8 leaders that the developed countries, including the U.S.,
should reduce their emissions 80% by 2050. These targets are loosely derived from
integrated scientific and economic assessments of the consequences for the earth's
climate of elevated atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. The problem of
mitigating greenhouse gas emissions will affect all countries. Here we examine the
scale of what would be required for the U.S. to achieve carbon emission reductions
in this general range.
19
H.R. 2454: American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, Section 702. The bill did not pass in the
Senate.
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It is widely recognized that an effective strategy for reducing greenhouse gas
emissions must focus on the energy sector, whose releases of carbon dioxide account
for 80% of all U.S. anthropogenic GreenHouse Gas (GHG) emissions. There are
two essential elements of a strategy for reducing energy-related carbon emissions:
first, improving the energy productivity or, equivalently, reducing the 'energy
intensity' of the economy; and second, 'decarbonizing' the nation's energy supply
infrastructure - that is, reducing the carbon intensity of the energy system by
moving away from primary reliance on petroleum for transportation and high
carbon fuels for electricity generation towards alternative transportation fuels and
low or zero-carbon electrical generating technologies. It is evident that these two
elements of an overall strategy are interdependent. The more rapid the transition
to low carbon energy supplies, the less we will need to rely on energy end-use
efficiency gains to achieve a given emission reduction target, and vice versa.
There is in fact a fixed relationship between the two if a target for economic output
is specified together with the carbon reduction goal. The relationship between these
four factors - carbon emissions, carbon intensity of the energy system, energy
intensity of the economy, and economic output - is given by the Kaya identity2
20
Climate change avoidance strategies must also reduce emissions of potent non-carbon greenhouse
vases such as methane and nitrous oxide.
The relationship between these factors was first pointed out by the Japanese engineer Yoichi Kaya
(Kaya, Y., "Impact of Carbon Dioxide Emission Control on GNP Growth: Interpretation of Proposed
Scenarios", Paper presented to the IPCC Energy and Industry Subgroup, Response Strategies
Working Group, Paris, 1990 (mimeo).)
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C= x x x P1)
where C = carbon emitted in a given time period, E = energy consumed in that time
period, Y = economic output in that period, and P = population, and where, for
convenience, economic output is expressed as output per capita. This ratio, Y/P, is
the broadest measure of productivity in an economy, and is sometimes used to
measure national prosperity. Equation (1) applies to any specified geographical
unit, from a small region to a country to the world as a whole. The differential form
of the identity relates the fractional rate of change of carbon emissions to the rate of
change of each of the four factors, i.e., carbon intensity, energy intensity, economic
productivity, and population:
aC _(C /E) a(E /Y) +(Y /P) +P
-+ + +- 2C (C/E) (E/Y) (Y/P) P
Alternative and even simpler differential forms are
aC _a(C/Y) 8(Y/P) aP
- d / )+ + -- (2a)
C (C/Y) (Y/P) P
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aC = (C /E) +(E/P) 8P
-+ + -(b
C (C/E) (E/P) + P
where (C/Y) indicates the carbon emissions per unit of economic output, and (E/P) is
the energy use per capita.
As equation (2) indicates, it is a straightforward exercise in carbon, energy, and
economic growth accounting to identify energy intensity and decarbonization
scenarios that could, in combination, meet specified targets for carbon emission
reduction and economic growth. In this chapter we present a simple framework for
investigating these scenarios for the U.S. economy over the period from 2008 to
2050. Details of the framework are provided in Appendix I, and the results are
discussed below. These results come with an important proviso. Whether any
scenario satisfying the basic identity could actually be realized in practice cannot be
determined from this kind of exercise, since this depends upon interactions between
the energy sector and the rest of the economy that require much more complex
modeling to describe. But the identity is nonetheless useful in indicating possible
pathways towards achieving the various emission reduction goals and in suggesting
the scale of the change needed to reach them. Equally important, it shows what is
not possible, and as such is useful in revealing plans and strategies that are
incapable of achieving their intended result.
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2.2 Scenarios
In this paper we take as the target for aggregate U.S. energy-related carbon
emissions in 2050 an 85% reduction relative to the 2005 level. This is slightly above
the Waxman-Markey goal and is equivalent to an 80% reduction relative to U.S.
emissions in 1990 - a goal that has been advocated by President Obama and others
in the past. It corresponds to an average rate of reduction in carbon emissions of
4.18% per year. These targets are derived from integrated scientific and economic
analyses of the consequences of elevated levels of greenhouse gas emissions for the
earth's climate. In particular, the 2007 U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) estimated in its Fourth Assessment Report that to avoid the chance
of 4.5"C or greater warming, the global CO 2 concentrations must be kept below
double the pre-industrial levels. In such a scenario, industrialized countries are
called upon to reduce emissions by as much as 90% compared with 1990 (IPCC
2007).
Here we only consider emissions in the U.S; however, the global context has
important implications for energy intensity reductions. Energy intensity of the
economy can be reduced by increasing the energy efficiency of processes or by
shifting economic activity towards less energy intensive activities. It is important to
note that energy intensity reductions achieved by moving energy-intensive
activities out of the U.S. to economies with equal or greater carbon intensity will not
reduce global emissions and may even exacerbate them. In the recent past, much of
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the energy intensity reduction in the U.S. has come from changing economic
composition; in particular, the U.S. economy has shifted towards services, which are
less energy intensive, and away from manufacturing, which is more energy
intensive and has been migrating to international locations. Here we limit energy
intensity improvements, requiring that they come from energy efficiency gains
rather than changes in the composition of the GDP. In reality, then, even
maintaining the recent trends in energy intensity reduction will require
accelerating efficiency gains. For the remainder of this chapter, we will use the
terms energy efficiency and energy intensity interchangeably, but they are not, in
general, equivalent.
We next consider three alternative decarbonization scenarios, described below. The
scenarios cover the entire economy, but the short descriptions focus on the electric
power sector.
Scenario 1 ("All Hands on Deck"): In this scenario, the electricity sector in 2050
relies to a much greater extent than today on low carbon sources of supply. Solar
and wind expand rapidly, and by 2050 each is providing 20% of total electricity
supply. The obstacles that would today stand in the way of such a scenario are
assumed to be overcome; reliability problems associated with heavy dependence on
these intermittent sources are resolved with economic electricity storage and other
advanced grid technologies that are not available today. Nuclear power is also
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assumed to provide 20% of total electricity supply (the same percentage as today,
but with many more reactors producing much more electricity in absolute terms).
The technology for coal plant carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) is assumed to
be available without constraint. Geothermal provides 100 GWe (compared with
about 2 GWe today). Hydroelectric plants continue to contribute at their current,
relatively modest level. These are generally very ambitious goals. Some observers
would likely regard them as being at or even beyond the bounds of plausibility.
Scenario 2 ("No Nuclear/No Coal"): In this scenario, the path to decarbonization
is diverted by obstacles to nuclear and coal use. No new nuclear plants are built,
and all currently operating plants are phased out. Carbon capture and
sequestration technology is assumed not to become available, and no new coal
plants are built either. Existing coal plants are phased out. Solar and wind expand
rapidly, however; by 2050 each are providing 20% of total electricity supply. The
balance of electricity supply is provided by a combination of hydroelectricity
(unchanged from today), geothermal (100 GWe), and biofuels.
Scenario 3 ("Additionally Constrained"): In this scenario, the constraints on
low-carbon sources multiply. As in Scenario 2, nuclear and coal power are phased
out completely, while wind and solar are more restricted than in the two previous
scenarios. Wind accounts for 15% of total electricity supply in 2050, and solar
another 5% - both many times larger than their current contributions, but below
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today's most optimistic projections. Hydro, geothermal, and biofuels provide the
balance of electricity supply.
The three scenarios are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Decarbonization scenario assumptions
SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO 3
"All Hands on "No Nuclear/No "Additionally
Deck" Coal" Constrained"
Population growth2 2  0.9%/yr 0.9%/yr 0.9%/yr
Intermittent renewables
as a share of total
electricity generation in 40% (20%/20%) 40% (20%/20%) 20% (15%/5%)
2050 (wind/solar)
Carbon capture and Limited only by None
sequestration in 2050 CO 2 emission None
constraint
Nuclear as a share of
total electricity 20% None None
generation in 2050
Geothermal in 2050 100 GWe 100 GWe 100 GWe
Hydroelectric Unchanged from Unchanged from Unchanged
2008 2008 from 2008
2.3 Implications of 'Business-as-usual' Energy Efficiency
To see what these different decarbonization scenarios would mean, we first consider
the case in which the energy intensity of the economy continues to decline at the
22 The U.S. population is assumed to grow at an annual rate of 0.9% between now and 2050,
following the estimate of J.S. Passel and D'Vera Cohn, "U.S. Population Projections: 2005-2050", Pew
Research Center Report, February 2008. The U.S. Census Bureau recently projected a growth rate
between 0.8% and 0.96% per year over this period
(http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/2009projections.html).
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same rate, 2.16%/year, that it averaged from 1980-2006. From equation (2), the
combined rate of decarbonization (C/E) and economic growth (Y/P) required to
achieve the targeted reduction in carbon emissions in this case is:
d(CIE) 8(YIP)
+ = 4.18 + 2.16 -0.90 = -2.89%/yr
(CIE) (YIP)
Table 2 shows the economic growth trajectories associated with each of the three
decarbonization scenarios. Even in the "All Hands on Deck" scenario, with its very
optimistic assumptions about the future availability of renewables, nuclear, and
coal with CCS, the mid-century carbon emission reduction goal could only be
achieved if the annual rate of growth in GDP per capita between now and 2050
were to decline to 1% per year. It is worth noting that in no decade since the 1930s
has this broad measure of the nation's economic growth performance been as low.
For the less optimistic "No Nuclear/No Coal" and "Severely Constrained" scenarios,
per capita economic output would actually have to contract in order to achieve the
mid-century carbon emission reduction goal.
23
This is the emission-weighted average performance for the economy as a whole. Our model
disaggregates this economy-wide average into the average trend for each of the energy-using sectors:
transportation (-1.53%), residential (-2.66%), commercial (-1.76%), and industrial (-3.03%).
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Table 2: Economic growth with 'business-as-usual' energy efficiency trend
Growth rate in GDP/capita,
Supply-Side Scenario
2008-2050
"All Hands on Deck" +1.0%/yr
"No Nuclear/No Coal" -0.67%/yr
"Severely Constrained" -0.85%/yr
Uncompromising environmental advocates assert that the risks of climate change
are so great that carbon emission reductions must be achieved regardless of what
this would mean for economic growth. But that view is not widely shared and as a
practical matter national policy is unlikely to privilege the emission reduction goal
in this way. Certainly many people would regard the prospect of weak or even
negative economic growth in the service of avoiding global climate change as
unacceptable. But it is an inescapable fact that even with extraordinary measures
to adopt low-carbon energy supply technologies on a large scale it will be
mathematically impossible for the country to enjoy even moderate economic growth
in the absence of much stronger energy efficiency gains than in the past. Equally,
strong economic growth will be impossible even with rapid gains in energy efficiency
if these are not accompanied by more aggressive future rates of decarbonization of
supply.
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We next explore the implications for the energy system of setting a requirement for
more vigorous economic growth simultaneously with the desired carbon emission
reductions.
2.4 Implications of Sustained Economic Growth
We specify a performance goal for the U.S. economy of 2% annual growth in GDP
per capita through 2050. In historical terms, this is a fairly modest target. It is
approximately equal to the per capita growth performance achieved by the U.S.
economy between 1973 and 2000, and falls well below the 2.5% growth rate
achieved between 1950 and 1973 (and again during the strong expansion years of
1992-2000).2' As before, we impose the 85% carbon emission reduction target in
2050, and again consider the three decarbonization scenarios described above.
The results are summarized in Table 3. An important result is the required rate of
reduction in energy intensity, i.e., energy use per unit of economic output (E/Y). In
Scenario 1 ("All Hands on Deck"), with its highly optimistic assumptions about the
rate of decarbonization, energy use per unit of economic output would need to
decline by 3.05%/year on average between now and mid-century in order to achieve
the carbon mitigation and economic growth goals. As already noted, energy use per
unit of GDP declined by 2.16%/year on average between 1980 and 2006; from 2005-
24
Between 2000 and 2007, a period of weak growth that preceded the economic recession that began
in December 2007, the per capita U.S. growth rate was 1.35%/year.
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2009 the average rate was 1.96%/year. In Scenario 2 ("No Nuclear/No Coal"), with
its less optimistic assumptions about the availability of low-carbon technologies,
energy use per unit of economic output would need to decline by 4.50%/year. In
Scenario 3 ("Additionally Constrained"), with its even less optimistic assumptions,
the implied requirement is for energy efficiency to improve by 4.75%/year on
average. In each scenario, total energy use in 2050 would be lower than it is today
- by 6.1% in the "All Hands on Deck" scenario, and by more than 50% in the
"Additionally Constrained" scenario.
In the "All Hands on Deck" scenario, the reduction in carbon emissions is achieved
primarily through very rapid electrification of the economy, which by 2050 relies on
electricity for 54.3% of final energy use, compared with 18.3% in 2008. In the "No
Nuclear/No Coal" and "Additionally Constrained" scenarios electrification is much
less important, and the main contributor to carbon emission reductions is a
dramatic reduction in energy use. In all three scenarios, however, rapid
electrification of the automobile fleet is essential, even assuming the early
availability of advanced biofuels with a much lower carbon footprint than corn
ethanol.2 5
25
In our model, biofuels are assumed to have a carbon emission rate in 2050 equal to 50% that of
traditional petroleum fuels. The EPA's current lifecycle GHG emissions estimates for biofuels
compared with petroleum are: corn ethanol 79% or higher; corn butanol 69%; soybean diesel 43%;
sugarcane ethanol 39%; waste grease biodiesel 14%; switchgrass ethanol -10%. Source: Chapter 2.6
of the EPA's Renewable Fuel Standard Program (RFS2) Regulatory Impact Analysis. February 2010.
EPA-420-R-10-006. Accessed at www.epa.gov/otaq/renewablefuels/420r10006.pdf . Since the lowest
emission fuels require the most development, and corn and soybean-based fuels are the most scalable
in the medium term, we chose the level of 50% emission compared with petroleum as a
representative estimate.
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Table 3: Kaya framework scenario results under sustained economic
growth
Rate of change in CO 2
emissions per unit of GDP,
2008-2050
SCENARIO 1
"All Hands on
Deck"
-7.08 %/yr
SCENARIO 2
"No Nuclear/No
Coal"
-7.08 %/yr
SCENARIO 3
"Additionally
Constrained"
-7.08 %/yr
Rate of change in energy
consumption per capita,
2008-2050
Rate of change in energy
consumption per dollar of
GDP, 2008-2050
Change in total U.S. final
energy use between 2008
and 2050
Change in total U.S.
electricity consumption
between 2008 and 2050
Share of electricity in final
energy use (cf. 18.3% in
2008)
Transportation sector end
use energy consumption
shares in 2050
-1.05 %/yr
-3.05 %/yr
-6.1%
+178%
54.3%
33% biofuels
67% electricity
0% petroleum
-2.50%/yr
-4.50%/yr
-48.3%
-25.0%
26.6%
54% biofuels
46% electricity
0% petroleum
-2.75 %/yr
-4.75 %/yr
-53.5%
-43.6%
22.2%
60% biofuels
40% electricity
0% petroleum
Figure 3728 shows the required rates of decarbonization and energy intensity
improvements compared with past performance.
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Figure 37: Rates of decarbonization and energy intensity improvements
required by each scenario compared with historical trends
The implication of these results is clear: the past performance of the U.S. energy
sector with respect to both energy efficiency gains and decarbonization falls far
short of what will be required in the future. It will be impossible to achieve the
mid-century carbon emission reduction goal while at the same time maintaining a
decent rate of economic growth without major advances in both dimensions of
performance relative to past trends.
How difficult will it be to meet these requirements? We can gain insight into the
energy efficiency requirement by estimating the needs within individual energy
end-use sectors and comparing these with recent performance. Figure 3829 shows
the recent historical trend in energy consumption per capita in each of the four
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main end-use sectors of the economy, i.e., transportation, residential buildings,
commercial buildings, and industry.2 6
Figure 38: Average annual rate of change in final energy
end use sector, 1980-2006
use per capita, by
As one example, consider the residential buildings sector. Figure 3930 compares
the projected residential energy efficiency requirements for each of the three
decarbonization scenarios with the actual 25-year historical trend in residential
energy efficiency (expressed in terms of reductions in energy use per capita) in
several states. The variation in performance across the states is striking. Many
26
In our model we estimate the energy efficiency requirement in each sector using the predictions of
the Energy Information Administration's 2009 Annual Energy Outlook (AE02009). For each sector,
we compute the ratio of sector-specific to economy-wide energy intensity trends in AE02009 for the
period from 2008 to 2030, and these same sector-to-average ratios are used in our model. They are:
residential: 1.17; commercial: 0.87; industrial: 1.03; transportation: 0.94.
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For the "All Hands on Deck" scenario, one way to achieve the required gains in
residential energy efficiency at the national level would be for every state to raise
its performance above the level of the best recent performers (i.e., California and
Iowa.) For the "No Nuclear/No Coal" and "Additionally Constrained" scenarios,
however, even this would fall far short of the need; in those cases, every state would
have to raise its performance to a level nearly three times that of California's recent
record.
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2.00%
The decarbonization requirements on the supply side of the energy infrastructure
are no less formidable. Focusing again on the implications for the electric power
sector, in the "All Hands on Deck" scenario we estimate that the average rate of
installation of all new generating capacity would be over 100,000 MWe per year.
(This is almost certainly an underestimate since our simple framework makes no
allowance for the need for an adequate capacity reserve margin to maintain
adequate grid reliability levels.) As Figure 4031 shows, this is roughly twice the
installation rate during the peak year for new capacity additions during the past
decade, and several times higher than the installation rate during more typical
years. Figure 4132 shows the shares of installed capacity in 2050 by technology in
this scenario. Even though wind and solar are assumed to be supplying amounts of
energy comparable to nuclear and coal, the capacity requirements for these
technologies are much greater because of their inherently low capacity factors."
27
Of course, even in the absence of the climate constraint there would also be a large requirement for
new capacity, to meet additional electricity demand and to replace retired capacity.
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Figure 40: Additions of U.S. electrical generating capacity of all types:
1997-2007 (actual), and 2008-2050 (projected in "All Hands on Deck"
scenario)
Figure 41: Total installed electrical generating capacity in 2050 for the "All
Hands on Deck" scenario (% share of electricity generation in parentheses)
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Demand-response programs enabled by new 'smart-grid' technologies could
potentially reduce this capacity requirement. The main purpose of these programs
is to shave and shift in time the peak power demand that must be met by regional
electricity networks. Such measures are expected to be less expensive than
installing low-carbon capacity sufficient to meet daily and seasonal demand peaks.
One recent study found that demand-response programs could conceivably bring
about a reduction of 20% in peak demand by the year 2019. Here we make a
simple estimate of the potential impact of such programs on the requirements for
new capacity through 2050. In the "All Hands on Deck" scenario, a demand-
response strategy that lowered the peak-to-average demand ratio from its current
value of 1.75 for the U.S. as a whole to, say, 1.25 by the year 2050 (i.e., a 28%
reduction in peak demand) would avoid the need to build 288 GWe of coal with CCS,
140 GWe of nuclear, 28 GWe of geothermal, 416 GWe of solar, and 356 GWe of wind
between 2008 and 2050.28 Taken together this represents more than the total
installed nameplate electricity generating capacity in the U.S. in 2008.
The role of natural gas
Natural gas plays only a modest role in our scenarios, primarily because in most
applications it is displaced by advanced biofuels, which emit less CO 2 per unit of
energy output. Advances in drilling technology have greatly increased the amount
28
For this simple calculation we assume that each type of generation contributes to meeting the
peak demand in the same proportion that it contributes to meeting energy requirements.
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of gas that is projected to be economically recoverable from shale.29 This has led to
suggestions that natural gas may hold the key to the energy transition, either as a
bridge fuel or in the longer-term as a complement to intermittent renewables.3 0 The
natural gas industry has also been promoting the increased natural gas reserves as
the best way to tackle climate change and achieve energy security. But of course,
from the perspective of carbon emissions, natural gas is not a 'clean' fuel; while it
emits significantly less carbon dioxide per unit of energy than coal, some are
questioning the optimism about using natural gas to avert climate change. 31 f
combined with carbon capture and storage, natural gas could be an alternative to
the large scale use of coal in the electric power sector, though many of the economic
and other obstacles that stand in the way of implementing CCS with coal-fired
power would apply in this case too.3 2 In the absence of CCS, natural gas could only
serve as a transitional fuel, and from a carbon emissions perspective it would be
less attractive than advanced biofuels, for which it might otherwise substitute.
29
The Potential Gas Committee's 2010 year-end assessment estimates that the U.S. has a total
available future supply of 2,170 Tef. This includes a 1,739 Tcf resource base of "traditional"
reservoirs (including shale gas), a 159 Tcf resource base in coalbed reservoirs, and 273 Tcf of proved
dry-gas reserves, as determined by the DOE. Of the total, 273 Tcf is considered proved, 550 Tcf
Vrobable (current fields), 736 possible (new fields), and 614 Tcf speculative (frontiers).
For example, see John E. Podesta and Timothy E. Wirth "Natural Gas: A Bridge Fuel for the 21st
Century" The Center for American Progress, August 10, 2009.
31
Studies by the IEA, by Dr. Robert Howarth of Cornell University, by Tom Wigley of the National
Center for Atmospheric Research, and by David Hughes of the Post Carbon Institute are a few
examples (IEA 2011; Howarth et. al. 2011; Wigley 2011; Hughes 2011).
32
Even with the additional resource estimates, natural gas suffers from a resource limitation
relative to coal. Given the numbers for the "All Hands on Deck" scenario, if natural gas with CCS
were to replace coal with CCS in 2050, and its generation were to remain flat at that level, the
estimated future US supply of 2,170 trillion cubic feet would be exhausted within about 50 years.
Since some would be consumed leading up to 2050, and since demand would continue to increase
after 2050, the timeframe for resource exhaustion would be even shorter without a further increase
in supply.
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2.5 Conclusions
Officials in both the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government have
declared their support for the goal of reducing U.S. carbon emissions 80% or more
by 2050. This chapter has examined some of the implications of achieving a goal of
this magnitude for the U.S. energy sector and for the economy more generally.
In essence, the recent energy efficiency and decarbonization performance of the U.S.
economy falls far short of what would be required to achieve the goal. One
indication of the size of the task ahead is that if the energy intensity of the economy
were to continue to decline at the same rate as during the last 25 years, the
economy could not grow faster than roughly 1% per year per capita between now
and mid-century and still meet the carbon goal, even with extraordinarily high
rates of installation of solar, wind, geothermal, nuclear and coal-fired generating
capacity with carbon capture and storage. And if the economy were to grow instead
at a more acceptable (but still relatively modest) rate of 2% per year per capita,
even heroic decarbonization measures would fail to yield the desired emission
reductions unless, in addition, the country were to move onto a path of rapidly
declining energy intensity and remain on that path for decades. Since most of the
low carbon energy supply technologies are more expensive than the incumbent
high-carbon energy sources, this analysis also draws attention to the need for a
sustained flow of innovations in many different fields of application in order to
bring down the costs of these low-carbon alternatives. If this is to happen within
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the timeframe that most climate scientists advocate, the innovation process will
also need to be accelerated.
Returning to the model of the energy innovation process given in Figure 156 in
Chapter 1, recall that we have adopted a four-stage simplification, where the stages
are: creating options, demonstrating viability, early adoption, and improvements-in-
use. Each one of these steps must be accelerated to sustain energy innovation in
the future, but because of the long lead time for large scale deployment of energy
technologies, between today and 2050 the first stage of the energy innovation
process will not be the dominant contributor to emission reduction. It may pay
dividends farther in the future, but technologies that are currently pre-commercial
are more likely to enable GHG emission reduction by 2050 (Lester & Hart 2012).
This indicates that we should pay particular attention to the downstream stages of
demonstrating viability, early adoption, and improvements-in-use. As shown in
Figure 156, the investment requirements grow as technologies move to the next
stage, with costs of up to about $1 billion in the demonstration phase, $10s of
billions in early adoption, and $100s of billions during improvements in use. As the
requirements increase, finding enough capital investment to support further work
becomes the biggest challenge to the innovation path. Estimating the capital
investment requirements is the subject of the next chapter.
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3 Chapter 3: Capital Investment Requirements for CO 2
Emission Reduction in the U.S. Energy Supply
System
This chapter takes some of the concepts presented in Chapter 2 and applies them
specifically to the task of estimating capital investment requirements as a metric
for measuring the challenge of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In Part I of this
chapter, we use the MARKAL model to estimate total capital investments. First,
the reasons for choosing capital investment as a metric are explained. Then the
modeling approach is discussed, beginning with an explanation of the software and
the database used and followed by a description of the changes that were made to
the input database. Next, the scenarios are described. Finally, results are
discussed, beginning with the general energy trends shown in a few of the main
scenarios and followed by Monte Carlo uncertainty analysis. In Part II, we
introduce an original model that simulates innovation investment in a two-stage
innovation process. We then demonstrate the operation of the model as a tool to
estimate total innovation investment requirements and to compare the relative
value of "front-end" innovation investments and later stage learning-focused
investments. We use several stylized examples involving new nuclear power
reactors.
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3.1 Chapter 3 Part I: Capital Investments in Electric Power
Supply
3.1.1 Popular Methods for Estimating the Cost of Climate Change
Mitigation
Many methods have been used to estimate the economic impact of climate change
mitigation, and many different metrics have been used in an attempt to measure
that impact. The Stern review compiled estimates of the costs of climate change
mitigation in terms of percentage of global GDP lost by 2050, with values ranging
from -2% (net gains) to 5% (losses) of global GDP (Stern 2006). Welfare losses are
another commonly used metric. Paltsev et al. provide a concise description of the
most commonly used metrics (Paltsev et al. 2009). Those metrics are:
- Emissions price
- Welfare change
- Consumption Change
- GDP Change
- Per capita and per family/household costs
- Discounted costs
- Change in energy prices
- Marginal abatement cost
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These metrics are helpful in evaluating the burden of various policy options on
society, but we will argue that another metric, capital investment, provides
additional valuable information.
3.1.2 The Importance of Capital Investment Requirements for Climate
Change Mitigation
Converting the energy supply capital stock in the U.S. from a GHG-intensive to a
low-GHG emitting system is a major transition that will require large capital
investments in low-carbon energy sources. The availability of adequate capital is a
necessary condition to see such a transition through, and this is neither a trivial
concern nor is it independent of other government policies. In any policy or non-
policy scenario, significant capital investments will be made in the energy supply
system through 2050. It is informative to look at the impacts of climate change
mitigation strategies on capital requirements. The capital investment requirement
will not shed light on the social costs of the transition or the costs to households in
terms of energy or income, but it is a very practical metric that can reveal the ease
or difficulty of meeting certain goals.
Looking specifically at the electric power sector, those investments will be needed to
replace retiring capacity as well as to expand capacity and to expand fossil resource
recovery. Investments in transmission and distribution are not included here.
While the model used here (MARKAL) has the capacity to model those, the EPA
input database used here does not include them. Transmission efficiency is set at
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92%, and extraordinary transmission costs associated with remote wind
installations are included in wind investment cost figures. In the presence of a
carbon policy, more investment will be needed in low-carbon capacity, and perhaps
less in fossil capacity and resource recovery. Whether the total required capital
investment will need to be much larger or much smaller, whether it will be
associated with higher investment risk or lower risk, and what organizations will be
most likely to make the necessary investments is not immediately obvious.
Particularly in the absence of carbon pricing, refraining from any policies to
influence the direction of those investments could result in over-investment in fossil
technologies and under-investment in low-GHG technologies. If deep cuts in carbon
are an inevitability but policymakers cannot give investors any confidence in that in
the short term, investments in long-lifetime capacity and infrastructure will be
made in accordance with current policy and thus misdirected with respect to the
long-term optimum (assuming an eventual carbon reduction policy). Ultimately
this will force a decision between expensive early retirements or relaxing desired
carbon emission reduction, thus causing significant unnecessary losses or
compromising climate change mitigation efforts.
If policies are needed to steer new energy supply investments towards technologies
that help, not hinder, future carbon reduction efforts, it is sensible to ask what type
of policies are needed, and at what scale and what cost (and perhaps with what
timing). To explore the answers to these questions, we begin with the U.S. EPA
121
single-region United States database for the International Energy Agency (IEA)
MARKAL energy economy model. A comparison of investment requirements in the
base case with those in reduced-carbon cases is informative, and we used nine
scenarios to illustrate those variations. The scenarios differ in CO 2 reduction
targets and energy demand levels, and are described in detail later in the chapter.
We then performed sensitivity analyses to explore the impact of changes in capital
costs for wind and nuclear power and changes in the domestic natural gas resource
base in one of the nine scenarios. These variables were chosen to reflect current
uncertainty about the capital costs of nuclear and wind plants, and to reflect
uncertainty about the size and importance of the domestic shale gas resources.
Because nuclear, wind, natural gas, and coal with CCS substitute for one another as
their relative costs fluctuate in the model, varying three of these captures much of
the uncertainty surrounding their competitive relationship in future electricity
markets.
3.1.3 Modeling Capital Investment Requirements: Method
3.1.3.1 The MARKAL Model
The MARKAL model (named for MARket ALlocation) is a bottom-up, dynamic,
linear programming model of energy supply and demand subject to economic
optimization within an overall economy. 33 It was originally developed at
Brookhaven National Laboratory and was selected as the primary energy supply
33 For a detailed description of MARKAL, see the ETSAP MARKAL users manual at
http://www.etsap.org/documentation.asp
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and demand modeling system by the International Energy Agency (IEA) in 1978. It
is now used by more than 40 countries for planning purposes.
The MARKAL framework is based on a network called a Reference Energy System
(RES) that models the energy system by tracking the flow of energy carriers from
resource availability and acquisition to the end-use demand for the energy (IRG
2001). It is divided into four stages: resource, process, conversion/generation, and
end-use demand or energy services, as illustrated in Figure 4233 below.
MARKAL Building Blocks
Resources Processes Generation
Figure 42: The MARKAL reference energy system building blocks (Source:
International Resources Group 2001)
Each stage is primarily comprised of resources or technologies that are defined by
the user. The resources are characterized by available supplies at varying costs of
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End-Use
obtaining them and the technologies are characterized by unit investment costs,
fixed and variable operation and maintenance costs, fuel delivery costs, fuel usage
(efficiency), emission coefficients, lifetimes, existing capacity, year of availability,
etc. The final end-use stage includes demands like residential lighting and air-
conditioning, vehicle miles traveled, hot water heating, etc.
The user can also define constraints, including limits on particular technology
capacities, limits on emissions, and many other items. The MARKAL model then
calculates the least-cost solution to satisfy both energy demand and the user-
specified constraints. Outputs include the installed capacity of each technology in
each 5-year time interval, emissions of GHG emissions and other pollutants,
investments made in each technology during each time interval, value of total
carbon taxes, and many other data points.
3.1.3.2 The U.S. EPA's MARKAL Database
The MARKAL model is highly data-driven, and as such the results are strongly
dependent on the quality of the input database. The U.S. EPA has developed a nine-
region database for use in modeling the United States' energy system in MARKAL,
and has derived from that a single-region model that is essentially a summation of
the nine-region model (with some subtle adjustments where needed) (EPA 2008).
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The data are drawn from a large number of sources. A table of the most important
sources for the database is shown below. The 2010 database is used in this analysis
because it is the most up-to-date national database available at this time.
Table 4: EPA national MARKAL database sources (Source: Johnson 2004)
Sector Sources Technologies
Transportation DOE Office of 15 personal vehicle technologies in 5 size
Transportation classes; 40 other passenger and freight
Technologies technologies
Electricity National Energy 45 technologies
Modeling System
(NEMS),
Integrated
Planning Model
Commercial NEMS 300 heating, cooling, ventilation, lighting,
and refrigeration technologies
Residential NEMS 135 heating, cooling, lighting, and
refrigeration technologies
Industrial SAGE (an EPA Framework covering 6 industries, 6 energy
model) services
Coal supply NEMS 25 types by region, sulfur content, and
mine type; 8-step supply curves
Oil/gas supply NEMS, U.S. 5 grades imported oil; 9 imported refined
Geological Survey products plus natural gas; 3-step supply
curves.
Domestic oil and gas production under
development
Emissions EPA, GREET (an C0 2, CH 4, N20 criteria pollutants
EPA model) Vehicle-specific emissions for transport
Control technology options for electricity
Sector fuel averages for residential,
commercial, and industrial
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All costs in the EPA 2010 database are in year 2000 dollars and the long-term
annual discount rate for the economy is 5%.
The EPA database contains six resource categories. Those are crude oil, imported
refined products, natural gas, coal, nuclear power, and renewable sources (biofuels,
wind, solar, hydro, and geothermal). Full details on the characteristics of the
resources are described in the EPA Documentation (EPA 2008). Emissions
standards for SO2 , NOR, and CAFE standards that were legislated prior to 2010 are
included in the model. The base case is largely modeled based on EIA, DOE,
Department of Transportation, and other U.S. government data and projections.
The base case is the EPA's default case and represents a Business As Usual (BAU)
projection. The database includes specifications for seasonal and time-of-day
variations in the demand for energy and in the availability of renewable power
sources. This serves to prevent over-reliance on intermittent sources.
3.1.3.3 Changes to the Database: Electric Power Investment Costs
Since one of the primary aims of this work was to estimate capital investment
requirements, particularly for the electric power sector, it was necessary to update
the input values for the investment costs of the various generation technologies.
Some of the values in the database were low compared with recent estimates. To
replace them, we primarily used the values from the OECD International Energy
Agency and the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency joint report "Projected Costs of
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Generating Electricity 2010 Edition" (IEA 2010). This data set was chosen for its
comprehensive coverage of technologies, its transparency in terms of assumptions
made, and its basis in data on actual operating power plants. It focuses on
technologies that could be commissioned by 2015-2020, within our timeframe of
interest, it reflects a broad collaboration among many experts and reviewers, and it
is the seventh in a series of similar OECD reports.
The table below provides the estimates of investment costs for electric technologies
in the EPA 2010 database, the updated estimates used in this work, and an
explanation of the source of the new estimates. The costs include engineering,
procurement, and construction costs, owner's costs, contingency costs, and
construction interest.
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Table 5: Capital cost adjustments made to the EPA MARKAL input
database
"MIT
Future of
EPA Natural
Generation Capacity Database Updated Gas"
Technology Factor Cost Cost Source Cost"
$/kWe
m$/Gwe $/kWe (2005$)
Natural Gas -
Advanced
Combined-Cycle
(Turbine)
(NGAACC) 0.90 827 1113
Natural Gas -
Combustion
Turbine 0.95 602 687
Natural Gas -
Combined-Cycle
(Turbine) 0.90 864 1113
Natural Gas -
Advanced
Combustion
Turbine 0.95 569 687
Pulverized Coal
Steam - 2010 0.85 1916 2526
Integrated Coal
Gasif. Combined
Cycle (Coal IGCC) 0.85 2213 2916
Biomass
Integrated
Gasification
Combined-Cycle 0.80 3147 4564
Integrated Coal
Gasif. Combined
Cycle - CO 2 Capt. 0.85 3159 4263
Oxyfuel Coal
Steam - CO 2
Capture 0.85 3159 4263
IEA Projected
Costs of
Generating
Electricity 2010
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964
2377
4116
4177
4177
Natural Gas 1995
Combined Cycle -
CO 2 Capture 0.85 1586 2207
Calif. Energy
Geothermal - Commission Cost
of Generation
Binary Cycle and Model Version 2.02
Flashed Steam 0.64 1536 5075 (CEC 2010)
Advanced light 4930
water reactor 0.90 3766 4296
Solar Thermal 5109
Centralized
Generation 0.56* 4423 5913 IEA Projected
Solar PV Generat ng 6144
Centralized Electricity 2010
Generation 0.25* 5419 6545
Landfill gas to
energy: Gas
Turbines 0.90 1010 2995
Landfill gas to
energy: Engines 0.90 919 2725
Landfill gas to Escalated by the
energy: Steam same factor as
Turbines 0.90 349 1035 LFG Gas Turbines,
Municipal Solid above
Waste: Waste-to-
energy 0.90 935 2773
Wind Generation Average Wind costs were 1957
Cost Category A yearly 1523 n/a left as-is, because
Wind Generation 0a7ue they reflect
Cost Category B varying by 1758 n/a detailed resource
Wind Generation level of asshe sets and
Cost Category C resource 2110 n/a with time, so the
Wind Generation (location) EPA values appear
Cost Category D 2697 n/a to be as good as, or
Wind Generation better than, the
Cost Category E 3872 n/a IEA estimates.
* Solar resource availability varies by season and
average values.
time of day. These represent the
In addition to these changes to capital costs, modifications were made to the
retirement schedule for nuclear and coal plants that exist at the beginning of the
model ("residual capacity"). The EPA inputs do not allow for the retirement of any
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plants of either type, resulting in an unrealistically low business-as-usual capital
investment requirement (since none of these plants must be replaced). In the
adjusted input database, the residual coal capacity begins declining from its initial
349 GWe by 5 GWe per year in 2016. By 2050, residual coal capacity of 174 GWe
remains. The residual nuclear capacity begins declining in 2026 from its initial 106
GWe by 5 GWe per year, resulting in full retirement by 2050.
3.1.3.4 Changes to the Database: Constraints Removed
The EPA database contains very strict constraints on the fuel splits in various end-
use applications. For example, the relative proportions of electricity, oil, gas,
geothermal, and other fuels in residential heating is highly specified for the entire
model horizon. This leaves very little room for switching to lower-carbon options
like geothermal and electricity. The constraints are imposed by the EPA to drive the
MARKAL results to mimic the AEO and NEMS projections as closely as possible.
MARKAL might choose something more efficient without the constraints, so to
enable this kind of flexibility, constraints on fuel splits were removed from
residential heating and cooling, commercial cooking, heating, ventilation, and
transportation fuels. Since this study is focused on reduced carbon cases, which
implies changes from business-as-usual, the constraints are unnecessary and, in
fact, counterproductive.
In addition, in the transportation sector, constraints on the split among light-duty-
vehicle classes (i.e. compact, full size, large utility, minivan, minicompact, pickup,
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and small utility) were removed. And in the industrial sector, the lower limit on
fossil-fueled steam for paper production was removed because it caused significant
CO 2 emissions and other technologies were available.
3.1.3.5 Changes to the Database: Constraint on H2MBIOCCS
A number of constraints were added, either for some or all of the scenarios
considered. For all scenarios, a technology called H2MBIOCCS is included in the
EPA database. This is a hydrogen production technology that consumes biomass
feedstock and includes carbon capture and sequestration post-combustion. This
technology presents a problem, first because it is considered a long-term option by
the DOE office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) so it is
somewhat far-fetched to consider it as a major contributor to hydrogen production
in the next 20-30 years (EERE 2009). The other problem with the technology is that
it becomes a way to "cheat" on achieving the carbon goals. The EPA database
assumes that production of hydrogen with biofuels emits no net CO 2 because of the
CO 2 absorbed by the biomass during the growth cycle. When the CO 2 emitted in the
hydrogen production process is then sequestered, it becomes a negative carbon
emission and offsets carbon emissions elsewhere in the economy. In the more
challenging carbon reduction scenarios, the model exploits this feature of
H2MBIOCCS to avoid expensive changes to other parts of the energy supply
system. To mitigate this, the allowed capacity of H2MBIOCCS was limited to 3,500
PJ/annum, which equates to 3.3 Quadrillion Btu of hydrogen fuel. That amount
would be enough to fuel just over 12% of transportation sector demand in 2010, and
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is five times the current annual use of natural gas as a transportation fuel.
Allowing a higher capacity of H2MBIOCCS would increase the amount of offsetting
provided by the sequestered CO 2. With enough sequestration from hydrogen
production, the rest of the economy can avoid any carbon emission reductions and
can even increase emissions. Even when there is no demand for additional
hydrogen, the model can employ the technology for its value in providing negative
CO 2 . Since sequestration is not yet considered permanent on geological timescales,
it isn't realistic to treat it as a silver bullet, and since the H2MBIOCCS technology
is not likely to be available for quite some time, we imposed this limitation to
minimize the distortions caused by the technology. More stringent limitations
caused other feedback problems within the model; this chosen level represents the
lowest found at which those did not occur.
3.1.3.6 Changes to the Database: Constraints on CO 2 Emissions
In the EPA base case there is no restriction on CO 2 emissions, so for comparison we
created two additional CO 2 emission scenarios. The first is referred to as "Low C02"
and incorporates a carbon cap that mimics that of H.R. 2454, the American Clean
Energy and Security Act of 2009. This includes a reduction in CO 2 emissions of 17%
of 2005 emissions by 2020, 42% of 2005 emissions by 2030, and 83% of 2005
emissions by 2050. In the intervening years, we assume a linear decrease in CO 2
emissions. The next scenario, "Mid CO2" includes an intermediate carbon
constraint. CO 2 emissions are limited to 50% of 2005 emissions by 2050, linearly
132
decreasing from 2010. These emission reduction patterns are shown in Figure
4334.
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Figure 43: C02 emissions in the three scenarios tested
3.1.3.7 Changes to the Database: Adjustments to Energy Demand
One set of scenarios was run with business-as-usual energy demand, as specified in
the EPA database, and based on the Annual Energy Outlook for 2010 (AE02010)
demand projections. Two other sets were run with reduced demand scenarios.
Demand was reduced by exogenously specifying it for each sector and end use. It is
possible to cause the model to use more efficient technologies to achieve demand
reductions, but in this instance that adds complications without major advantages;
new technologies would need to be added and those would introduce many new
assumptions. On the other hand, exogenously specifying demand limits the
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usability of the outputs. Instead of requiring the model to provide normal services
using only half the normal energy, this approach allows the model to use half the
energy by providing half the services. This means that the reduced demand
scenarios don't incorporate associated costs of drastically increasing efficiency, and
so the resulting estimates of total costs and other trends are not useful. However,
the generation investment requirements in the electric power sector - the topic of
interest here - are a valid output when reduced demand is achieved this way,
because they are independent of the cost and method of reducing the demand. The
two reduced demand scenarios were chosen to correspond to the lower and upper
reduced-demand cases in Chapter 2 (scenario 1, "All Hands on Deck" and scenario
3, "Additionally Constrained," respectively), and are referred to as "Low Demand"
and "Mid Demand." The end-use energy services demand for each scenario is given
in Figure 4435, and a guide to the names of each of the cases is provided in Table 6.
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Figure 44: Total end-use energy for each demand scenario
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Table 6: Case names for MARKAL model emission and demand scenarios
BAU Demand: Mid Demand: Low Demand:
106 Quad in 70 Quad in 2050 33 Quad in 2050
2050
BAU C02 BAU Demand Mid Demand Low Demand
Emissions BAU C02 BAU C02 BAU C02
Mid C02: 50% BAU Demand Mid Demand Low Demand
Reduction in Mid C02 Mid C02 Mid C02
C02 Emissions
by 2050
Low C02: 83% BAU Demand Mid Demand Low Demand
Reduction in Low C02 Low C02 Low C02
C02 Emissions
by 2050
Some of these cases are more useful to our analysis than others. As we explored by
using the Kaya identity in Chapter 2, greater efforts in energy efficiency will make
it easier to meet carbon goals. The low demand cases are motivated by the aim of
reducing carbon, and aren't likely to occur without substantial carbon policy. Thus,
the Low Demand Low C02 case is the most informative low demand case; low
demand is only likely in a highly carbon-constrained scenario. Likewise, mid level
demand is not likely without constraints, so the Mid Demand BAU C02 case is not
a likely scenario. All of the BAU demand cases are of interest as illustrations of the
most challenging energy supply cases; since reduced demand does not play a role in
those scenarios, decarbonization of supply bears the entire carbon reduction burden.
For these reasons, our presentation of results will be focused on the BAU Demand
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cases, the two Mid Demand carbon-constrained cases, and the Low Demand Low
C02 case.
3.1.4 Results
Results are first presented for changes in energy use and electric power capacity in
each scenario. Subsequently, other relevant results including investment
requirements will be presented. Next, results of sensitivity tests are shown,
illustrating the impacts of changes in gas supply, nuclear capital cost, and wind
capital cost on results.
3.1.4.1 Energy Use and Electric Power Trends in MARKAL Scenarios
Because they drive the electric power investment requirements, several of the
particularly interesting results from the MARKAL modeling are the electric power
capacity present in 2050 in each case, and the mix of technologies contributing to
that total. Figure 4536 presents those results for the BAU demand cases and for
the starting year, 2010. Looking first at the technologies present, we can see that
the difference between the 2010 mix and the 2050 mix in the BAU C02 case is
largely an increase in natural gas, and a decrease in coal and nuclear capacity due
to the exogenously imposed retirements. All of the scenarios include an initial
residual nuclear power LWR capacity of 105.8 GWe, and that capacity is fully
retired by 2050.36 In the BAU C02 cases, no additional nuclear plants are installed
to replace the retired capacity. Once a 50% CO 2 reduction is imposed (Mid C02), a
large amount of wind (213 GWe), nuclear (155 GWe), and natural gas with CCS
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(170 GWe) capacity is added, along with 35 GWe of coal with CCS. This indicates
the need for a significant increase in low-carbon baseload capacity. Which
technologies are deployed is largely dependent on their relative costs, as sensitivity
cases will show. It would be reasonable at this high level of analysis to consider any
baseload low-carbon plant being built in place of another. This really comes down
to cost and other practicalities that are not very predictable, especially decades out.
In the Low C02 case, low-carbon baseload increases further, with 669 GWe of coal
with CCS, 647 GWe of nuclear, and 213 GWe of wind. Wind and solar capacity also
increase in the low-carbon cases, but it is worth noting that due to their lower
capacity factors, their contribution to generation per installed GWe is proportionally
less that that of the base-load technologies.
BAU Demand Low C02 Conv. NG
Conv. Coal
BAU Demand Mid C02 Hydro
Wind
BAU Demand BAU C02 Solar
Other
Residual Nuclear
2010 Nuclear ALWR
Coal with CCS
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 NGw/CCS
Total Electricity Generation Capacity, GWe
Figure 45: Electric generation capacity by technology for BAU demand
cases in 2050 with varying C02 and for 2010
In both of the constrained CO 2 cases, natural gas capacity is cut back compared
with the BAU C02 case in order to accommodate the carbon goal. The model
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results do not account for the recent discoveries of increased shale gas resources in
the U.S., but sensitivity cases presented later address this. Conventional coal
capacity is retired at the same rate in each scenario due to input assumptions, but
remaining capacity is utilized at levels that vary with CO 2 emission requirements.
As shown in Figure 4637, in reduced carbon cases much of the remaining installed
capacity is left idle by the end of the time period because it is too carbon intensive.
This contributes to the very large total installed capacity; while the low carbon case
has about twice as much generation as the BAU case, nearly 1600 GWe of that is
idle in 2050, mostly coal and natural gas, as well as some oil and biofuels. The
stricter the carbon goal, the more carbon-intensive generation (and capital) sits idle
or is run at a low capacity factor.
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Figure 46: Unused (idle) fossil-fueled electric generating capacity in the
BAU demand cases, 2010-2050 (predominantly coal and natural gas -fired
generation)
Figure 4738 shows the installed capacity for 2010, for the BAU energy demand
cases, and for the low and mid level energy demand cases. All of the reduced
demand cases actually have lower installed capacity than BAU even without a
carbon reduction. It is quite clear that reaching the mid demand level by improving
energy efficiency (or energy intensity of GDP) would relieve much of the burden on
the electricity supply side. The feasibility of achieving such a low demand level is
not explored here, but would be a good area for future work.
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Figure 47: Installed electric generating capacity by technology for all
demand and emission scenarios in 2050 and for 2010
In these scenarios, existing coal capacity is partly in use, partly retired, and partly
deactivated but not retired. Since the inputs to the model allow limited retirement
of coal plants, additional deactivated plants are expressed as idle or deactivated
capacity. Figure 4839 shows the levels of deactivated but unretired coal capacity in
all scenarios. As a practical matter, much of this capacity would likely be retired
and decommissioned. Either way, the central point is that large fractions of
otherwise operable generation would be deactivated, with investments in new
cleaner generating plants required to replace them. Of a total installed coal base of
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about 174 GWe in 2050 after 186 GWe are retired, about half is deactivated in the
Low C02 cases.
Figure 48: Deactivated (or idle) coal capacity for each scenario in 2050 and
for 2010
Projections of total electricity generation by technology augment the new and
deactivated capacity trends to provide a fuller picture. The figures to follow show
the changing mix of generation in several cases. Figure 4940 shows the electricity
generation shares for the BAU Demand BAU C02 case. Most of the increase in
electricity demand is filled by natural gas while coal and hydro continue to
contribute at substantial levels. Nuclear and wind power are phased out by the end
of the time period due to their cost disadvantage.
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Figure 49: Electricity generation by technology for BAU Demand BAU C02,
2010-2050
By contrast, Figure 5041 shows drastic changes in the BAU Demand Mid C02 case,
with conventional coal nearly completely phased out, natural gas use increasing
steadily to replace most of the coal reduction, and wind, nuclear, and coal with CCS
increasing to fill the balance of demand increase. The expansion of wind and
nuclear and the appearance of coal with CCS demonstrate the impact of carbon
constraints in advancing the competitiveness of these technologies.
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Figure 50: Electricity generation by technology for BAU Demand Mid C02,
2010-2050
BAU Demand Low C02 is the most challenging supply side case, and thus shows
the most radical changes in electric power generation. Figure 5142 shows the
generation mix. It is first significant to note the large increase in electricity
generation, corroborating the finding from Chapter 2 that in such a constrained
case there is a need for widespread electrification of energy supply. The supply is
derived almost exclusively from nuclear and coal with CCS, with contributions from
wind and from hydroelectric power.
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Figure 51: Electricity generation
2010-2050
by technology for BAU Demand Low C02,
In the mid demand cases, total electricity generation actually declines over the
modeling period, as shown in Figure 5243. With the reduced demand, conventional
coal is largely phased out and there is an increase in natural gas and wind
generation.
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Figure 52: Electricity generation
2010-2050
by technology for Mid Demand Mid C02,
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In the Low Demand Low C02 case, there is no need for new low-carbon technology
deployment, as shown in Figure 5344. There is a large drop in electricity demand,
and the continuing hydro and coal capacity along with a small amount of natural
gas is sufficient to fulfill demand.
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Figure 53: Electricity generation by technology for Low Demand Low C02,
2010-2050
Since the generation options vary in cost, the wide variations in generation mix
imply that the cases have differing economy-wide electricity costs. Total spending
on electricity for several cases is shown in Figure 5445, and the results indicate that
any reduced demand scenario will have lower electricity spending than the BAU
Demand cases, regardless of C02 constraints. Also as one would expect, the BAU
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Demand Low C02 case has substantially higher electricity costs than any other
case.
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Figure 54: Annual U.S. spending on electricity for several scenarios from
2010-2050
Looking outside of the electric power sector, another area of interest is in the
transportation sector. As shown in Figure 5546, in a BAU Demand Low C02 case,
the transportation sector must make substantial strides toward electrification
(roughly 1/3 electric fuel). In the Mid and Low Demand cases, and in the BAU
Demand Mid C02 reduction case, the transportation sector is able to remain
petroleum-driven.
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Figure 55: Transportation sector fuel use by type for all scenarios in 2050
and for 2010
The residential sector also sees significant changes in the BAU Demand Low or Mid
C02 cases. While a large part of residential energy comes from natural gas in both
2010 and 2050 for the business as usual case, when a carbon constraint is imposed
that fraction is drastically cut to meet emission goals, just as it was in the Kaya
scenarios of Chapter 2. The database used for this section did not account for the
newly available shale gas resources, so if those contribute to moderating gas prices,
it is possible that the business as usual demand case would include even more gas
use in 2050 and it would be increasingly difficult to transition to the small amount
allowed in the reduced carbon scenarios.
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Figure 56: Residential sector fuel use by type for all scenarios in 2050 and
for 2010
3.1.4.2 Capital Investment Requirements for MARKAL Scenarios
Here we use the MARKAL model to assess electric power sector capital investment
requirements. The model outputs the capital investment in each technology for
each time period, reflecting the installation of generation at the updated cost given
in Table 5 and neglecting transmission and distribution needs. Investments made
later in time are not discounted relative to earlier investments. The resulting total
investments are shown for the illustrative scenarios in Figure 5748. The BAU
Demand Low C02 case has a total investment requirement of $7.5 trillion (in 2000
dollars) for the electric power sector, compared with BAU Demand BAU C02 at just
$1.0 trillion. 7 The BAU Demand Mid C02 scenario has a somewhat less daunting
figure of $3.0 trillion and the Mid Demand Low C02 scenario requires investment
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of $3.5 trillion. The other reduced demand cases have lower electric power
investment requirements than business as usual.
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Figure 57: Cumulative investments in electric power capacity for each
scenario, 2010-2050
By simply dividing the cumulative investments by 40 years, we calculate the
average annual investment requirement for the same cases. These results are
shown in Figure 5849.
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Figure 58: Average annual investments in electric power for each scenario,
2010-2050
By way of comparison, we can look to some historical data. The Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) provides capital flow tables that catalogue the investments in new
equipment, software, and structures by a selection of industries. The most recent
data available are from 1997. Some pertinent data points are given in Table 77.
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Table 7: Capital investment in new equipment, software, and structures by
industry in millions of 1997 dollars (Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis)
Industry (NAICS Investment in Investment in Total Capital
code) Equipment & Software Structures Investment
Oil and gas extraction $5,974 $23,024 $28,998(2110)
Coal mining (2121) $2,985 $652 $3,637
Power generation and $24,825 $17,841 $42,666
supply (2211)
Natural gas $2,962 $6,493 $9,455
distribution (2212)
The above investments represent investments in a single year. The four industries
combined invested nearly $85 billion in 1997 dollars in 1997. The power generation
and supply industry invested only $18 billion in structures and $25 billion in
equipment and software. Only a fraction of the $25 billion might have been for new
capacity, but that level of detail is not available. Even assuming that all $43 billion
was invested in new capacity, it would still be less than one-fourth the required
investment in the BAU Demand Low C02 case and well below the requirement for
the BAU Demand Mid C02 case.
3.1.4.3 Sensitivity Analyses
The next step is to test the behavior of the system under varying natural gas supply
scenarios and to explore the impact of capital cost perturbations on technology
deployment. We chose to perform the sensitivity tests on the Mid Demand Low
C02 MARKAL case. We use three domestic natural gas resource scenarios, all from
the MIT Study on the Future of Natural Gas. The three scenarios are low, mean,
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and high resource cases, characterized by a finite volume of gas available to be
recovered at a given wellhead price. Those volumes are given in Figure 5950. We
varied nuclear capital costs and wind capital costs simultaneously but
independently in 50 cases, each of which was modeled for the three gas supply
scenarios, for 150 cases in total.
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Figure 59: Domestic natural gas resource scenarios (Source: MIT Study on the
Future of Natural Gas)
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In varying nuclear power capital costs we used Monte Carlo sampling of a normal
distribution about the original cost with the standard deviation calculated for
OECD nuclear plants in the IEA "Projected Costs of Generating Electricity" study.
A histogram of the samples is given in Figure 6051.
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Figure 60: Nuclear capital cost sampling histogram
In the case of wind power, we again varied the original cost, but in this case the
original cost was more complicated. Wind costs in the EPA input database vary
with time and with the type of wind site used, forming a matrix of capital costs. To
maintain that structure, we multiplied the matrix of costs by a number, N, the wind
capital cost scaling factor. In the base case, N is 1, and we varied it by Monte Carlo
sampling a normal distribution based on the standard deviation in OECD wind
costs from the IEA "Projected Costs of Generating Electricity" study. A histogram
of the sampled values is shown in Figure 6152.
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Figure 61: Wind capital cost scaling factor sampling histogram
We find that the level of nuclear capacity depends strongly on the capital cost, as
shown in Figure 6253. Above about $3800/kWe, nuclear is not installed at all, and
in cases with costs above $3444/kWe, nuclear is deployed only in the low gas
resource case.
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Figure 62: Nuclear installed capacity variation with capital cost and wind
cost
In instances where the wind cost scaling factor is particularly low (wind power is
relatively inexpensive), nuclear capacity falls, replaced by lower cost wind. This is
evident, for example, in the lowest nuclear cost case of $2014/kWe; we would expect
a high installed nuclear capacity, but wind costs are varied independently, and in
this case due to the very low wind cost scaling factor of 0.56, we actually see a
decrease in nuclear capacity. Wind power and nuclear power are not perfect
substitutes due to the variability of the wind resource, but the dispatch model in
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MARKAL accounts for this effect. The set of sampled wind and nuclear capital costs
is run three times, under each of the three natural gas resource scenarios described
by Figure 5950.
While the variation in results due to changes in capital costs are marked, the
impact of gas supply on electric power is more subtle. This may be because the
chosen Mid Demand Low C02 scenario relies very little on natural gas in the
original case without sensitivity analysis. In fact, by 2050 nearly all generation
comes from coal with CCS, with some from wind, as shown in Figure 6354. This is a
result of the carbon constraint, which doesn't leave much allowance for natural gas
emissions in the electric power sector.
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Figure 63: Electricity generation
scenario
by technology for Mid Demand Low C02
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When we instead take the mean of the sampled sensitivity cases for mean natural
gas supply, we have the mix of generation shown in Figure 6455. Rather than the
nearly binary decision on nuclear capacity characterized by Figure 6253, we see a
modest capacity of nuclear power along with substantial wind and coal with CCS
and a dramatic deployment of natural gas with CCS. Here, "Other" includes
conventional coal, hydro, and several other energy sources.
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Figure 64: Average share of electricity generation by technology, mean gas
resource
The generation mix for the low gas resource case is shown in Figure 6556 and the
mix for the high gas resource case is shown in Figure 6657. Neither is dramatically
different from the mean resource case. This may be because under a stringent
carbon constraint the electric power sector must lower its carbon intensity to almost
zero, so even when gas is used in these scenarios, it is primarily in plants with CCS.
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These are more capital intensive than conventional gas plants, and thus show less
correlation in cost of electricity with natural gas wellhead costs. Increasing natural
gas resources would be expected to have the most positive impact on conventional
gas plants, which are nearly absent here due to their CO2 emissions. Another factor
that dampens the impact of domestic gas resource variation is substitution of
imported gas. As Figure 6758 shows, the level of gas imports varies dramatically;
when domestic resources are lower, more gas is imported, and vice versa. If
imported natural gas became very expensive, this might not happen so readily, but
in the current model it is a strong effect.
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Figure 65: Average share of electricity by technology, low gas resource
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Figure 66: Average share of electricity generation by technology, high gas
resource
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Figure 67: Average cumulative net imports of natural gas
The next two figures show the variation in the use of natural gas for electricity in
more detail. Figure 6859 shows the level of electricity generation from natural gas
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High Gas Case
from 2010-2050 in the three resource scenarios. The paths are very similar, again
highlighting the small impact of the change in domestic gas supply for the Mid
Demand Low C02 scenario.
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Figure 68: Electricity generation using natural gas, 2010-2050
Figure 6960 shows the total cumulative electricity generation from gas in each case,
and this gives the intuitive result that the most electricity from gas is generated in
the high resource scenario, and the least in the low resource scenario. All cases,
however, are within 10% of each other, reflecting the high substitution of imported
natural gas.
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Figure 69: Total cumulative electricity generation using natural gas, 2010-
2050
In comparison with the reduced CO 2 scenarios in the MIT Future of Natural Gas
study, these results show a greater reliance on nuclear and on coal with CCS than
on natural gas. This is probably because the carbon constraint is more stringent in
this case, and because nuclear power growth is less constrained. In the BAU
Demand BAU C02 and Mid C02 cases, the 2050 electric power mix shows a much
larger increase in conventional natural gas electricity generation compared with
2010 (up to roughly two-thirds of total electric generation in the BAU C02 case). In
these cases, increased natural gas supply would be expected to translate into
increased consumption both because of its larger role in the generation mix and the
lower cost of emissions that enables the use of lower capital cost conventional gas
technology rather than gas with CCS. Conventional gas generation is more
dependent on fuel price, so its use would be more sensitive to changes in gas supply.
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3.2 Chapter 3 Part II: Investments in Energy Innovation
In the first part of this chapter, we have estimated the capital investment
requirements for the build-out of new generating capacity in a clean energy
transition. Those investments will be influenced by many external risks, including
uncertainties over the future price of energy, the regulatory regime, and the
adoption of policy tools like carbon caps and other restrictions.
Under greenhouse gas reduction scenarios, much of that investment will need to be
made in low-carbon technologies that are not competitive in the marketplace today,
and that cannot, at least initially, be built at the cost assumed in most models.
These technologies will require additional investments to resolve technological
risks, to generate more information about performance, to develop complementary
resources such as supply chain capabilities, new workforce skills, and regulatory
systems, and to exploit learning phenomena to bring costs down to a competitive
level. Typically these investments will be made at a time when there is still
considerable uncertainty and risk associated with the performance of the new
technologies, and when they may not be competitive with the incumbent energy
systems. No less than investments in research and development, these are
investments in innovation. In the second part of this chapter we present a method
for estimating the magnitude of the innovation investment required to bring a
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generic technology to a competitive cost level. (In the remainder of this chapter, we
use the term 'innovation investment' specifically to refer to the investment required
to bring a technology with demonstrated technical viability to the point at which it
is able to compete in the marketplace.) We begin by providing background
information on the parties that are involved in these innovation investments and
the conditions that influence their actions.
3.2.1 The Environment for Energy Innovation Investments
Investors in energy innovation include private technology developers of energy
supply and demand devices, federal, state, and local governments, ISOs and RTOs,
utilities, and independent power producers, as described in detail in Chapter 1.
Private sector investors like banks, hedge and pension funds, private equity and
venture capital firms, and wealthy individuals all play a significant role in funding
new projects in energy technologies that promote innovation. In general these
different types of investor have different affinities for risk-taking as well as
different amounts of capital to invest. Many of them have the option to invest in
innovations outside the energy sector. In evaluating opportunities in the energy
sector, they must consider all of the risks that would be involved in investments in
competitive technologies (e.g., unstable policy, uncertainties in the future price of
energy, regulatory uncertainties), as well as the intrinsic technological risks
associated with investments at this earlier stage. These include the risk that the
technology does not operate as expected and the risk that its cost cannot be
sufficiently reduced. Investments in innovation are often dependent on subsidy
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policies, so there is additional risk associated with policy changes affecting those
subsidies. While the specific examples explored in this chapter will be focused on
nuclear power technologies, the methods used here can equally be applied to
technologies involved in energy storage, alternative fuels, and consumption (e.g.
batteries, automobiles, appliances, heating, lighting, etc.)
In cases where carbon emissions are considered to be a negative environmental
impact, subsidies may be enacted to encourage low-carbon technologies; however,
all such subsidies must then be measured against the implicit subsidy to the carbon
emitters, i.e. the failure to compel emitters to bear the costs of carbon emissions. As
long as this carbon externality remains un-corrected, any subsidy to low-carbon
technology is effectively reduced by the lack of a carbon cost. To overcome that
effect, any such subsidy must be much larger than would be needed in the absence
of this market failure. Policies for attracting investment in low-carbon energy
innovation are generally aimed either at increasing revenues or lowering costs (e.g.
through production tax credits, feed-in tariffs, and rebates) or at lowering risks
(e.g., by providing regulatory delay insurance, loan guarantees, or purchasing
agreements). Subsidies can be funded through a variety of channels. They can be
taxpayer-funded through the federal or state appropriations process, they can be
supported by user fees, such as a charge on consumer electric bills, by a production-
based fee, by a tax on carbon emission or on energy use, or through some other
mechanism.
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Experience suggests that investments in modular technologies (with low costs per
module) or technologies with low project costs or unit costs can be stimulated by
subsidy programs like temporary production tax credits. We see this in solar power
in particular, as well as in Energy Star@ appliance incentives and automotive tax
credits. But these subsidies have so far proved generally insufficient to induce very
large investments, especially in high-capital-outlay technologies like nuclear or coal
with CCS. Once a project becomes large enough that a total loss would threaten the
financial viability of the investor, programs with modest incentives or short time
horizons have little impact. Such investments tie up large amounts of private
capital that may take decades to fully recover, so evidence of long-term (i.e. decades)
profitability is more important than in less costly projects that will pay off in
several years or fewer. Large investments of this type are hampered by the risk
that technology-specific subsidy programs will be short-lived, and they will then be
left to compete against carbon-emitting technologies that benefit from the implicit
subsidy of costless emissions. Thus, these investments may depend on electric rate-
payer-financed construction cost recovery, or a predictable and stable long-term
carbon policy (cap or tax). An adequately large combination of direct incentives
like government cost-sharing, loan guarantees, tax credits, and regulatory
insurance may also spur investment, but these programs are hindered by the
administrative process of case-by-case application and negotiation, and thus have
narrower and slower impact than would a carbon price. These efforts do have value
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38in preserving technological options for use under a future carbon constraint. But
they are not the best approach to achieving rapid scale-up of electric generation
technologies with large per-project capital cost.
Targeted temporary technology-specific subsidy policies have proved easier to
implement than an economy-wide carbon constraint. Comprehensive carbon
constraints, in principle, have many more 'losers,' since all emitters currently
benefiting from the carbon externality would see increasing costs. Additionally, the
impact on the economy, particularly in the short term, would be more pervasive
than those caused by most direct subsidies targeted at low-carbon technologies.
Such subsidies do, however, compete for funding with other areas of public interest
like national defense, education, healthcare, other environmental initiatives, and
many other needs that place demands on the budget. Even technologies that are
complementary in practice must compete for investment from a limited pool of
funding. Investors are then faced with the challenge of building a portfolio of
options within a budget while still investing sufficient funds to enable progress and
success in each case.
3.2.2 Investment in Each Stage of Innovation
Not only does investment need to reach many sectors and many technologies within
the energy sector, it also must reach all key stages of innovation. Revisiting our
earlier illustration of the innovation process, Figure 7061 shows the four stages of
creating options, demonstrating viability, early adoption, and improvements-in-use.
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For sustained energy innovation and continued development towards a low-carbon
energy system, consistent and simultaneous investment is needed at all four stages
(Lester & Hart 2012). While the level of technological uncertainty is reduced in the
later stages, the amount of investment at risk is much larger.
Creating options Demonstrating Early adoption Improvements-
"Ideation" viabilty Market/regulatory
Laboratory Market testing development Continued cost
research Debugging Manufacturing
Development and System integration Complementary net
proof of concept Risk reduction infrastructure
Prototyping esdeployment Learning-by-doing/Demonstration at Limited using
Pilot-scale commercial scale competition Carbon pricing
Seed stage Scale: Learning-by-doing/ Evolutionary
Scale- $10M-1B using advances
$1OOK-100M Economies of scale scale: Up to
Scale: Up to $1006 of billions
$106 of billions
Figure 70: Steps in the energy innovation process (Source: Lester & Hart 2012)
Just as the private sector is not strongly inclined to invest in fundamental research
at the option-creation stage (Griliches 1992), in the absence of long-term policy
stability it is unlikely to invest in major high-risk efforts at the demonstration stage
for the reasons described in the previous section. Public funding is made available
for fundamental research to compensate for the lack of private funding; but the
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stages of demonstrating viability and of early adoption often have investment
requirements that exceed the financial capabilities of government agencies in terms
of project cost and size (as well creating demands for knowledge of the marketplace
that public policymakers may not have), so cost-sharing and joint decision-making
with industry, at a minimum, is necessary. However, in the absence of strong
policy, industry is hard-pressed to commit to large investments even with
government cost-sharing. These large investments in demonstration projects do not
promise great immediate profits; their value to private sector participants lies
primarily in the possibility of future market potential. If the potential is great,
demonstration participants may benefit from early involvement in the market, from
expertise and experience gained through demonstration, and from the ability to
build up specialized capabilities and relationships with the assistance of
government funding. If government policies are crucial to market success and those
policies are not stable, the private sector may be hesitant to invest because there is
uncertain expected future market and uncertain benefit to early involvement. The
next stage, improvements-in-use, can only progress if a technology is being
consistently deployed in the market.
Little is currently known about how to balance investments, public or private,
among these various stages of innovation. There is consensus about the need to
invest in all stages, but when it comes to optimizing the distribution or timing, or
even modeling the impact of investments at a given stage versus those at another,
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current analytical tools are underdeveloped. Ultimately, innovation investment
decisions would benefit most from a comprehensive model of the effects of
investments at each stage and for different technologies over time. This would
enable decision makers in business and in government to weigh the costs and
benefits of all options before making investment commitments, thus enabling the
most efficient use of scarce resources. The reduced uncertainty that would come
from this modeling capability would also encourage total investments in energy
technology to grow, and would enable policymakers to design more efficient policies.
3.2.3 A Simplified Two-Stage Model of Innovation Investment
With the long-term goal of a comprehensive innovation investment model in mind,
here we take a first step with a highly simplified model. We begin with a stylized
two-stage model of the innovation process, illustrated in Figure 7162.
Front-End Innovation Learning-Based Innovat on
*eu&D e Leaming by doing
* Prototying * Evolutionary advancements
* System integration ammte Market development, etc.
" Demonstration, etc.
Equivalent to a combination of Equivalent to a combination of "Early
"Creating Options" and "Demonstrating Adoption" and "Improvements-in-use"
Figure 71: Simplified two-stage model of the innovation process
The first stage represents those 'front-end innovation' activities that are aimed at
reducing the cost and increasing the viability of a technology before its practical
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introduction. It is equivalent to the combination of those efforts made in the first
two steps of the innovation process presented in Figure 7061 and in Unlocking
Energy Innovation: How America Can Build a Low-Cost, Low-Carbon Energy
System (Lester & Hart, 2012).
In this stylized first step, substantial up-front investments are made with the
expectation of improving the technology long before it is able to generate any
income in the marketplace. These investments carry a large risk, but are not nearly
the magnitude of those in the following stylized step of 'learning-based innovation'.
This latter step is equivalent to a combination of the latter two stages in Lester &
Hart: "early adoption" and "improvements-in-use." In this stage, technology is
improved and costs are reduced through experience gained, learning and efficiencies
achieved, and economies of scale.
The next section presents our modeling approach and the findings of our analysis.
3.2.3.1 Two-Stage Innovation Model Architecture
Our model simulates the progress of one pre-commercial technology through the
two-step innovation process illustrated in Figure 7162. The primary purpose of this
model is to provide a tool for policymakers to understand the cost of incentivizing
that innovation under different circumstances. The model consists of three states
and two process phases, with three investment types. A schematic representation
of the model is given in Figure 7263. The "Initial State" is the state of the
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technology at the beginning of the modeling time period. For our use here, this will
be 2012. The technology has an initial capital cost, CCInit, and an initial installed
capacity, IC(0). For our use here, we take initial installed capacity to be zero. A
technology in this state is technically ready for deployment, but is uneconomic.
From this initial state, the technology enters the "Front-end Innovation" phase. In
this phase, resources are optionally invested in research and development aimed at
reducing the capital cost prior to deployment. The abbreviation "RS," for Research
Subsidy, denotes these investments. Here, as in the MARKAL modeling in Section
3.1, the capital costs include engineering, procurement, and construction costs,
owner's costs, contingency costs, and construction interest, so reductions in any of
these factors will serve to reduce our capital cost. The technology next enters the
"Interim State," which is subsequent to capital-cost-reducing R&D but prior to
commercial deployment. The technology now has a capital cost of CC1, and stillkhas
an installed capacity of IC(O). If no research subsidy is invested, CC1 will be
equivalent to CCInit. In general, CC1 is still too high for the technology to be fully
competitive with the incumbents.
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Figure 72: Innovation investment model schematic
The technology now enters the second phase of innovation, the learning-based
innovation (or "learning") phase, during which costs can be reduced as a result of
learning, evolutionary advancement, and market development that take place
during the early period of deployment. At the same time, since the technology is
uncompetitive with the incumbents, we assume that a "Production Subsidy" PS is
required to incentivize deployment of the technology. The total production subsidy,
summed over all subsidized units, is the amount needed to bring the cost of the
technology from that of the early adopter down to the cost that is competitive in the
market. We conjecture that without this subsidy private industry would be
unwilling to invest in the high-risk technology. The total innovation investment
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includes the private funds that are also invested in these plants, and this model can
yield that information as well, but since the primary motivation for the model is to
develop tools to aid policymakers, our focus is on the subsidy costs of incentivizing
private expenditures and the decisions affecting those public funds. We define the
PS for each plant built in terms of the Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE). The
LCOE for the subsidized plant is derived from the capital (and fuel and operating
and maintenance) costs of the technology. The competitive LCOE is that at which
the plant produces electricity that is competitively priced relative to the incumbent
generation technologies. The capital cost that corresponds to the competitive LCOE
is what we will refer to as the competitive capital cost. In our simplified model, only
capital costs decline during the learning period; other components of LCOE remain
constant. The required production subsidy for each megawatt-hour generated is the
difference between the LCOE of the subsidized unit and the competitive LCOE (in
$/MWhr). The production subsidy is required for each MWhr produced by a
subsidized unit for a 20-year period. (Twenty years is chosen as a likely capital
recovery period; after all of the initial capital is recovered, we assume the
production subsidy is no longer necessary.) The payments begin when the plant
begins generating electricity. With no learning and no other mechanism for cost
reduction, a production subsidy would be needed indefinitely, unless the competitive
LCOE rose to meet the subsidized LCOE. This model is intended to model
innovation, so cost reductions due to learning do lower the LCOE and thus the
production subsidy for each subsequent plant.
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The literature on learning curves provides a method for exploring this stage of
innovation. The following outline provides a summary of the main mechanisms for
cost reduction during this stage. The mechanisms affect both construction and
operations & maintenance:
1. Construction cost declines
o Lower owner's costs
- Lower contingency factor as technology matures
- Lower interest during construction
e Lower interest rates
* Faster construction time
- Lower licensing/delay/litigation costs
o Lower EPC costs due to mass production, improved quality
control, established manufacturing partnerships, lower
contingency
2. Operating & Maintenance cost declines
o Increase in labor productivity
o Increase in capacity factor/reliability
o Generic "learning" improvements
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In many applications, including electricity generation, these processes are
approximated by learning curves, which describe the cost reduction as a function of
cumulative installed capacity according to the relationship:
P(t) = P(O) q(t)
q(O))
Where:
P(t) = cost of technology at time t
q(t) = cumulative production at time t
b = learning coefficient
and
Progress Ratio = PR =2-.
For each doubling of cumulative installed capacity, the cost decreases by a factor of
(1-PR). For a more in-depth description of learning curves and their application to
energy technologies see Jamasb 2007 and IAEA 2000.
In our model, learning leads to a reduction in capital cost over time. In future work,
the learning process could be disaggregated so that different contributors to cost
reduction could be varied independently. This refinement would be valuable if a
relationship between specific investments and specific cost reduction mechanisms
could be established. Here we posit that innovation investments in the form of a
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"Progress Ratio Subsidy" (PRS) can improve (i.e., reduce) the progress ratio. There
is currently no proven mechanism for achieving this result; however, the
possibilities for achieving this will be discussed later. Investment in the PRS is
made primarily during the time period encompassing the time of initial deployment.
It would likely begin slightly before deployment, peak with the first several projects,
and then decrease over time. Here we approximate it as an investment made at the
point of initial deployment. We will also refer to the PRS as a "learning subsidy."
In the learning phase of the model, the capital cost of the technology declines as
installed capacity rises in accordance with the learning curve equation. At the
outset of this phase, two attributes characterize a given technology: capital cost,
CC1, and PR, the progress ratio. The first plant has capital cost CC1, the second
has CC2 where CC2 = CC1* (IC(2)/IC(1))^(ln(PR)) according to the learning curve
equation, the third benefits from a doubling of capacity and has CC3 where CC3=
(1-PR)*CC1, and so on. This continues until the capital cost falls to CCFin, at
which point the technology is considered competitive in the marketplace. At this
point, we have reached the policy goal of bringing the technology to a competitive
state, and the model period ends. In the marketplace, learning would continue, but
cost reductions occur increasingly slowly (in capacity terms), and a subsidy is no
longer required to support the deployment of the technology.
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The primary purpose of this model is to enable the optimization of the two modes of
cost reduction discussed above. The relative impact of reductions in initial capital
cost and reductions in progress ratio on total subsidy costs could aid policymakers
in determining the proper allocation of resources. Before the model can be used to
accomplish this, however, the relationship between a given investment in RS and
the intermediate capital cost CC1 must be known, as must the impact of an
investment in PRS on the progress ratio. This is an important area for future
work, with the latter topic, in particular, being currently under-investigated.
3.2.3.2 Innovation Model Example Case 1: ALWR
As a first example of the application of the model, we take the ALWR that was used
in the MARKAL modeling in Section 3.1. We assume that the competitive capital
cost is $4,296/kWe, the cost used in the database. Variable Operations and
Maintenance (O&M) and fixed O&M costs are also drawn from the model, and a
capital recovery factor of 0.16 is used to compute LCOE (based on a recovery time of
20 years, an interest rate of 15%, and no taxes). Each plant unit is of 1 GWe
capacity. The resulting competitive LCOE is $94.1/MWhr. Given the end
(competitive) state, we suppose that the initial capital cost is higher, and a goal is
set to bring the technology down to the competitive cost. We can explore the
relative effectiveness of changes in initial capital cost and progress ratio in reducing
the production subsidy required to achieve a competitive capital cost.
In general, the total subsidy, TS, is the sum of the three specific subsidies:
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TS = PS + RS + PRS. In a case with RS 1 = 0 and PRS1 = 0, then TS 1 = PS 1. If instead
we look at a case with research and learning investment, so RS2 > 0 and PRS 2 > 0,
then TS 2 = PS2 + RS 2 + PRS2. If the research and learning subsidies are
worthwhile, then we will have TS2 < TS 1. For this to be true, the amount invested in
research and learning must be less than the savings in production subsidy, such
that RS 2 + PRS2 < PS1 - PS2 .
In this case, we know the competitive cost, but not the initial cost (CCInit) or the
interim cost (CC1), so we consider multiple possibilities. Figure 7364 shows the
magnitude of the total production subsidy at various interim capital costs for five
different progress ratios. In this case we take CC1 = CCInit. The results show that
the higher the initial cost, the greater the potential PS reduction due to progress
ratio reduction. For example, at the maximum capital cost shown ($10,800/kWe,
roughly 2.5 times the competitive level), reducing the PR from 0.92 to 0.90 results
in over $1.3 trillion in PS savings. The characteristic shape of the curves indicates
that the returns to progress ratio improvements are favored at higher initial capital
costs.
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Figure 73: Total production subsidy versus interim capital cost at varied
progress ratios for a representative ALWR
Figure 7465 shows the amount of capacity installed during the learning phase for
varied PR and CC1. In the high PR cases, CC1 is limited below the other cases to
improve visibility of the graph. Since each plant is 1 GWe capacity in this case, the
graph also gives the number of subsidized plants installed in each case. A faster
learning rate has a dramatic effect on that number.
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Figure 7566 shows the required production subsidy as a function of progress ratio at
higher magnification at two different interim costs: one where CC1 is twice the
competitive cost, and one where it is 1.5 times that level.
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In the case of the higher initial cost, an improvement in the progress ratio from 0.93
to 0.92 results in very substantial savings of over $500 Billion. In the lower cost
case, the benefit of investing in improving the progress ratio is less. In other words,
the farther the technology must travel on the learning curve, the more important is
the slope of that curve. (Or the larger the cost gap, the more important is the speed
of improvement in capacity terms.) Suppose that innovation investment aimed at
reducing the progress ratio involves efforts like setting up institutions for sharing
results and learning, working to standardize certain aspects of the technology, or
improving education and training. Such efforts would not be likely to vary with the
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starting capital cost of the technology, although they may vary based on the pre-
existing foundation, the complexity or novelty of the technology, or other factors.
Since the benefits to reducing the progress ratio are so great in cases with high
initial capital costs, and the innovation investment required in achieving that may
not scale accordingly, it appears most promising to explore the use of a progress
ratio subsidy in cases where the needed cost reduction is greatest. In simpler
quantitative terms, looking to Figure 7566, the reduction in PS indicates that a
policymaker or planner could be willing to spend up to $500 Billion to effect a PR
reduction from 0.93 to 0.92 in the higher capital cost case. (This assumes that
policymakers and planners are willing to implement a progress ratio subsidy as
large as the amount that they expect to save in the production subsidy.) In the
lower capital cost case, policymakers would be willing to spend less than $23 Billion
to achieve the same reduction in the progress ratio.
Figure 7667 shows, for several starting capital cost levels, the "equivalent" percent
reduction in capital cost from CCInit to CC1 (i.e. (CCInit-CC1)/CCInit*100%) and
reduction in progress ratio as they impact the total PS. That is, the curves are
indifference curves that show those reductions that result in equal production
subsidy savings, and thus those that a planner should be willing to invest equal
resources in achieving. Supporting the conclusions drawn from the previous chart,
we see that in the case of CCInit = 1.5*CCFin where the unsubsidized progress
ratio is 0.90, a policymaker is willing to make an equal innovation investment
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either to reduce capital cost by 10% to CC1 (CC1 = 0.9*CCInit) through front-end
innovation, or to reduce the progress ratio from 0.9 to 0.81 through a progress ratio
subsidy. Further work is needed to draw final conclusions from this; the
effectiveness of these two mechanisms of innovation investment is not well
understood. However, based solely on common sense and on the inexperience with
reducing progress ratios, one might suspect that a 10% reduction in capital cost
would be a more realistic goal than a nine-point reduction in progress ratio. On the
other hand, in the case where CCInit = 4*CCFin, it is less clear. It is plausible that
a nine point reduction in progress ratio is less challenging than a 43% decrease in
capital cost through R&D.
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As mentioned earlier, knowledge of the relationship between spending and
outcomes for each of the innovation mechanisms would render this analysis
actionable in a real case. The option of investing in neither the research nor the
learning subsidy is also available, of course. As long as some learning takes place,
it would in theory be possible to pay the production subsidy on all plants until they
became competitive. Ideally, the research or learning subsidy would allow the
planner to leverage those investments, such that the savings in production subsidy
would be greater than the costs of the research and learning subsidies. This would
reduce the total required innovation investment, which consists of the sum of the
three subsidies in our model.
3.2.3.3 Innovation Model Example Case 2: ALWR with Time Constraint
Aside from simply deciding whether an investment in RS or PRS will pay off in net
terms, there is the important dimension of time to consider. As discussed earlier,
the timing of the three types of investment are quite different. The RS is made well
before a technology (an ALWR in this case) can be deployed in the marketplace, the
PRS is made primarily during the time period surrounding early adoption, and the
PS is made more gradually, with some investment corresponding to each plant
deployed while the learning-based innovation phase is ongoing. The timing of these
investments has implications for policy and budgets: it may be difficult to support
large up-front investment in R&D, but it may also be difficult to commit to a long-
term program of production subsidies, etc.
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To incorporate time into the model, we begin with a policy goal. In our example, the
goal draws on the work in the MARKAL modeling of 3.1. In the Mid Demand Low
C02 scenario, nuclear energy is not deployed in the unperturbed case. Here we
suppose that it is a policy goal to bring nuclear ALWR costs down to a level that
supports competitive use in 2025. By iteratively running MARKAL at decreasing
nuclear capital costs, we find that the ALWR capital cost must fall to $3440/kWe by
2025 to be competitive in this scenario. We take $6000/kWe as the current capital
cost (CCInit) and assume that plants can be built from 2012 through 2025 before
they reach $3440/kWe (acknowledging that the completion of a new build in the
U.S. in 2012 is unrealistic).
Figure 7768 shows the total production subsidy for a selection of cases in which
either the progress ratio is reduced or the starting capital cost is reduced.
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One of the causes of the variation in PS is the number of units that must be built
before learning is 'complete' and the competitive cost is reached. Figure 7869 shows
the required number of subsidized units for the different cases. This could be an
important factor outside of total subsidy cost. While this model assumes no
transaction costs, in reality there may be costs associated with each project. For
example, if, as with the nuclear loan guarantee program, the subsidies are
determined on a case-by-case basis, substantial time and money might be spent
assessing each project, negotiating, and reaching (or failing to reach) an agreement
in each case. These costs should be minimized where possible, but if they cannot be
eliminated, then fewer subsidized projects will result in lower transaction costs.
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Figure 78: Number of plant units installed during the learning-based-
innovation phase for a representative ALWR
In order to explore the timing of investment requirements, we chose a building
schedule that began with one plant in the first year and a slow ramp up to a
constant rate of construction. Figure 7970 shows the timing of builds for the case of
CCInit = $6000 and PR = 0.91. The schedule follows a similar shape for all cases.
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Figure 79: Unit build schedule during the learning-based-innovation phase
for a representative ALWR with CC1 = $6000/kWe and PR = 0.91
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Figure 8071 shows the production subsidy schedule for each case. The profiles are
similar, all reaching their maximum in 2025 when the last subsidized plant is built,
and falling off sharply when the first few plants (which require the greatest
subsidy) reach the age of 20 years. For all except the highest subsidy cost case, the
PR-reduction and starting-cost-reduction cases are paired, with each requiring
roughly the same total PS. Discounting can also affect the present value of future
savings and the breakeven point for current investments. In this model we have
not included any discounting effects because of the current lack of information
about the quantitative effectiveness of innovation investments. This should be
incorporated in future work. For each pair of cases in Figure 8071 the PS costs for
the PR-reduction case are weighted toward the beginning of the period, while the
PS costs for the starting capital cost reduction case are slightly deferred in time.
The addition of discounting to the model will further affect this aspect of the PS
profile. This may be of interest in considering policy design.
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In the highest PS case (CC1 = $6000 and PR = 0.91), the curve describes all of the
modeled innovation investments. In the other cases, though, earlier innovation
investments are also required. In the reduced starting capital cost cases,
investments (RS) are made in R&D well before 2012. In the reduced PR cases,
investments (PRS) in reducing the progress ratio are made beginning somewhat
before 2012 and continuing through at least the first several years of deployment.
The choice between earlier and later investments, and the net savings associated
with the earlier investment approach are important aspects of policy decisions that
could be illuminated by this model, particularly when combined with knowledge
about the size of the PRS and RS that would be required.
3.2.3.4 Innovation Model Example Case 3: A Choice of Two Technologies
Here we use the two-stage innovation investment model to investigate a topic of
current interest. Positing a choice between a policy that commits innovation
investment to gigawatt-scale ALWRs or to Light Water Small Modular Reactors
(LWSMRs), we explore some characteristics of the options.
The ALWR modeled here is the same as that described in the previous section, with
CCInit = $6,000/kWe and a unit size of 1 GWe. For a generic LWSMR we assume a
200MWe unit size and CCInit = $8,000/kWe. We assume that in both cases, the
reactors must reach a unit cost of $3440/kWe by 2025. Here, as in the MARKAL
modeling in Section 3.1, the capital costs include engineering, procurement, and
construction costs, owner's costs, contingency costs, and construction interest, so
190
reductions in any of these factors will serve to reduce this capital cost. While SMRs
may not be capable of reaching an overnight cost as low as that of an ALWR, their
shorter construction times and perhaps lower risk premiums and contingency
factors allow for the possibility that they could achieve equal capital cost on the
terms we have defined. Figure 8172 shows the number of LWSMR units installed
during the learning phase for a variety of PRs. The large numbers (compared with
the number of ALWRs) reflect the higher starting price, and thus the greater cost
reduction required.
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Figure 81: Number of units installed during the learning phase for
representative LWSMR
While the number of units is large, since the LWSMRs are only 200 MWe in size,
the total installed capacity in GWe is just one-fifth the number of units. To achieve
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a given degree of learning (doubling the number of units, for example), the LWSMR
requires much lower capacity (1/5), and thus lower total investment. It has the
disadvantage of starting from a higher capital cost level than the ALWR. LWSMRs
are proposed in module sizes of 50 MWe or less, and these smaller plants would see
even greater effect from their small size, requiring even lower total capacity than
our 200 MWe version if they were starting at the same CC1. However, smaller
units may have higher capital costs per kWe, offsetting, more or less, the benefit of
their size. Figure 8273 shows the production subsidy cost profile for the LWSMR at
varying progress ratios. It shows the same general trend as the ALWR, except that
the smaller unit size of the LWSMR results in smoother transitions from low to
high to low subsidy costs.
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Figure 82: Production subsidy profile in time for a representative LWSMR
Figure 8374 shows the total production subsidy cost for the LWSMR with changes
in PR (indicating learning-enhancing innovation investments) and changes in
starting capital cost (indicating R&D innovation investments).
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As one basis for comparing the learning phase of the LWSMR and the ALWR, we
take the capital costs at the beginning of learning to be CCnit ($6000/kWe for the
ALWR and $8000/kWe for the LWSMR). Figure 8475 gives the total production
subsidy required to reduce the cost of each technology to $3440/kWe as a function of
the progress ratio. For these starting cost conditions, we find that for progress
ratios above 0.88, the ALWR production subsidy is less costly, but for lower progress
ratios (faster learning), the LWSMR has a lower production subsidy. The starting
capital costs and the size of each plant unit will affect this intersection point.
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Figure 84: Total production subsidy for LWSMR and ALWR as a function of
progress ratio
Because LWSMRs are designed to be modular, factory-built, and completely
standardized, many expect to see faster learning from LWSMRs than from ALWRs.
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If this bears out, we might expect that if, say, the ALWR progress ratio is 0.90, then
the LWSMR progress ratio might be 0.89 or less. In this case, the LWSMR
production subsidy would be lower than that for the ALWR. This result is
particularly important because it suggests that there are circumstances where
policies supporting a higher initial cost technology might be less costly over time
than those supporting a lower initial cost technology. This directly challenges a
pattern of policymaking described in the next chapter; during the development of
nuclear power in the U.S., policymakers who were motivated by the goal of
controlling spending and budgets repeatedly chose only to fund demonstrations of
the lowest-cost (at that time) technologies, i.e., LWRs. At the same time, other
technologies were relegated to design studies and other conceptual efforts. While
we cannot know how a different strategy would have unfolded in that particular
case, the evidence shown in Figure 8475 suggests that in some cases, higher unit-
cost technologies may benefit more from learning-based innovation investment,
while technologies that are closer to commercially competitive costs may benefit
most from R&D aimed at reducing initial cost.
3.2.3.5 Innovation Model Example Case 4: ALWR with Future Competitive
Cost Uncertainty
In the examples described above, it was necessary to estimate the future
competitive capital cost of the new technology, which implicitly involved estimating
the future competitive price of electricity. But there is considerable uncertainty
associated with the competitive electricity price trajectory. If the electric price
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proves lower than expected, the competitive cost of the new technology will also be
lower. To reach that cost level, more units will require a production subsidy to
compete, and the total production subsidy cost will be greater than expected.
Conversely, should the competitive electricity price prove higher than expected, the
new technology will outperform expectations and production subsidies will be
needed for fewer units. The magnitude of the increase or the reduction in the
production subsidy requirement resulting from a failure to predict the future price
of electricity correctly will vary depending on whether the innovation strategy
emphasizes reducing CC1 through RD&D investments or whether it emphasizes
reductions in the progress ratio through investments in accelerated learning. Here
we explore how the outcomes of these two innovation strategies are affected by
uncertainty in the future competitive electricity price.
We consider Example 2, in which an ALWR with CCInit = $6000/kWe and a default
PR of 0.90 must be brought to a capital cost of $3440/kWe by 2025. In the base case
with no additional initial cost reduction or PR reduction, the total production
subsidy required to achieve this is $77.4 Billion. We then take the cases in which
future competitive capital cost is 10% higher, 10% lower, 20% higher, or 20% lower
than $3440. Figure 8576 shows the variation in production subsidy in each case. In
the more challenging cases, the assumption is made that additional plants must be
built under subsidy to move the capital cost from $3440/kWe to the lower required
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cost, and that the new cost does not change while the additional plants are being
built (perhaps for several years).
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Figure 85: Production subsidy under competitive capital cost uncertainty
Since each additional unit reflects learning and thus requires a smaller subsidy
than the previous unit, one result is that the reduction in the production subsidy
associated with a higher-than-expected competitive cost target is greater than the
increase in the required subsidy associated with an equivalent lowering of the
competitive cost target. In Figure 8576, a 10% reduction in CCFin causes a 1.4%
increase in the required production subsidy, whereas a 10% increase in CCFin
results in a 12% reduction in the production subsidy.
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Next, we explore the effect of long-term price uncertainty on the relative
attractiveness of different innovation strategies designed to reduce the production
subsidy. We consider two innovation strategies, each of which is designed to reduce
the production subsidy by the same amount: from $77.4B to $61.2B. In the first
strategy, investment in accelerated learning is used to reduce the progress ratio
from 0.9 to 0.89. In the second strategy, investment in RD&D is used to reduce CC1
from $6000/kWe to $5791/kWe. Figure 8677 illustrates the impact of unforeseen
changes in the competitive electricity price, and hence the competitive capital cost,
for each strategy.
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modest PS reduction strategies
In the cases that result in PS savings, the strategy of lowering CC1 results in
greater savings than the strategy of enhancing learning. In the case of a 20% fall in
competitive price, the required PS is increased, but here the strategy of enhancing
learning is favored, though only very slightly. In the case of a 10% fall in
competitive price level, both strategies result in the same increase in PS. The latter
outcome results from the discrete nature of the PS; this case requires the
construction of one additional unit to achieve the competitive cost for both
strategies, and in both strategies that unit is built at a cost of $3440/kWe and must
be subsidized for 20 years.
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If we look at a more ambitious PS reduction case, the results are similar but more
pronounced. Figure 8778 shows the results for two strategies that reduce the
production subsidy to $24.4B. In the enhanced learning strategy, the PR must be
reduced to to 0.80 to achieve this goal, while the RD&D-based approach must
reduce CC1 to $5050/kWe.
Figure 87: Production subsidy for two ambitious PS reduction strategies
under uncertainty
In this case, we find that a 20% increase in competitive cost level results in just a
5% decrease in PS for the learning-based strategy, but a 33% decrease in PS for the
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CC1 reduction strategy. Conversely, a 20% decline in the competitive capital cost
results in a PS increase of 25% with the CC1 reduction strategy, but only a 9%
increase under the PR reduction strategy. The divergence in results between
strategies in this case is moderated by the effect of decreasing subsidies for each
additional unit, as discussed above for the case without a PS reduction strategy.
In each case above, we examined RD&D-based and enhanced-learning based
innovation strategies that produced the same savings in the production subsidy for
the expected electricity price trajectory. If the two alternative innovation strategies
had the same cost (i.e. RS = PRS), a planner would be indifferent between them to
first order, but the different behavior of the two strategies under uncertainty, as
illustrated above, might lead the planner to adopt one over the other. In reality, we
cannot yet determine the required value of RS or PRS to achieve the same PS
savings, but in general we would not expect them to be equal. The decision on
which strategy to use will then involve considering the overall cost (i.e., including
the cost of investment in innovation and the cost of the resulting production
subsidy), and the influence of uncertainty on the strategy, as we have been
exploring here. We have not performed a Monte Carlo uncertainty analysis here
because it would have little additional value without knowing the impact on
changes in RS and PRS. We would observe changes in PS with variations in electric
power prices, as is adequately demonstrated by the examples above. However, we
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would not know the total impact on subsidy costs, and would thus be unable to
calculate any expected values.
We have found that relative to a RD&D-based strategy that reduces CC1, a
learning-based strategy has a smaller "downside" (additional PS) when the expected
value of CCFin turns out to be too high, but also a smaller "upside" (PS savings)
when the forecasted CCFin is too low. This is an interesting result. Depending on
the shape of the uncertainty about future electric power costs, one strategy may
have a PS with a lower expected value, but may at the same time have a greater
probability of exceeding the budgeted amount, or of exceeding some predetermined
unacceptable level. Which innovation strategy is preferred may therefore depend
on whether the priority of the policymaker is to minimize the expected cost of the
strategy or to maximize the probability of remaining below some maximum
acceptable cost.
3.2.3.6 Value of this Innovation Model
When it can be combined with relationships describing the effectiveness of
investments in RD&D and in enhanced learning on costs, a model like the one
developed here will be a powerful tool for assessing policies aimed at bringing the
costs of novel technologies to a competitive level. It will allow policymakers to
estimate the total costs of supporting one technology versus another, and of using
one mechanism versus another, or a mix of mechanisms. Such a model will also
allow policymakers to study the timing of investment requirements, and the
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distribution of the innovation investment burden. If, for example, a production
subsidy is to be provided through ratepayer funding, and thus those costs will fall
on the ratepayer, policymakers might wish to cap those costs, and then determine
how to control them, either through providing an appropriate RD&D subsidy and/or
learning subsidy from another source.
The utility of such a model is extensive, and ultimately a more disaggregated model
of the innovation process would enable informed planning of many more aspects of
innovation support. The model developed here is primarily targeted at government
decision-making, but using such a model in a corporate strategy context would also
be possible, particularly to improve product development processes and resource
allocation.
The model also draws attention to an important topic for future research: learning
rate improvement. The model demonstrates the large potential savings associated
with an improved progress ratio, and suggests that efforts to improve learning could
be quite valuable. There is some evidence that policies can impact the slope of
learning curves that describe energy efficiency for demand-side technologies, but
currently there is no proof that progress ratios for production (or capital) costs can
be affected by large infusions of public resources into RD&D (Junginger et al. 2008).
However, neither is there proof to the contrary, and not all RD&D can be
characterized as an effort to enhance learning capacity. Indeed, most RD&D is not
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explicitly intended to achieve that goal. As we have mentioned in this section,
possible mechanisms for improving the progress ratio might include developing
institutions to enable better collaboration on lessons learned without compromising
commercially sensitive information. The Institute for Nuclear Power Operations
(INPO) provides a template for such an institution. Other ways to enhance learning
might be to build a coherent education and training plan on a national level to
support a growing technology, to provide standards and regulations earlier in the
innovation process to promote concentration of efforts to meet requirements, and to
provide common experimental space for industry use. Investments in such efforts
or other creative learning enhancements are learning investments, and it is
important to determine what options are available, to study their effectiveness, and
to work to develop new options that might be even more valuable. The energy
innovation system is the vehicle for moving learning enhancements forward, and so
the improvement and cohesion of that system will assist this effort.
3.3 Conclusions
This chapter has quantitatively substantiated several characteristics of a low-
carbon energy supply transition:
Without unprecedented improvements in energy efficiency, the burden on the
energy supply system is massive, but strong improvements in efficiency can
do much to alleviate that.
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- By 2050, low carbon scenarios generally imply lower natural gas capacity
than higher carbon ones, and greater idle capacity of both coal and natural
gas. Fossil capacity built early in the time period becomes a liability by 2050.
- Very stringent carbon reduction goals require substantial electrification of
the transportation sector.
- Meeting low-carbon electric power demand requires large amounts of low-
carbon baseload power.
- Total investments in the BAU demand scenario are much higher than
anything the power industry has approached in the past, but in low demand
cases they are manageable.
- Some portion of the investment is high-risk. These are atypical investments
for the electric power industry and will demand some other source of funds or
source of risk reduction.
- The magnitude of the high-risk investment is heavily influenced by the speed
of the learning process and by the initial cost of the low-carbon technologies.
- Technological learning is a valuable mechanism for cost reduction. Efforts
should be made to understand this phenomenon and how the energy
innovation system can impact it.
These findings, and particularly the last two, lead us to the conclusion that
innovation will play a crucial role in enabling a reduction in carbon emissions and,
importantly, in making that reduction affordable. The more effective the energy
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innovation system, the more it will help to reduce the costs of meeting policy goals.
The government, then, has a strong interest in seeing the energy innovation system
operate effectively, and since the government plays a significant role in that system
it also has opportunities to influence the outcome.
Having assessed the scope of the transition and the possible investment
implications, we will next use a historical perspective to identify concrete actions
that can be taken. In the next chapter, we review U.S. energy innovation policy as
it has related to nuclear power. We identify successes and failures, and point out
the improvements that are both possible and necessary moving forward.
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4 Chapter 4: U.S. Nuclear Energy Innovation Policy:
Lessons from History and Recommendations for the
Future
4.1 Introduction
Insights drawn from a review of past nuclear energy policies can be generalized
(with care) to the broader energy innovation system and can inform policies that
will help to drive the levels of investment discussed in Chapter 3. The historical
development of the nuclear power industry in the United States can shed light on
important questions that are being asked today, as Congress and the Executive
Branch struggle to devise a response to the dual challenges of energy security and
climate change. Among these questions:
- How can the government improve the prospects of large energy technology
demonstration projects?
- In its efforts to stimulate energy innovation, should the government provide
direct support for technology research and development? Should it
alternatively provide support for the creation of markets for the new
technologies? Or should it attempt to do both? If both, in what combination?
- What types of government intervention are likely to be most effective? Are
certain types of intervention more or less likely to cause technology 'lock-in'?
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* How can the government best regulate the nuclear industry so as to protect
the environment and health and safety without unduly inhibiting innovation?
- How can the government support the development of new small modular
reactors more effectively and efficiently than it did the first generation of
reactors?
The history of the nuclear power industry cannot provide definitive answers to
these questions, but it can offer some insights to inform future policy. We derive
some of those insights in this chapter.
4.2 The Struggle for Civilian Control
Nuclear power in the United States has its origins in the Manhattan Project and
the nuclear weapons development programs that followed. Between 1944 and
1946, policymakers debated the future of nuclear technology. Who would regulate
it, who would research it, who could patent or own it, and all manner of other issues
proved to be contentious. The most heated initial debate centered on whether
atomic research and development should be under civilian, military, or joint control.
Ultimately, the Senate approved the McMahon Bill, S. 1717, introduced on
December 20, 1945, which called for a five-member commission on atomic energy
consisting of civilian members appointed by the President. In both the Senate and
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the House of Representatives, debate was heated, with allegations that the bill was
"Soviet," socialistic, and that control of the bomb by a civilian commission was
dangerous and would be tantamount to giving the bomb to the Russians (Hewlett
and Anderson 1962). The patent provisions of the bill were seen as an assault on
industry, and a threat to all industries - not only to the field of atomic energy. The
provisions that were eventually adopted in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946
prohibited patents on all inventions "useful solely in the production of fissionable
material or in the utilization of fissionable material or atomic energy for a military
weapon," and also revoked all existing patents in that field. The bill prohibited
patents relating to research in nuclear fields, and granted the government the
power to license patents "affected with the public interest" as that related to atomic
energy, defense, fissionable materials, or any purposes of the Atomic Energy Act.
Other provisions affected the administrative process for obtaining a patent in the
atomic field (Ooms 1948).
The Atomic Energy Act was finally passed and was signed by President Truman on
August 1, 1946. It established the United States Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC), a Military Liaison Committee (MLC), a General Advisory Committee (GAC),
and the congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE). The AEC was to
be responsible for nuclear technology research, development, and regulation, as well
as the production, ownership, and control of all fissionable materials and nuclear
weapons in the U.S. The MLC would advise the AEC on the interests of the
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military, and the GAC would serve as scientific and technical advisor to the AEC.
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy would be responsible for overseeing the
AEC, and would have jurisdiction over all legislation involving atomic energy. The
Act's patent requirements, discussed above, caused great concern among patent
attorneys, who believed they might exclude risk capital from the atomic energy field
(Hewlett and Anderson 1962).
Even after the bill was passed, there was disagreement about the role of the MLC
and how much influence it should have. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
held confirmation hearings for the nominees to the Atomic Energy Commission in
January 1947. David E. Lilienthal, chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA), had been nominated for the position of chairman of the AEC. During the
confirmation hearings, Bernard M. Baruch, the U.S. representative to the United
Nations Atomic Energy Commission, and Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of
Michigan both expressed doubt as to whether atomic energy should be completely
civilian-controlled. Vandenberg criticized Lilienthal for not meeting with General
Leslie R. Groves during his month as acting chairman of the AEC, and Senator
Kenneth D. McKellar (R-TN) suggested that Lilienthal had Russian and communist
sympathies. Senator H. Stiles Bridges (R-NH) claimed that Lilienthal favored
"extreme New Dealism," and criticized him for directing the TVA, which he called "a
social experiment, which is a wide departure from the American system of private
ownership of property" (Hewlett and Duncan 1969). This incendiary discourse
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reflected partisan divisions that would persist unrelentingly during these formative
years.
The AEC confirmation hearings also revealed another tension that would be a
portent of larger battles ahead - that between public power advocates and private
power advocates. Public power supporters, predominantly Democrats, believed that
government-controlled electricity was in the public interest because utilities could
not be trusted to serve customers fairly (either by charging fair rates or by
expanding service to underserved areas). Private power supporters, predominantly
Republicans, opposed government control of power production both because they
saw it as "creeping socialism" and the expansion of government (Pendergrass 60),
and because they believed that the private enterprise system was better able to
develop new technologies, reduce costs, and provide the best services.
The early electric power industry was overwhelmingly privately owned, and those
municipal power companies that did exist had trouble competing with private
utility companies. Electric power was a natural monopoly, so the government
quickly found that it needed to intervene on behalf of consumers to ensure fair
pricing practices. Even with regulation of prices, many consumers and their
representatives were unhappy with private utilities in the 1920s. They believed
that the utilities were exercising monopolistic power and that government-owned
electric power generation and distribution was preferable. Rural customers were
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underserved compared with urban customers, so some also supported government
involvement as a way to extend service to otherwise unprofitable areas (Federal
Smart Grid Task Force 2010). This was a nascent issue in the United States in the
1920s, but the Great Depression and the New Deal programs it spawned brought
the argument into the forefront of political debate.
In 1932, public power supplied less than 5% of the nation's electricity, private
utilities 75%, and self-generation the balance (Marks 1956). During the 1930s and
early 1940s, the federal government encouraged and supported public power
development through the opening of hydroelectric sites for public development,
through Public Works Administration grants and loans, through the Rural
Electrification Administration, through the Bonneville Power Administration
(BPA), and through the Tennessee Valley Authority. At the same time, the
regulation of private utilities was tightening. Prior to 1935, only states regulated
electric power, but the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA) gave
the federal government much more influence. The Act forced many of the largest
utility companies to divide or divest some of their assets, thus shrinking and
weakening their monopolies. When President Eisenhower took office in 1953,
federal involvement in power supply stopped expanding, but TVA and BPA
continued to grow, as did local cooperatives, such that by 1956, public power
supplied 20% of the nation's electricity, private utilities only 65%, and self-
generation 15% (Marks 1956).
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Republican anger over New Deal programs that put government-owned generation
facilities in competition with private utilities would color atomic energy policy
debates in the coming years. Likewise, Democrats who favored government-owned
power would argue for more public involvement and less cooperation with private
industry as the field of atomic energy was developed, perhaps in the hope that this
would revive the public power movement. As we will show, when nuclear generated
electricity became a major focus of the government, this polarizing issue prevented
a coherent development program from emerging, and instead led to
uncompromising positions on both sides. The result was a policy towards nuclear
development that swung back and forth between these positions, and the lack of
constancy and predictability was a significant obstacle to the development of atomic
energy.
In the period immediately following World War II, however, the question of atomic
power was set on the back burner, and military matters received most of the
attention.
4.3 Military Applications and Priorities Take Precedence
From the post-World War II era to the end of the Cold War, civilian atomic power
prospects were hindered by the close connection to the weapons program, both
technically and organizationally. The AEC, GAC, and JCAE were responsible for
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both programs, and funding was allocated more or less in a lump sum to the
combined effort. This put the GAC and the JCAE in the position of having to
prioritize the AEC's efforts between military and civilian efforts. Under the
pressure of war and the race with the Soviet Union, policymakers saw very little
choice in the matter - military needs would come first. The implications for atomic
power were broad. The need for secrecy meant that declassification would move
slowly, hindering industry involvement. Funding went first to military needs, and
the AEC took care to see to it that military efforts did not lose good scientists to
atomic power R&D.
A comparison of the treatment of atomic power with treatment of biomedical
applications of atomic research during this period reveals remarkable differences.
Life sciences received separate funding allocated to cancer research, did not have
strict secrecy requirements, and did not fall under the GAC's authority. The
National Research Council provided fellowships in biomedical sciences, and Dr.
Shields Warren, Director of Biology and Medicine for the AEC from 1947 to 1952,
did not hesitate to award fellowships, private research contracts, and grant support
to universities and private research institutions. Biomedical research took off at a
remarkable pace, and developments came quickly (Hewlett and Duncan 1969).
A report to the GAC was prepared in 1946 by the directors of the research centers to
advise the Committee on prioritizing research programs. Walter Zinn, the director
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of the laboratory at Argonne, addressed the topic of power reactors. Zinn believed
that the shortage of fissionable materials dictated a need for breeder reactors, and
he advised pursuing a breeder reactor development program (Hewlett and Duncan
1969). Although many scientists favored fast breeder and high flux reactors over
other power reactor projects, the need to amass an atomic weapons stockpile was
seen as an overriding national security imperative. Power reactor research was
neglected, and the GAC was pessimistic about the prospects of developing a feasible
reactor within ten years (Hewlett and Duncan 1969). As shown in Figure 8879,
civilian reactor development comprised only 2% of the AEC's total spending from
1952-1961.
It was pressure from the navy in 1948 that pushed the AEC to proceed with the
reactor program. Admiral Earle W. Mills and Captain Hyman G. Rickover were
strong advocates for nuclear submarine propulsion, and took great initiative in
pressing forward with a research program in the face of a hesitant and plodding
AEC (Hewlett and Duncan 1969). While this did lead to reactor development, a
series of seemingly incidental decisions along the development path led the U.S.
towards technological 'lock-in' with Light Water Reactor (LWR) technology that
some experts doubted was the best choice for a civilian power plant. We will
highlight some of the key decisions that contributed to this lock-in. Figure 8980 is
revealing: from 1950-1952, of all nuclear reactor R&D, only 20% was spent on
civilian reactors, with nearly half of that spent on LWRs.
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Captain Rickover wished to pursue three types of reactors: liquid metal cooled,
water cooled, and gas cooled. The reactor development program was reorganized
around a few separate experimental reactors, including a light water naval
submarine reactor, an intermediate-power breeder reactor, a materials testing
reactor, and an aircraft propulsion reactor effort for the Air Force. Rickover's
request to have GE work on a liquid-metal-cooled submarine reactor was initially
denied, and later designated for future work by Carroll L. Wilson, general manager
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of the AEC. Wilson was not willing to support a gas reactor, believing that the
navy's LWR program with Westinghouse was adequate. After the Soviet atomic
bomb detonation of August 1949, the naval submarine reactor program quickly
became the center of the development effort. The light water submarine reactor
project was successful, with the Westinghouse SiW prototype reactor built in Idaho
followed by the successful launch and commissioning of the first operating nuclear-
powered submarine, the USS Nautilus (SSN-571), in 1954.
GE eventually worked to develop an intermediate-power breeder reactor, but it was
repurposed from civilian to naval applications due to disappointing experimental
results and the increasing availability of raw uranium ore. GE went on to build the
prototype sodium-cooled SlG reactor. This project produced the USS Seawolf (SSN-
575), a submarine powered by a sodium-cooled fast nuclear reactor that was
launched in 1955 and commissioned in 1957. This was an experimental submarine,
and experienced a variety of operational and maintenance difficulties. In 1958 the
navy sent the USS Seawolf to Electric Boat for conversion of the reactor to a
Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) (Hewlett and Duncan 1969). Westinghouse and
GE were the major industry participants in early nuclear submarine development.
Westinghouse constructed a research and development lab called Bettis Atomic
Power Laboratory, in West Mifflin, PA, and General Electric built the Knolls Atomic
Power Laboratory in Schenectady, NY. Other companies, including Combustion
Engineering and Bechtel, would later enter the nuclear submarine propulsion
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market with fuel production and R&D. Despite Rickover's early attempt to support
a variety of reactor types, the focus was quickly narrowed to the LWR, not entirely
for technical reasons, but instead out of a desire to trim the budget and to accelerate
the submarine program for enhanced national security. This marked the beginning
of LWR dominance in the industry that has persisted to this day.
Lawrence R. Halfstad, head of reactor development from 1949 through 1954,
believed that the AEC should concentrate on military propulsion and plutonium
production reactors. He thought that breeder reactors and power reactors would be
important in the long term, but felt that private industry should handle their
development. He envisioned a private nuclear industry that would be able to
produce power for the nation during peacetime, and shift to producing plutonium
for military use during crises (Hewlett and Duncan 1969).
The GAC was generally pessimistic about the prospects for nuclear power as a
competitive source of electricity, and saw no compelling reason to pursue it. In
1952, the AEC determined that power reactors would need to be competitive with
other power sources on the basis of electricity prices alone, without receiving credits
for plutonium production. This tempered industry's enthusiasm, despite the
encouraging development of increased uranium ore discoveries (Hewlett and
Duncan 1969).
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The focus on military needs and the policy of leaving power reactor R&D to private
industry stunted power reactor development throughout the 1940s and in the early
1950s. The submarine effort was the only robust government development
program, and the priorities of that program led to the emergence of the LWR, and
especially the PWR, as the most viable reactor available in the 1950s.
4.4 Atoms for Peace: The Emergence of a Civilian Nuclear
Industry
In November 1952, General Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected President of the
United States. The AEC and the National Security Council worked to put together
an administration policy on power reactors early in 1953, but decided to hold off on
a subsidy policy until later on, and instead chose to focus on the need to amend the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946 to facilitate industry participation. One proposal aimed
at maintaining some funding for reactor development was to eliminate the
propulsion projects for aircraft and aircraft carriers, and use the funds freed up to
build a prototype sodium-cooled graphite-moderated reactor.3 9 A competing goal,
balancing the budget, was also important to both the National Security Council and
President Eisenhower (Hewlett and Holl 1989). Thus, the sodium reactor
suggestion was rejected, and a potential competitor to the PWR was again cut from
the R&D program.
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An industry group was formed in 1953, and it proposed amendments to the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946 that would enable private investment in the field. Nuclear
power now became fully embroiled in a larger political debate about public versus
private roles in the U.S. economy. The administration and most Republicans
supported a private effort, but it became clear that the private sector was not
prepared to invest the funds needed for the development of power reactors without
significant government support. Democrats largely wished to see nuclear power
facilities solely owned and operated by the federal government (Hewlett and Holl
1989). Conspicuously absent from the debate was any focus on safety or
environmental protection.
A temporary compromise was reached in 1953 wherein the aircraft carrier
propulsion reactor demonstration would be re-purposed, and a pressurized water
reactor (PWR) for electric power production would be built instead. Rickover, who
led the naval efforts, would lead the PWR project, but industry would participate
and operate the plant. It would be a 60,000 kWe reactor, considered a full-scale
power reactor at the time. An invitation for industry to participate in the PWR
demonstration project received nine responses. The Duquesne Light and Power
Company was chosen as the industry partner, and a final determination was made
that the PWR was the only reactor ready for full-scale demonstration. The PWR
was the most mature reactor technology primarily because there was experience
with PWRs in the naval reactors program - two naval PWRs had already been built.
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The demonstration power reactor became known as Shippingport (Hewlett and Holl
1989). The Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy expressed some
concerns about the project. The Committee did not see the wisdom of spending so
much money on a reactor design (the PWR) that in its view could not be economical.
It was widely thought that the homogenous reactor and fast-breeder designs would
be the more commercially successful options (Hewlett and Holl 1989). But to build
either of those reactors from the ground up would have been more costly than
repurposing a reactor that had been previously developed. In the choice of the PWR
as the only major government-supported demonstration power plant, a very strong
barrier to entry for other reactor designs was created. The costs of developing and
demonstrating a new reactor design were so great that private industry would have
to see extraordinary potential in a novel design in order to choose to develop that
rather than work with the commercially-available PWR.
On December 8, 1953, President Eisenhower delivered his famous "Atoms for Peace"
address to the United Nations General Assembly. In the address, he proposed the
establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a body that
would collect and share fissionable materials and work to develop the uses of those
materials toward agriculture, medicine, atomic power, and other peaceful purposes
(Eisenhower 1953). The Atoms-for-Peace program gave the U.S. a reason to
accelerate nuclear power development; the U.S. was in a race with the U.K and the
Soviet Union to be the international leader in the field (Hewlett and Holl 1989).
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Late in 1953, the AEC developed a five-year reactor development program. The
largest component was the Shippingport PWR demonstration reactor project led by
Rickover. Other components of the plan were a fast-breeder experiment at
Argonne, a boiling water reactor experiment at Argonne, a homogenous reactor
experiment at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), and a sodium-cooled
graphite-moderated reactor (Hewlett and Holl 1989).
The National Security Council thought that it was important to develop nuclear
power using private industry, rather than government funds. Lewis Strauss,
chairman of the AEC, and President Eisenhower also supported this view. Industry
executives insisted that they were prepared to build nuclear power plants, so the
AEC solicited proposals for power reactor demonstration projects in 1955. The
terms of cooperation were open-ended in the solicitation. The purpose was to
determine the level of government support that industry required by allowing them
to compete to offer the most attractive possible terms to the AEC (Hewlett and Holl
1989). Little came of this, however, since congressional actions led to several
changes in plans.
Congressional Democrats were particularly concerned that the U.S. would fall
behind other nations in developing nuclear power, and did not want to wait for
private industry to develop power reactors. In particular, they felt threatened by
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the Soviet Union's estimates of upcoming nuclear capacity. In 1956, Democrats
criticized the Eisenhower administration for moving too slowly to develop nuclear
power, for being too concerned over secrecy, and for being too concerned with the
need to keep other countries from misusing nuclear technology. Congressional
Democrats tried to push through the Gore-Holifield Bill, which would have directed
the AEC to build full-size power reactors on its laboratory sites, but Republicans
managed to prevent its passage, objecting both to the scale of government spending
increase and to the activity of government in what they saw as a private industry
imperative (Hewlett and Holl 1989). Industry, fearing an "atomic TVA" that would
compete with them to sell power, also opposed the bill, and sponsored an
advertising campaign against it (Time 3/4/1957). In the public and in the
government, the argument about the development of nuclear power served as a
proxy for the highly charged ideological debate over public versus private power.
While this was an important issue in its time, it crowded out other issues that were
more important for the successful development of nuclear power. Had debate
centered around the best ways to balance human safety, environmental protection,
and a diverse and competitive electricity supply, the nuclear industry might have
followed a much more constructive development path.
With the help of Congressman Clarence Cannon, chairman of the House
Appropriations Committee, the JCAE gained some leverage over the AEC in 1957.
Cannon accused the AEC of acting outside the bounds of the Atomic Energy Act by
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failing to seek Congressional authorization for each specific demonstration project,
and the JCAE seized on the opportunity by offering to authorize the
demonstrations. While Cannon's accusations were probably without merit, the AEC
reluctantly accepted the JCAE action, establishing a precedent that gave the JCAE
a significant role in determining which projects went forward. This was a key event
in the history of nuclear innovation policy; from this time forward, projects were
increasingly dictated by Congress, rather then developed internally at the AEC.
This trend has continued to the present day, and, we will argue in Section 4.14, this
has been to the detriment of nuclear energy innovation. The JCAE Democratic
majority immediately set to accelerating the reactor development program by
authorizing full funding and adding several projects to the AEC's plans (Hewlett &
Holl 1989). Under the leadership of Democratic Representative Chet Holifield of
California, the JCAE presented a draft bill that added four new reactor projects to
the AEC's program and altered the Power Demonstration Reactor Program (PDRP)
to remove utilities from the picture, and to leave direct ownership of the plants with
the AEC. Republicans objected, and a compromise was reached with two new
reactor projects instead of four, plus one design project. The AEC ownership
remained, much to the dismay of private power advocates. The JCAE Democrats
went so far as to specify the types, locations, and managers of the reactor projects,
essentially wresting control of the program from the AEC. Republicans decided to
fight the authorization because of its "public power favoritism" and because it
"would constitute a substantial start toward a program for government-owned
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atomic-power facilities" (Green 182). Through the amendment and conference
processes, Republicans managed to eliminate two of the reactor construction
projects, instead authorizing design studies that would have to be re-authorized to
move on to the construction phase. The continued focus on the issue of public
versus private power again stalled nuclear power development.
In 1957, Democrats, led by Senator Anderson (D-NM), were able to authorize
funding for three rounds of demonstration reactor projects - two rounds that had
already begun (four reactors each), and a third that would take place in the future.
Representative Melvin Price (D-Il) and Senator Anderson then introduced what
came to be known as the "Price-Anderson Act," which limited the accident liability
of nuclear power operators and owners and required the publication of reports by
the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The bill passed without
controversy, perhaps indicating a softening of the Democrats' opposition to private
ownership, but certainly no reduction in their support for public ownership (Hewlett
and Holl 1989).
The demonstration reactor program did not proceed smoothly. Contract
negotiations proved to be a major sticking point, and many of the projects ended at
this stage. Cost estimates for a number of the projects were too high, causing
cancellations. Meanwhile, the Shippingport plant started operation in December
1957. It was a great success as a technology demonstration, and operated well, but
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it was not the type of project that Strauss was hoping for. It had been financed by
the government, and built under the close supervision of Rickover and his naval
staff (Hewlett and Holl 1989).
Strauss continued to oppose government development of nuclear power during
negotiations over the 1958 budget and programs. He and the rest of the AEC
agreed on a compromise that would include some government-funded prototypes,
but the administration's efforts to reign in spending made that essentially
irrelevant, since $220 million of $260 million in supplemental funding requests for
those projects were denied. This action dramatically scaled back government
support for the reactor prototype programs (Hewlett and Holl 1989). At this point,
the civilian power program had yet to achieve very much industry participation or
any cost reduction, and the future of the industry was very much in doubt. Industry
had come to realize that it needed government support to commercialize nuclear
power. The industry was stalling in the U.S., while Britain and Russia were
pushing ahead (Time 2/10/1958).
In July 1958, John A. McCone replaced Strauss as AEC chairman. He set out
immediately to develop a cooperative relationship between the AEC, the JCAE, the
Congress, and the President (Hewlett and Holl 1989). McCone was not opposed to
government programs in the way that Strauss was, so he set out to advance nuclear
power without the constraint of requiring that private industry do all the heavy
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lifting. In 1958, the JCAE tasked an expert panel of reactor and utility experts with
drafting a long-term nuclear power policy. That policy statement was released for
public comment in August 1958, shortly after McCone became chairman of the AEC.
The policy document stated a goal of demonstrating "economically competitive
nuclear power in the United States by 1970 and in 'high cost' free world nations by
1968." Another goal was to fortify the U.S. position of leadership in nuclear power.
While the policy statement supported industry participation in demonstration and
R&D, it did not support waiting for industry to decide which reactors to pursue and
at what rate. It called for "positive direction" by the AEC. "The Commission should
no longer permit the national laboratories and contractors to decide which types of
reactors they would study but rather ... it should establish a comprehensive plan for
each reactor type (Hewlett and Holl 1989 pp496)." If industry did not show interest
in partnering with the AEC on demonstration projects, the Commission "promptly
would assume responsibility for construction." The plan called for constructing
twenty-one reactors over five to seven years, including five reactor experiments,
nine large power reactors, four intermediate, and three small (Hewlett and Holl
1989).
McCone, who did not share Strauss's aversion to government intervention, received
this draft policy statement with an open mind. He directed an ad hoc committee to
develop a policy statement from the AEC's perspective, as well as a plan for
implementing the policy. He also issued requests for industry proposals in 1958.
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Proposals were requested for engineering studies and cost estimates for a Boiling
Water Reactor (BWR), a PWR, and an organic-cooled reactor. Fuel cycle issues
were also presented for industry proposals (Hewlett and Holl 1989).
The ad hoc AEC committee issued its policy statement in January 1959. It largely
supported the earlier JCAE policy and went beyond it. It advocated building many
prototypes of many designs - in fact nearly every design concept that had been
considered recently. However, the demonstration program would concentrate on
small prototypes, of 80MWe or smaller, so as to keep the budget low while
entertaining many designs. The reasoning suggested that rushing to build large
nuclear power plants before the market supported them would not be productive,
and instead the AEC could work with a modest budget and in fact accomplish much
more per dollar spent. The committee's statement also advocated shifting the R&D
emphasis from focused projects to a more general applied research philosophy.
However, while the committee believed this new plan would offer a much more
effective use of funds, it also involved an absolute increase of more than $60 million
for 1960. The Bureau of the Budget, meanwhile, had decided to cut the AEC's
budget $300 million below 1959 levels for 1960, and further directed the AEC to cut
more than $250 million from nondefense programs, which required $60 million in
cuts in reactor development. McCone spent most of 1959 trying to reach a
compromise between the JCAE's desire (and the AEC committee's recommendation)
for a broad program of R&D and prototypes and the Eisenhower Administration's
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commitment to reducing spending and avoiding an expansion of government
involvement in nuclear energy (Hewlett and Holl 1989).
McCone's strategy was to advocate prototype reactors because of a number of
advantages:
* Less expensive construction
e Faster construction
e Provision of data on efficiency, performance characteristics, operating factors,
and costs.
McCone also stressed evaluating all projects on their merits, particularly whether
they would produce valuable results. If they would not, he sought to cancel them.
Two victims of this were the homogenous molten-salt thermal breeder reactors at
ORNL and the liquid-metal fuel reactor experiments at Brookhaven. McCone
instead supported focusing the Commission's efforts on water-cooled and organic-
cooled reactors. McCone and the AEC developed a long-range reactor development
plan that rested on their belief that PWRs would be competitive first, BWRs next,
then organic-moderated reactors, and finally sodium and gas-cooled reactors.
Development, then, would be pursued in that order, as much as funding would
allow (Hewlett and Holl 1989).
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By 1960, a handful of the reactors from the power reactor demonstration project
were under construction, and the reactor development program at the AEC had re-
focused its efforts on cost reduction and on developing the most promising reactor
types, rather than performing conceptual-design studies of all of them (Hewlett and
Holl 1989).
In stark contrast to the early management of the power reactor demonstration
project, Rickover's management of the naval reactor program had been highly
successful. Nuclear submarines had been standardized and were being produced in
an efficient production line, reportedly achieving major cost savings. By the end of
1960, 37 submarines had been authorized based on the same reactor module
(Hewlett and Holl 1989).
Despite lengthy debates over public versus private power and nuclear R&D
proposals that went unfunded, the nuclear industry in the U.S. did slowly take root.
A number of cooperative demonstration and prototype reactors were built. The
organic-cooled prototype reactor at Piqua, Ohio only ran from 1964 to 1966, when it
was shut down due to problems with control rods, fouling, and coolant viscosity
issues. This essentially ended any serious consideration of this reactor design in
the U.S. Gas reactors were not yet being built, but a sodium reactor at Hallam was
built, and is described in more detail below in the section on breeder reactors.
Three LWR and three BWR power plant demonstration projects were underway,
231
modeled on the light water reactors designed for the navy, but with many cost-
saving measures.
The government's success in building LWR demonstration plants introduced a
strong LWR bias into the market, and with a 7% annual electricity demand growth
rate creating pressure for immediate capacity additions, the industry proceeded to
build LWRs.
In 1963, planning began for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant - the first large-
scale commercial power plant in the country. It began operations in 1969. During
the 1960s, only a handful of nuclear power plants were built, but many more were
ordered. In 1964, President Lyndon Johnson signed the "Private Ownership of
Special Nuclear Materials" Act, which allowed utilities to own nuclear fuel for
power production.
During the 1960s and 70s, dozens of nuclear plants were ordered and constructed.
The 70s also saw the emergence of the environmental movement, and the
introduction of many new regulations that would affect nuclear power as well as all
other sources of power.
By 1971 there were over twenty commercial nuclear power plants operating in the
U.S., and in 1973 utilities ordered forty-one new nuclear plants. Nuclear
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generation skyrocketed during the 1970s, rising from about 2% of U.S. electricity
generation to about 12% from seventy-two reactors (EIA).
4.5 Breeder Reactor R&D and Gas-Cooled Reactor
Demonstrations
The AEC continued its small breeder reactor program in the 1960s, focusing its
efforts on the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR), as shown in Figure
9081. As LWRs were built commercially and needed less government support, the
AEC focused more on the breeder. During the 1970s and early 1980s, particularly
after the energy crisis of the early 70s, breeder reactors became the major, and
nearly singular, focus of federal nuclear energy RD&D. They were still seen by
many as having superior economics compared with LWRs, and in an era of fuel
scarcity, the prospect of a reactor that would produce its own fuel was particularly
alluring.
233
3500
3000 *
All Other
Reactors
0 (mostly military)0
' 2000 - CD N Breeder
% 10Reactorso 1500 - - -w s
500 -
0
1963196419651966196719681969197019711972197319741975
Figure 90: U.S. AEC expenditure on nuclear energy, 1963-1975 (Source:
Management Information Services, Inc. 2008)
4.5.1 Early LMFBR Demonstrations
Before the LMFBR program began in earnest, Experimental Breeder Reactor-I
(EBR-I) (1.4 MWt) was the first breeder reactor built in the U.S. Construction
began in 1949 and finished in 1951. It was built as a research reactor that would
validate the breeder reactor concept, but it was also the first nuclear reactor to
produce electricity. EBR-I was deactivated in 1964 and replaced with EBR-II (62.5
MWt), which operated from 1965 to 1994. EBR-II was to demonstrate fuel breeding
followed by on-site reprocessing and recycling of fuel. This cycle was demonstrated
from 1964-1969. The EBR-II then served as a prototype for the Integral Fast
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Reactor (IFR), also referred to as the Advanced Liquid-Metal Reactor (ALMR). The
IFR was cancelled in 1994 (DOE Energy Technology Engineering Center 2011).
The Hallam Nuclear Generating Station was a demonstration reactor built as a
partnership between the AEC and the Consumers Public Power District of
Nebraska. A 240 MWt sodium-cooled graphite-moderated reactor, it operated only
from 1962 to 1964, when it was shut down due to stress corrosion cracking and
other material failure issues. Initially it was designed to provide power to the local
grid, and a second reactor was to be built on site, but a second reactor was never
built (DOE Energy Technology Engineering Center 2011).
4.5.2 The Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF)
The Fast Flux Test Facility was a sodium-cooled fast-neutron flux test reactor built
on the Hanford Site in Richland, Washington. It was designed to support testing
and development of materials, fuels, and equipment for the LMFBR program.
Conceptual design took place from 1965-1969, kicking off the AEC's breeder
development program that lasted into the 1980s (Cahalan 2007; IAEA 2007).
Construction of the 400 MWt reactor began in 1970 and was completed in 1978.
Criticality was achieved in 1980, and the reactor operated for research from 1982 to
1992. In addition to testing and development for the LMFBR program, the FFTF
was used to produce medical isotopes, to produce tritium to support fusion research,
and to serve many international research needs. Shutdown began in 1993, and the
reactor remained on standby for more than 10 years before it was drained of coolant
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in 2003. The reactor was initially authorized in 1967 at a budget of $88 million and
an expected completion year of 1972, but ultimately the cost grew to over $500
million before completion in 1978. The facility served many research needs during
its operation, but as a prototype for testing components and fuels, and as a project
to give construction and design experience with LMFBRs, its utility was partly
diminished by its delays. The Clinch River Breeder Reactor (CRBR) Project was
seen as the next step in LMFBR development, taking the demonstrated technology
of the FFTF, improving it, and operating it commercially; but the FFTF was not
even in operation until 1980, while engineering and design work on the CRBR
began in 1973, and the preliminary safety analysis report was first submitted in
1975 (Cahalan 2007; Nemzek et al. 1974). The FFTF's shutdown was ordered for
economic reasons: the costs of operation were not adequately offset by the research
and production being performed (DOE Hanford 2011; Fluor Hanford 2004).
4.5.3 Other LMFBR Support Projects
A variety of other testing and demonstration facilities were built to support the
LMFBR program (DOE Energy Technology Engineering Center 2011). Those
included:
- The Small Components Test Loop (1958-1988)
- The Liquid Metal Development Lab 1 & 2 (dismantled in 1996 &1999)
- Large Leak Test Rig (late 1970s- 1982)
- Sodium Component Test Installation (SCTI): The SCTI was used to test
sodium heat exchangers from 1964 to 1995.
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- The Sodium Pump Test Facility (SPTF): The SPTF was a non-nuclear facility
used to test large sodium pumps. It operated from 1974 through October
2001.
- Hazardous Waste Management Facility (HWMF): The HWMF was built to
treat and store metallic wastes that resulted from LMFBR research. It
operated from 1978 to 1998.
- Various others
4.5.4 The Clinch River Breeder Reactor
The LMFBR research program spanned approximately 1965 to 1984, and was
motivated by expected electricity demand growth and uranium scarcity, as well as
the belief that plutonium production could be a profitable endeavor. During the
1970s, a breeder reactor demonstration program was undertaken. Initially, three
demonstration projects were envisioned, but the Office of Management and Budget
cut the funding for planning the second two demonstrations when industry voiced
unwillingness to participate. The AEC was opposed to the cut (Cohen & Noll 1991).
By 1970, the one remaining project was the Clinch River Breeder Reactor (CRBR)
Project. In July 1973, The AEC formed a partnership with Commonwealth Edison
and the TVA to build the reactor (Cochran et al. 2009). Several hundred electric
utilities also contributed funds to support the project through the Breeder Reactor
Corporation (BRC), and the Project Management Corporation (PMC) was formed
out of a consortium of utilities to be in charge of administering the project (Nemzek
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et al. 1974). Ultimately, Burns & Roe was the architect-engineer, Westinghouse
was chosen as the reactor manufacturer, and GE, Atomics International, and many
other vendors contributed to building the CRBR.
The project was burdened with goals touching every aspect of uncertainty reduction.
It was expected to demonstrate liquid metal fast breeder reactor technology, to show
that the LMFBR was commercially competitive, to show that industry was capable
of handling such a large and complex project, and to demonstrate the feasibility of
licensing the new technology under new environmental regulations. (In the
hearings, the objective was stated as: "demonstrate the technical performance,
reliability, maintainability, safety, environmental acceptability and economic
feasibility in a utility environment of an LMFBR central electric power station
(Cohen & Noll 1991)." The CRBR was to follow on the heels of the FFTF to benefit
from the learning and demonstration achieved there (Nemzek et al. 1974). Under
those planned circumstances, the technology would have been already
demonstrated on a prototype scale and the project goals may have been reasonable.
However, delays in the FFTF kept it from significantly contributing lessons to the
CRBR design, and the delays in both projects without design updates resulted in a
design that many in industry felt was outdated.
Appropriations began in 1972. Soon after the project began, however, the economic
case for breeder reactors unraveled, as uranium resources were expanded and
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plutonium production was no longer expected to be profitable. It became clear that
a breeder reactor would not be needed before 2020, and perhaps would not be
competitive until 2040 or 2050 (Cochran et al. 2009). The studies on which CRBR
was premised had projected that LMFBRs would be competitive in the mid 1980s,
as soon as they became available (Cohen and Noll 1991). Thus, while the research
program plodded along slowly, external conditions changed drastically, and the
project became somewhat irrelevant, and certainly much less urgent. This
diminished industry interest in the project, which hampered progress and funding,
and led to the AEC assuming management of the project in 1975. The construction
of the plant dragged on with many delays until the project was ultimately cancelled
in 1983
At the start of the CRBR project, Milton Shaw was the Director of the AEC's
Division of Reactor Development and Technology, and thus led the AEC's
involvement. Shaw had worked in the navy on nuclear submarine development
under Rickover, and emulated Rickover's management style (authoritarian and
abrasive) and his attitude towards nuclear safety (reliance on rigid adherence to
operating standards as adequate protection). This provided the type of structured
management that Rickover's style gave the Shippingport project, but resulted in
some conflicts with industry and the PMC, who felt that Shaw was usurping their
control and dictating design elements of the reactor. In particular, Shaw insisted on
using FFTF technology, when some in industry wanted to see newer technology
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demonstrated; some felt that the FFTF was outdated or that it would be a better
use of funds to avoid duplication (Shapley 1977). Shaw managed the FFTF project
at the AEC, and strongly favored LMFBRs over molten salt reactors. This led him
to advocate for the LMFBR technology even after breeders were generally
considered a long-term economic prospect, creating conflict with ORNL scientists
who favored further molten salt research. Allegations arose that Shaw may have
diverted funds from the CRBR project to support the over-budget FFTF, and later
allegations suggested that LWR funds and breeder reactor R&D funds might have
been diverted to support the ailing CRBR (Shapley 1977). These irregularities
reflect the lack of industry financial support and the uncertainty and volatility
faced by the research programs as they struggled to make consistent progress.
Another management issue was institutional in nature; the combination of
promotion and regulatory duties within the AEC led to conflicts over the proper
safety standards for the reactor. In addition to public concerns, this ultimately led
to long delays mid-way through the project when emergency core cooling system
standards were updated and the safety case for the CRBR had to be revised. The
adoption of new environmental regulations midway through the licensing process
also led to at least a year of delay and to conflicts with vendors over design changes
(GAO 1982).
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In 1976, management of CRBR was transferred from the AEC to ERDA. This
helped to resolve the internal conflict over safety standards through the creation of
the NRC, but also exacerbated regulatory delays. More problematic, though, was
the change in congressional oversight that accompanied this transfer. Before 1976,
the JCAE had authorizing responsibility and was highly supportive of the CRBR.
In 1976, authority was transferred to the Fossil and Nuclear Research
Subcommittee, which was far less supportive (Cohen & Noll 1991). In 1979, the
Energy Research and Development Subcommittee took responsibility and the
situation improved somewhat; but this instability was damaging, and the
leadership at the AEC could not adequately compensate, particularly given the
conflicts among labs and individuals within the organization.
The project provides a stark contrast with the Shippingport demonstration.
Shippingport thrived under Rickover's strong management, but only with the
consistent support of his superiors, of Congress, and even of public opinion, which
was much more mixed towards the CRBR. President Nixon was a strong supporter
of the CRBR program, but President Carter opposed it (and opposed all breeder
reactor development). Carter called for an end to construction, but Congress
continued to fund the project. Carter also suggested a redirection of efforts -
instead of the CRBR, the U.S. should build a large developmental breeder reactor
on government land without the long transitional licensing process (Carter 1977).
Congress objected to this on the grounds that the sunk costs were too high, and that
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the public confidence required a fully licensed reactor. The insistence that the
licensing procedure be followed caused a significant cost escalation due to the
resultant delay (Cohen and Noll 1991). The licensing would have been important
for a commercial demonstration, but by this time it was well-established that the
LMFBR would not be commercially competitive for many decades. As a result,
industry participants who had been the strongest advocates for commercial
licensing had lost interest in the project, rendering that task even less relevant.
Shippingport, by contrast, was built under a much less cumbersome and demanding
licensing regime, and thus moved much more quickly (and less costly) through the
process.
President Reagan supported the CRBR, but by 1983, legislators had lost patience
with the escalating costs and delays, and the Senate voted to stop financing the
project. The original cost estimate of $500 million had been revised upward to $4
billion by the time the project was canceled in 1983.
Cohen and Noll found that "pork barrel politics" had contributed to the
unwillingness to cancel or significantly redirect the project (Cohen and Noll 1991).
The likelihood of voting for cancellation was inversely related to the value of project
contracts in a representative's district, and the effect was significant, except among
Republicans in the later years of the project, when the efficiency of the project was
very low and desire to cut government spending was a priority. Cohen and Noll
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further found that in the absence of pork barrel benefits, the project would have
been canceled when the economic rationale was overturned in 1977. By 1977,
commercialization was decades away, and, since industry would not increase its
investment, the government had been compelled to take responsibility for most of
the project's funding. This is an important lesson that suggests that the decision to
cancel, continue, or redirect a demonstration project ought not be made by those
who have a significant financial interest in the outcome of the decision. The CRBR
experience also highlights the important of stable consensus policy and funding
support. We present one proposal for addressing these issues in Section 4.14.
4.5.5 Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station
The Peach Bottom Unit 1 nuclear reactor was a prototype high-temperature gas-
cooled reactor owned and operated by the Philadelphia Electric Company in Peach
Bottom Township, Pennsylvania. It was helium-cooled and graphite-moderated,
and had an output of 115 MWt (40 MWe). Its fuel was a mixture of uranium-235
and thorium in a graphite matrix arranged in hollow tubes. The reactor was
constructed from 1962-1966, and was designed and built by General Atomics.
Bechtel Corporation was the engineer and constructor, and financing was provided
by a group of 53 investor-owned utilities and the AEC. Peach Bottom operated
quite well, although there were some fuel failures early on. It ran from 1967-1974,
with 88% availability (DOE HTGR History 2011; General Atomics 2011; Kingrey
2003). The decision to decommission the reactor was based on the high cost of
investments needed to meet the AEC's requirement that the reactor obtain a full
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license for power production, rather than a license for a test reactor (Kohler et. al.
1977).
4.5.6 Fort St. Vrain
The Fort St. Vrain (FSV) reactor was a 330 MWe high temperature gas-cooled
reactor built in Colorado. It was helium-cooled, graphite-moderated, and fueled by a
mixture of uranium-235 and thorium in a prismatic graphite configuration. FSV
was licensed with the NRC as a demonstration reactor ("Class 104 Licenses; for
Medical Therapy and Research and Development Facilities"), under 10 CFR 50.21.
This allowed the NRC to impose "the minimum amount of such regulations and
terms of license as will permit the Commission to fulfill its obligations under this
chapter." FSV was planned beginning in 1965, constructed from 1968 to 1972, and
operated beginning in 1976 after a few years were spent working out problems.
FSV experienced core thermal fluctuations, and commercial operation did not begin
until 1979. FSV was plagued by leaks, control rod drive malfunctions, and high
moisture content in the coolant throughout its operating life. It ran so poorly that
the Public Utility Commission recommended issuing a rebate to customers.
Ultimately it was removed from the rate base and customers were issued a refund.
FSV was finally shut down in 1989 and was decommissioned. FSV has since been
converted to a natural gas-powered generating station. FSV's construction was
completed quickly despite the emergence of complications during the construction
process (in particular, bedrock, sand, and water table issues). The success in
construction probably reflects the simple structure of the project - it was owned by
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one utility (Public Service Company of Colorado, had one nuclear contractor (Gulf
General Atomic), one architect-engineer (Sargent & Lundy), and a constructor
(Ebasco). The ease of licensing is likely a product of the very open-ended research
reactor licensing process, and does not provide many lessons for any realistic
method for licensing a power reactor today (Copinger & Moses 2004).
4.6 The 1980s: A Shift to Near-Term R&D
During the administrations of Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter, energy's share of
the total federal RD&D budget tripled (GAO 1987). The Reagan administration
adopted the philosophy that energy RD&D for technologies nearing
commercialization should be left for private businesses to pursue. Thus, while
energy research and development in the 1970s was federally supported from basic
research through commercialization, the 1980s saw a shift towards supporting
"long-term, high-risk, high-payoff' projects in the earlier stages of RD&D (GAO
1987). President Reagan treated nuclear energy differently, however. Once
Congress terminated the Clinch River Breeder Reactor project in 1983, nuclear
fission research was actually focused more on near-term issues while advanced
technology RD&D was scaled back and the overall budget was slashed, as shown in
Figure 9182.
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Figure 91: Federal nuclear energy R&D expenditures, 1976-1988 (Source:
Management Information Services, Inc. 2008)
The shift toward near-term nuclear issues was partially in response to the nuclear
accident at Three Mile Island in 1979 and the evident need to improve operations
and safety in the existing fleet of reactors. LWR safety research was thus given a
high priority. Increasing fuel burn-up and improving the licensing process were
other major priorities of the LWR RD&D program (GAO 1987). Focusing on near-
term issues would be instrumental in helping the industry improve operating costs
and safety, but meanwhile, without federal support for development of a new
technology, the LWR would remain the only commercially viable plant available.
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4.7 The 1990s: The Industry Improves Operations and
Management
The U.S. nuclear power industry faced a number of serious problems in the early
1990s. Many saw it as being on its way out, and its financial performance was poor.
Recognizing the need to improve the operations of the current fleet in order to
revive the ailing sector, the nuclear industry, led by the Institute of Nuclear Power
Operations (INPO), launched an ambitious campaign for improvements, which the
industry spent the decade carrying out.
In 1990, the U.S. nuclear energy industry (through the Nuclear Power Oversight
Committee) developed a "Strategic Plan for Building New Nuclear Power Plants" to
try to address the trouble plaguing the industry and provide an atmosphere in
which utilities could order new plants (Nuclear Power Oversight Committee 1990).
The plan rested on a list of "building blocks," each of which was an enabling
condition for new orders. The building blocks included:
- Current nuclear plant performance
- Predictable licensing and stable regulation
- Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) utility requirements
- NRC design certification
- Siting
- First-of-a-kind engineering for the ABWR and the AP600
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e Life-cycle standardization (originally "enhanced standardization beyond
design")
- Enhanced Public Awareness
- Clarification of ownership and financing
- State economic regulatory issues
* High-level radioactive waste
- Low-level radioactive waste
The group set out with very ambitious, but crucial goals. The achievement of those
goals was mixed. The final report was issued in May 1998, and at that point the
industry had made remarkable and commendable progress, but had not
implemented all of the necessary reforms. In particular, large portions of the 10
CFR Part 52 standardized and risk-informed licensing process were yet to be
demonstrated, a federal spent fuel repository was not yet under construction, and
capital financing for new plants was still essentially unavailable (Nuclear Power
Oversight Committee 1998).
Energy RD&D spending fell during the Clinton administration and reached its
lowest point in 1998. Between 1990 and 1998, spending on nuclear fission RD&D
was cut by more than 98%, leaving support for little more than university reactors
(Gallagher 2008). This move essentially halted R&D on new nuclear energy
technology, except in a few small (and shrinking) private companies that had
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largely relied on government contracts. Nuclear development outside of academia
would remain stunted until President William J. Clinton's term ended and
President George W. Bush took office in 2000. A 1998 PCAST report recommended
initiating the "Nuclear Energy Research Initiative" (NERI) to fund nuclear research
in universities. In 1999, NERI was funded at $18.5 million ($2000), while funding
for university reactors also increased (by $4 million) and "program direction policy
and management" increased by $3.7 million. 2000 and 2001 saw similar marginal
increases in funding, and it wasn't until 2002 with the start of the Advanced Fuel
Cycle Initiative (AFCI) that funding for nuclear fission energy R&D began to
recover to the levels it saw before President Clinton's nuclear energy policies set in.
4.8 Transition to the 2000s: Rebounding Federal Funding
President G.W. Bush, a supporter of nuclear energy, encouraged increasing the
R&D budget and presided over large increases in funding for the Nuclear Power
2010 program, Gen IV R&D, and the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative, as shown in
Figure 9283.
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Figure 92: Federal nuclear energy R&D expenditures, 1989-2006 (Source:
Management Information Services, Inc. 2008)
Between 1998 and 2009, funding for energy RD&D increased steadily and
rebounded to 1980s-era levels. As compared with 1998, all energy RD&D funding in
2009 had increased, except for efficiency, which had fallen 6%. The 2009 budget
request was approximately equal to the (inflation-adjusted) 1983 budget in energy
technology, but with a mix that included more funding for basic energy sciences,
renewables, efficiency, hydrogen, and fossil technologies, and relatively reduced
funding for nuclear fission and fusion. The details of these changes are shown in
Table 88 below (Gallagher 2010).
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Table 8: Federal energy RD&D funding changes: 1978 to 2009 and 1983 to
2009 (Source: Gallagher et al. 2010)
Change in Funding: 1978 to Change in Funding: 1983 to
2009 2009
(1978 was the peak year for (1983 had comparable total
total energy RD&D funding) energy RD&D funding to
2009 request)
Total Energy 1 57% 1 3%
Technology
RD&D
Nuclear Fission 1 71% 1 57%
Nuclear Fusion 1 46% 1 56%
Fossil Fuels 1 65% T 79%
Renewables 1 66% T 3%
Efficiency ? 9% t 101%
Basic Energy t 187% T 152%
Sciences
Hydrogen New program New program
Transmission & New program New program
Distribution
Nuclear fission RD&D in the 2000s has been concentrated on advanced LWRs
("Nuclear Power 2010"), Generation IV reactors, the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative
(AFCI), and the Nuclear Hydrogen Initiative. (GAO 1987; DOE Office of Nuclear
Energy Website; Gallagher et al., 2010).
4.9 Recent DOE R&D
In 2001, a Near Term Deployment Group (NTDG) was tasked with reporting to the
DOE with a plan of action for achieving near-term deployment of nuclear power
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plants in the U.S. The group outlined the steps that would be required to deploy
plants by 2010. The group identified five "gaps" requiring immediate action, and
four other "significant issues." The gaps were:
- Nuclear plant economic competitiveness
- Business implications of the deregulated electricity marketplace
- Efficient implementation of 10 CFR Part 52 (the NRC's new risk-informed
licensing process)
- Nuclear industry infrastructure
- National nuclear energy strategy
The four other significant issues were:
- Nuclear safety
- Spent fuel management
- Public acceptance of nuclear energy
- Non-proliferation of nuclear material
The NTDG recommended a plan for deployment with three phases:
Phase 1: Refine and demonstrate the 10CFR52 process
Phase 2: Complete the design of several near term deployment candidates (at least
one light water and one gas-cooled reactor)
Phase 3: Construct and start up new plants.
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The NTDG advocated a cost-sharing basis for phases 1 and 2, and full industry
responsibility for phase 3. Nuclear plant economic competitiveness was identified
as the biggest obstacle. The DOE responded to the NTDG findings with the Nuclear
Power 2010 program (National Research Council 2008).
4.9.1 Nuclear Power 2010
The Department of Energy announced the Nuclear Power 2010 program (NP2010)
on February 14, 2002. The program's goals were to demonstrate the new NRC
regulatory processes of early site permits, design certifications, and combined
construction and operating licenses, to commercialize new nuclear plants, and to
identify potential nuclear plant sites. The program was structured as a cost-
sharing arrangement between government and industry (DOE "Nuclear Power 2010
Overview" 2011).
NP2010 has supported three Early Site Permit (ESP) applications, all of which were
successful. It currently includes two projects seeking Combined Construction and
Operating Licenses (COLs) for an AP1000 40 and an ESBWR41 . The AP1000 has
achieved approval for design certification, and the ESBWR project is awaiting
completion of the NRC review of both the design certification and the COL
application (NuStart 2009; Nuclear Regulatory Commission "New Reactors" 2011).
While NP2010 missed the goal of deploying a new nuclear plant in 2010, it is
making an important contribution to nuclear plant deployment by developing and
demonstrating the viability of the previously untested 10 CFR Part 52 licensing
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process. Currently, 4 sites in the U.S. have received ESPs from the NRC (Clinton,
Grand Gulf, North Anna, and Vogtle) and more than a dozen projects have
submitted COL applications. Four Engineering, Procurement, and Construction
(EPC) contracts have been signed (Vogtle, V.C. Summer, South Texas Project, and
Levy), but a number of proposed projects have been suspended for economic reasons
(Department of Energy "Nuclear Scorecard" 2011).
4.9.2 Generation IV Advanced Reactor Program
The Generation IV Advanced Reactor Program (GenIV) began with a multinational
meeting in 2000. The Generation IV International Forum (GIF) began as a group of
nine countries, led by the United States, that set out to cooperate on a program of
R&D to support generation IV nuclear energy systems (defined as advanced
reactors under development for commercial deployment by 2030). The current
members are Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Euratom, France, Japan, Republic
of Korea, the Russian Federation, Republic of South Africa, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States (GIF 2011). The GIF initially set out to define a
roadmap for generation IV reactor development. That roadmap was released in
2002. It identified six nuclear energy systems that were most promising as well as
the R&D needed to bring them to maturity. Of those six, the U.S. chose to focus on
two: the Very High Temperature Reactor (VHTR), a helium-cooled, graphite-
moderated thermal reactor, and the Sodium Fast Reactor (SFR). Since 2002, the
U.S. R&D contribution has included not only the GenIV Nuclear Energy Systems
(GenIV) program, but also parts of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership and the
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Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative, which focused on fuel cycle issues and advanced
fuels, as well as fast reactor development. The Next Generation Nuclear Plant
(NGNP) project has been a major part of the VHTR development plan, but has been
languishing recently.
4.9.3 Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP)
The NGNP project began originally as a High Temperature Gas Reactor (HTGR)
demonstration project that would support the VHTR development effort of the
GenIV program. However, the proposed coolant outlet temperatures of the
demonstration plant have been gradually lowered to avoid materials issues, and the
plant concept has consequently become somewhat less useful as a VHTR prototype.
It has instead become a concept for demonstrating electricity and hydrogen
production and/or process heat production by an HTGR - either a prismatic design
(similar to those of General Atomics and Areva) or a pebble bed design (similar to
the PBMR design). On February 15, 2012, the NGNP Industry Alliance (a
consortium of private companies involved in the project) chose the AREVA HTGR
reactor design for development, so that question is settled (in favor of the prismatic
design) for now (NGNP Alliance 2012). The NGNP demonstration project was
officially authorized in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (whose other nuclear
provisions are detailed below). The Act called for sharing of demonstration costs
between the DOE and industry through a public-private partnership at roughly a
50/50 split. This has been the achilles heel of the NGNP project, as industry
participants have been unwilling to contribute that portion due to perceived risks.
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The Senate Appropriations bill of September 2011 eliminated funding for the NGNP
program in recognition of this impasse. NGNP R&D now continues under "Reactor
Concepts RD&D" funding at DOE, but funding for that program has been falling,
from $164 million in 2011 to an estimated $115 million in 2012. President Obama's
budget requests only $74 million for 2013. NGNP is poised to become another
demonstration project doomed by an overly ambitious scope. It has suffered from a
long list of technology demonstration goals, including electricity production,
hydrogen production, process heat production, very-high-temperature
demonstration, and both pebble bed and prismatic designs, at least until the latest
possible decision point. It has required many industry participants and has looked
to demonstrate commercial viability and to implement industry cost-sharing among
competitors and with government at the same time. It has encompassed NRC
licensing in its scope, including developing the framework for the NRC to license
this new reactor design. There are many major technology challenges to address in
the HTGR reactor, including materials difficulties, fuel qualification needs, core
design and fuel handling issues, and heat exchanger design. Expanding the scope
to include multiple applications for the energy produced as well as numerous
licensing and business tasks was excessive and ultimately played a role in the
events that led to the current decline.
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4.9.4 The Energy Policy Act of 2005
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 included a number of policies supporting nuclear
power. Those included a production tax credit of 2.1 c/kWh for the first 6,000 MWe
of new nuclear power capacity in the first eight years of operation, federal loan
guarantees for up to 80% of project cost for the first couple of new reactors (up to
$18.5 billion), federal risk insurance to cover up to $2 billion of the cost of
regulatory delays for the first six plants, a twenty-year extension of the Price
Anderson Act, and changes in taxes on decommissioning funds. The loan
guarantees were held up by political delays from 2005 to 2010. President Barack
Obama in February 2010 announced his proposal for $8.3 Billion in additional loan
guarantees for nuclear energy, but the terms of the guarantees have so far proved
too unfavorable to be helpful to those projects that need them most.
A conditional loan guarantee was issued to Southern Company for two units at the
Vogtle Power Station on February 16, 2010. The loan guarantee will be final when
Southern Company receives a COL from the NRC. Currently, it has an ESP, and
has submitted the application for the COL, and the NRC was scheduled to issue the
license in late 2011 (Nuclear Regulatory Commission "Application Review
Schedule..." 2011). Another conditional loan guarantee was offered to AREVA in
May 2010 for an enrichment plant in Idaho (Department of Energy Loan Programs
Office 2011). However, for utilities in deregulated electricity markets, the costs of
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the loan guarantees thus far appear to be so high that they are of little value to the
industry.
For each loan applicant, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) calculates a
subsidy cost for the loan. That cost is based on the size of the loan, the OMB's
estimate of default risk, and other factors. It is meant to serve as insurance for the
government against taking large losses over its whole loan portfolio. The fees paid
by borrowers who do not default are meant to cover the expected costs of defaults.
In the case of renewable energy and related applicants, Congress has appropriated
tax funds to cover the subsidy cost of the loans, so the applicant does not pay it. For
nuclear energy projects, however, Congress has not provided funding to cover the
fee, so the applicant must pay it. That has proved to be a significant barrier. The
OMB has not been willing to disclose its method of calculating the subsidy cost of
the loan guarantees, but in the case of Unistar's application for a loan guarantee for
a new reactor at Calvert Cliffs, OMB calculated a credit subsidy cost of 11.6% of the
value of the loan, resulting in a fee of $880 million for the loan guarantee. Unistar
was forced to withdraw the application because the financial justification for the
project was jeopardized by the OMB decision. OMB's (undisclosed) calculation
method results in much lower subsidy costs (on the order of 1%) for regulated
utilities, hence the successful loan guarantee for Southern Company's Vogtle project
(Turnage 2011).
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Another significant action by President Obama was the decision to discontinue work
on the Yucca Mountain spent fuel repository site, and reassess the nuclear waste
management plan. President Obama appointed a Blue Ribbon Commission to study
other options for managing nuclear waste. The Commission's draft
recommendations have been issued, but Congress has yet to take any action to
make changes to the current law. The future is now even more uncertain since it is
clear that the federal government does not intend to use Yucca Mountain to fulfill
its obligations under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, but no alternative exists.
There is not yet an overwhelming economic case for building new nuclear power
plants. Companies in the U.S. are not willing to build new plants without loan
guarantees, and a few of the projects have run into a familiar problem - regulators
do not want to allow utilities to increase rates to help finance new plants. However,
the industry is closer to building now than it has been at any time since the 1970s;
with preliminary work on the Vogtle plants already in progress.
4.9.5 The Emergence of a Small Modular Reactor Program
The current enthusiasm for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) in industry and among
policymakers seems to have grown rapidly in late 2009 and early 2010 (see timeline
in Appendix II). The Obama administration began making public statements in
support of SMRs at that point, and soon after that, industry and the DOE began
assessing R&D needs. Since 2007, the DOD and DOE, particularly at ORNL, have
been examining SMRs for possible development, but major policy initiatives aimed
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specifically at SMRs have only emerged in the past two years or so. One recent
congressional policy proposal was S.512, the Nuclear Power 2021 Act. It would
direct the Secretary of Energy to develop and demonstrate two SMR designs in a
public-private cost-sharing program. One reactor would be smaller than 300 MWe,
and one smaller than 50MWe. It is not clear whether any SMR initiatives will be
funded in the next appropriations bill, but the President's 2013 budget request
includes $65 million for SMR licensing activities.
The stated goal of the DOE's SMR program (yet to be funded) is to:
"Collaborate with industry, NRC, academia and National Laboratories on
advancing Small Modular Reactor (SMR) technology to improve the affordability of
nuclear energy and increase the potential to revitalize the U.S. manufacturing
sector" (Beville 2010). DOE plans to achieve that by supporting two activities:
Public/private partnerships (PPPs) to advance mature SMR designs, and R&D
activities to advance the understanding and demonstration of innovative reactor
technologies and concepts (Beville 2010). In January 2012, the DOE issued a draft
Funding Opportunity Announcement (FOA) for the development, licensing, and
deployment (by 2022) of SMRs in the U.S. On March 22, 2012, the DOE issued the
Final Funding Opportunity Announcement. Of note is the text that reads: "DOE
has been directed by Congress to consider applications utilizing any small modular
reactor technology that can be expeditiously deployed," where that is defined as
being licensed and in commercial operation in the U.S. by 2022. This specific
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congressional instruction is characteristic of nuclear RD&D policy after 1957 when
the JCAE obtained similar project-level authority.
The funding program is expected to support up to two projects if it moves forward.
One of the requirements of the FOA is that the reactor be proven technology or that
it is assured that any unproven technologies are "viable, standardization [sic],
flexibility of use, ease of capacity growth, ease of construction, ease of operation and
maintenance, expected conversion efficiency, and plant life (DOE 2012)." This reads
more like a list of utility requirements than requirements of a technology that
requires government assistance. These specifications and the target deployment
year of 2022 suggest that an LWSMR is most likely to be chosen. As in the 1950s,
the government is inclined to reduce the risk of loss by choosing the more proven
technology, despite the greater difficulty of novel technologies in attracting private
capital, and as it has since the 1950s, Congress has placed very specific demands on
the DOE, rather than asking it to fulfill its mission statement. Funding of $452
million over 5 years has been proposed, but the appropriations process must proceed
before the allocation can be assured.
Several nuclear vendors and startups have begun developing and marketing SMRs.
The new designs include Babcock & Wilcox's mPower, Westinghouse's SMR,
Hyperion's nuclear battery, the NuScale reactor, the TerraPower Traveling Wave
Reactor, General Atomics' EM2, GE-Hitachi's PRISM, the PBMR, and the Toshiba
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424S. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) has partnered with Babcock & Wilcox,
Bechtel, and about a dozen other entities to explore building a group of ten to twelve
mPower reactors on the Clinch River site at ORNL. TVA projects that it will
submit a construction permit application to the NRC in 2012, and the group intends
to proceed with both the 10 CFR Part 50 licensing and 10 CFR Part 52 design
certification procedures (Sterdis 2011).
Another potential SMR project is being pursued by a working group of the
Savannah River Site Community Reuse Organization (SRSCRO), Savannah River
Nuclear Solutions (SRNS), Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), DOE,
private industry, and local community leaders. This group is pursuing the vision of
a "U.S. Energy Freedom Center" (USEFC) that would be a hybrid energy system
and would include, in the near term (2010-2025), an SMR demonstration complex.
The concept for this project leverages existing nuclear infrastructure and expertise
at SRNL and proposes savings from shared security, emergency planning,
infrastructure, and utilities. Perhaps most importantly, it suggests running the
reactors as a test bed under the authority of the DOE, allowing for the NRC
licensing process to run in parallel with (rather than prior to) design, construction,
and demonstration. This would reduce the time to demonstration and commercial
availability of early SMRs by as much as ten years (Navetta 2010). SRNS has
announced partnerships with Hyperion Power Generation and with GE-Hitachi to
cooperate on building prototypes of the Hyperion reactor and the GE-Hitachi
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PRISM reactor at the USEFC (Dolianitis 2010). The likelihood of operating under
DOE authority is slim, though; the DOE has entered into an agreement to work
with Hyperion and SRNS on the project, but with the condition that NRC licensing
is pursued.
4.10 Current Licensing Options for New Reactors
A company interested in selling or owning a new reactor has a difficult decision to
make in licensing that reactor. In particular, many SMR vendors are engaged in or
approaching the licensing stage of their technologies and are struggling to find the
licensing strategy that is least burdensome. There are a handful of options:
- License with the NRC using 10 CFR Part 50 (the older and widely used
prescriptive LWR standard), obtaining a construction permit to begin
construction and a separate operating permit to begin operation.
- License with the NRC using 10 CFR Part 52, enabling design certification
prior to construction and lowering the risk of building a reactor that cannot
be granted an operating license. This is still tailored to LWRs, so any non-
LWR would need to develop standards for their reactor in cooperation with
the NRC.
- Build a test reactor with the DOE or DOD under authority of that
Department, avoiding the NRC licensing process.
- License instead in another country.
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- Currently unavailable option: license under a technology neutral framework,
or highly risk-informed process with few prescriptive requirements.
Each of these strategies has benefits and drawbacks, and each party involved
(reactor vendor/operator/owner) has different risks and concerns that may influence
their preferred licensing route. The interests and risks that face a vendor and
owner of a new power plant are not perfectly aligned, and so different approaches
may benefit each.
Table 9: Reactor vendor and owner considerations for licensing
Reactor Vendor Reactor Owner
Possible Goals -Obtain a Part 52 design -Obtain NRC license for
certification to facilitate high credibility, lower
sales of future reactors liability costs
-Use quickest and -Use quickest and
lowest cost method of lowest cost method of
licensing first reactor licensing first reactor
-Use quickest and -Use quickest and
lowest cost method of lowest cost method of
licensing many reactors licensing subsequent
-Preserve flexibility in reactors on-site
design adjustments for - Preserve flexibility in
FOAK plant design adjustments for
FOAK plant
Costs/Risks - Vendor likely shares - Single owner only
cost of licensing all shares the cost of
plants across U.S. and licensing the plant(s)
internationally they own
- Cost of delay -Cost of delay
- Cost of insurance
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While many of the interests of the vendor and owner appear quite similar, there are
some important distinctions. The vendor, if interested in building in the U.S., in
general will want to achieve design certification through Part 52. The owner may
have very little incentive for this if the owner only wishes to build one power
station. For the vendor, weighing the costs of the various approaches is not easy,
and the balance is influenced heavily by the degree of innovation in the reactor
design. If a Part 50 or Part 52 process will require a massive overhaul of NRC
regulatory guidance, and will require validating new software, the vendor may need
significant experimental data to accomplish that in a reasonable timeframe at an
acceptable cost. This is universally the case for any non-LWR reactors, and may
also apply to substantially modified LWRs. Obtaining experimental data is easiest
with a prototype reactor, but licensing that in the U.S. is not trivial either, nor is
government assistance in funding prototypes forthcoming. This may drive the
vendor to look for opportunities internationally to validate its reactor. The vendor
may also find regulatory regimes in other countries either to be more technology-
neutral or more willing to devote resources to developing standards for its
innovative design. This work could enable eventual U.S. licensing, or the vendor
could choose simply to concentrate on international markets for its sales.
SMR designs being proposed exist along a continuum of innovation compared with
traditional LWRs, ranging from reactors that are very similar to current LWRs and
ALWRs but much smaller and less complex, to reactors that use different fuels,
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moderators, and neutron spectra. Each of these initiatives must address the
question: what is the most appropriate licensing strategy? Across the spectrum of
designs, as the reactor design diverges more from the traditional LWR, the
relevance of the existing LWR licensing framework is progressively reduced.
Current cases illustrate this effect. A few of these are described here:4 3
4.10.1 mPower
The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) has partnered with Babcock & Wilcox,
Bechtel, and about a dozen other entities to explore building a group of ten to twelve
mPower reactors on the Clinch River site at ORNL. The mPower design is a Light
Water Small Modular Reactor (LWSMR) that uses a fuel assembly design similar to
today's LWRs, but on a smaller scale. TVA expects that it will submit a
construction permit application to the NRC in 2012, and the group intends to
proceed with both the 10 CFR Part 50 licensing and 10 CFR Part 52 design
certification procedures (Sterdis 2011).
The reasoning for this approach from TVA's point of view rests on a number of
considerations:
- Both TVA and the NRC are very familiar with the Part 50 licensing process
and have completed it recently in connection with the Watts Bar Unit 2
reactor.
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- The mPower reactor is substantially similar to existing LWRs in many
respects, so the prescriptive LWR regulations of Part 50 should not present
an insurmountable problem
- Part 50 licensing is concurrent with construction, so it will be much easier to
make design changes during and after construction through this process,
rather than making changes to a Part 52 certified design.
- Since Part 50 licensing does not need to be completed before construction
begins, TVA can optimize its commitment of capital and resources such that
the losses associated with an unfinished project are minimized. TVA has
calculated that the process of completing engineering and specifying details
to obtain a design certification through Part 52 exposes them to more losses
in the early and most risky stages of the project.
TVA has so far insisted on NRC licensing rather than using DOE authority to build
the reactor.
From B&W's point of view, the benefits of Part 50 licensing also have some
relevance: to the extent that Part 50 makes the reactor more marketable to TVA, it
is clearly important. Also, the ability to make some design changes along the way
gives B&W some flexibility that it likely values in a First Of A Kind (FOAK)
reactor. However, it is quite clear that from a business standpoint B&W sees it as
crucial to obtain a Part 52 design certification in parallel. This will make the
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mPower reactor much more marketable to future customers, who certainly would
prefer to have the lower licensing risk of a certified design.
This approach seems to be a carefully considered one, and may work well for the
case of TVA and mPower. However, a crucial element that makes this approach
feasible is that the mPower reactor design does not diverge very much from the
traditional LWRs that have been previously licensed by NRC. It is smaller,
contains more of the systems within the pressure vessel and containment, and has
multi-module operation and factory construction, but the core and neutronics are
substantially similar, and the fuel is nearly identical, except that it is shorter and
there are fewer assemblies in the core.
4.10.2 NuScale
Another LWSMR seeking to enter the market is NuScale, a 45 MWe PWR that
houses the entire Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) within the containment
vessel. It is designed to use passive safety systems and provides primary coolant
flow through natural circulation during normal operation and accident conditions.
The fuel assemblies are very similar to those used in today's LWRs; the only major
difference is that they are about half as high. From the standpoint of licensing, the
similarity of the reactor to existing LWRs is a key advantage. The natural
circulation features are new, but were licensed by the NRC in the AP600 and
AP1000 licensing processes, during which extensive testing was done. NuScale also
has use of a test facility at Oregon State University that performed some of those
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earlier tests, and that can be used to support NuScale's licensing efforts. All of this
prior work means that the NRC has established approved computer codes for safety
analysis, and has the necessary standards in place that will be used for design
certification (NuScale 2011).
NuScale's strategy is to seek a design certification through 10 CFR Part 52.
NuScale is seeking a certified design in particular to ease the path to
commercialization. According to NuScale's analysis, about 95% of the regulatory
basis for NRC design review of their multi-module plant already exists. In
particular, NuScale has found that "of the 255 sections in the Standard Review
Plan: 217 are directly applicable without modification, 25 do not apply because they
are related to BWR designs or they apply to components that have been eliminated
in the NuScale design (NuScale 2011b)." This leaves 13 topics that need to be
addressed, all of which relate to multi-module design, construction, and operation.
NuScale has indicated that it expects to file for design certification in 2012, and
expects the review process to take about 3 years. NuScale's goal is to have the first
nuclear facility operating by 2020. NuScale's approach resembles that of mPower.
The major difference is that NuScale does not have a customer or a construction
project in planning yet - instead NuScale intends to license the reactor under Part
52 and find a customer as that process nears completion. mPower has a customer,
TVA, so its approach differs somewhat. However, they have both decided to license
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their reactors through the NRC, and both see Part 52 design certification as an
important step.
For an SMR that is not an LWR, or that uses LWR technology that is radically
different from the currently licensed designs, both the Part 50 and Part 52 licensing
approaches are much more burdensome. All of the prescriptive requirements in
these regulations are tailored to traditional PWRs and BWRs. While both Part 50
and Part 52 could, in principle, accommodate other reactors, there is no regulatory
guidance in place, and the standards by which designs are measured for safety do
not yet exist for designs with which the NRC has little or no experience. The cost
and delay associated with developing those guidelines impose a substantial burden
on a company with a fundamentally innovative design (one that diverges
significantly in fuel, moderator, core neutronics, or other major design areas).
In this case, what are the options for a non-LWR or non-traditional LWR?
- Struggle through the Part 50 or Part 52 process, working with the NRC to
develop regulations that the vendor can then apply under for certification.
e Attempt to secure licensing as a demonstration or test reactor, which may
provide greater flexibility, but is likely to be much more difficult now than it
was in the 1960s.
- Cooperate with DOE or DOD on a demonstration reactor, if either agency is
willing to oversee the safety of the reactor.
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- Concentrate on overseas markets
A couple of these more radically different reactor designs are in development
currently, and the vendors are trying to develop a workable licensing strategy.
4.10.3 Hyperion
One of the SMRs that has less in common with conventional reactors is the
Hyperion concept. Its current design calls for a uranium-nitride fueled, lead-
bismuth cooled reactor of 70 MWth. Until recently, Hyperion expressed a belief
that it would need to bypass the typical Part 50 or Part 52 process in the interest of
rapid development and deployment. Hyperion was thus considering applying for a
10 CFR 50.21 Class 104 Research and Development reactor license. It was also
entertaining the possibility of building the first plant under DOE or DOD authority
without an NRC license, and even manufacturing and operating the first reactors in
countries with more rapid and less cumbersome regulatory options. In March,
2012, Hyperion signed a Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) with the DOE and
Savannah River National Lab to cooperate on the deployment of a Hyperion reactor
on the Savannah River site, but the DOE stipulated that the reactor must undergo
NRC licensing.
4.10.4 TerraPower's Traveling Wave Reactor
TerraPower's Traveling Wave Reactor (TWR), perhaps the most revolutionary SMR
design with major activity in R&D and financial backing, seems completely
271
uninterested in working with the NRC, DOE, or DOD on licensing the first plant.
The TWR is a breeder-burner reactor that can run largely on depleted uranium and
in principle can operate for many decades between refuelings. It is radically
different from anything the NRC has ever licensed, and thus will require extensive
testing before it can possibly be brought through the NRC process. TerraPower is
looking for a country to partner with on building a pilot plant under the regulatory
supervision of that country. Recently TerraPower has been in discussions with
China to explore building the first plant there. According to Roger Reynolds,
technical adviser for TerraPower, "'Breaking ground in 2015, with a startup in 2020, is
more aggressive than our current [U.S.] regulatory structure can support.... We intend
to build these in the U.S., but not the first one,' he said. The best way to win regulatory
approval in this country, he said, is to build a reactor. 'Then you get the data that says,
'This is what you can do, and here is the proof that it works (New York Times June 23,
2011)."'
4.10.5 An Option Worth Developing
One option that is not currently available is for a new technology to apply for a
license with the NRC under a Technology Neutral Framework (TNF). A TNF would
not contain artifacts that favored particular designs (those that are most similar to
traditional PWRs and BWRs), and so would not incentivize one technology over
another for administrative reasons. Such a framework does not yet exist, although
there is an international effort to create one, and there has been localized interest
in the U.S. as well. If such a TNF is many years off for a full-scale power reactor,
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perhaps the U.S. NRC could look to develop a TNF quickly that applies either to
demonstration and test reactors or to small modular reactors. The UK and
Canadian nuclear regulators are moving to accomplish this rapidly, and the NRC
has exhibited some interest, but it cannot move forward unless Congress allocates
funding to the task. Without the development of a viable regulatory option that
allows new designs to enter the domestic marketplace, it seems that the most
innovative technologies are poised to make their debuts overseas.
4.11 Lessons for Nuclear Power
4.11.1 Government RD&D Policy Should Have Clear Goals
The first lesson we can take from this history, a recurring one in the development of
nuclear energy, is that the goals of government policy should be clearly and
precisely defined. They should also be flexible enough to change with compelling
changes in external conditions, but a lack of clear goals has proved a larger problem
in the past. The initial competition between military and civilian goals proved
unhealthy for civilian nuclear power development, and as the government began to
embark on demonstration projects, this only worsened, as military requirements
drove the design of civilian reactor demonstrations. If the civilian program had had
its own clear mission, more appropriate planning might have taken place. The
civilian reactor program grew out of the submarine reactor program because the
civilian program was essentially defunct prior to Rickover's successful PWR project.
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The submarine program was aimed at building a reactor that would be quickly
available for use during the Cold War. Building a safe, environmentally sound, and
economical power reactor would have been a much more appropriate goal for the
civilian program, and might have had different results with greater social benefits.
The points described above are highly relevant to current decisions facing the
nuclear industry and the U.S. government. Overall nuclear innovation policy lacks
focus and coherence. It is not clear whether the main goal is to enable industry to
produce reactors for domestic baseload power, for industrial process heat, for
hydrogen production, or for export to other countries. It is not clear whether the
next generation of reactors should be based on an open fuel cycle or a closed one,
and the direction of nuclear waste policy is once again up in the air. If policy does
not even loosely define which direction we wish to take, we are nearly certain to
miss it.
Recently the DOE reactor demonstration program has been directed at the Next
Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) - a small modular helium-cooled graphite-
moderated reactor that is designed to produce process heat or electricity and
possibly hydrogen in a passively safe package. At the same time, a new licensing
framework is being demonstrated for a large central-station PWR. This licensing
process demonstration has little value for a high-temperature gas reactor like the
NGNP. Separately, the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative is exploring fuel cycle
274
options and Yucca Mountain has been canceled, but the reactor chosen for the
NGNP is clearly most suitable for a once-through fuel cycle. The choice of just one
demonstration is reminiscent of the PWR demos that led to technological lock-in in
the 1960s. An effort to launch an SMR program has begun suddenly, but the policy
toward the NGNP program has not been clarified, nor has the relationship among
the various programs been explained.
4.11.2 Government RD&D Policy Should Have Consensus Support
Despite its inauspicious beginnings, the civilian power reactor development
program did begin to receive attention during the 1950's. Unfortunately, that
attention was again misplaced; rather than debating issues specific to the nuclear
industry and technology, politicians used nuclear energy policy as a proxy for the
much larger and more contentious debate over public versus private power. There
was a tug-of-war between the parties, with the Democrats pushing for direct
government funding and development, and the Republicans insisting on reducing
that spending and involvement. The result was a disorganized, constantly shifting
development program. Only the PWR at Shippingport was built for initial power
demonstration, and soon the PWR was so far ahead of the other options that it
became the only rational option for industry. There was recognition that multiple
reactor types should be constructed and tested, but Republican cuts to
appropriations repeatedly left the PWR as the last project standing, partly because
there was experience with it, so it was less costly than other options. This led to
technological lock-in in a young and promising industry, and the experience
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suggests that it may sometimes be better to persist in pursuing common ground,
even at the expense of breadth, rather than rushing forward with measures that are
politically viable at the time but clearly are not in the longer term. Conflicts over
the societal benefits and drawbacks of nuclear energy also promoted inconsistent
policies, cycling repeatedly between heavy support and minimal support for
development and deployment.
A lack of consensus also caused the loan guarantees that began with the Bush
administration to be stalled by appropriation difficulties until Obama's second year
in office, and even now, the terms of the nuclear loan guarantees are so onerous as
to be undesirable to some applicants. A lack of consensus today also hinders
progress on nuclear waste policy and leads to many wasted dollars. In today's
debate over funding for demonstration and development programs, a larger debate
over the proper role of government and the role of private markets and industry
threatens to dominate the discussion. While those issues are important ones, they
should not be allowed to lead to the same erratic funding patterns of the past. It is
preferable that politicians reach a stable compromise that they can live with for a
decade or more, rather than forcing through measures that are certain to be
repealed within a few years. The latter path does more harm than good. One
approach to this systemic problem is described in Section 4.14.
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4.11.3 Government RD&D Policy Should Promote Variety
Not only should government seek to prevent technological lock-in by avoiding
heavily subsidizing a single technology's development to the exclusion of other
promising ones, it should also actively promote variety. In early development and
demonstration, the government should have given roughly comparable attention to
a group of designs. There were some who advocated this approach, but political
conflicts surrounding public versus private power and the budget deficit tended to
dash those plans. In the development of nuclear power reactors, industry was
involved in some of the demonstrations, particularly Shippingport and the other
early LWRs, but it was not as involved in the early breeder reactors, which only
further enhanced industry's appetite for LWRs.
An important lesson from the nuclear power reactor demonstration program is that
a demonstration of one technology gives it a significant head-start over other
technologies, and may lead to technological lock-in. Low-cost design studies, while
less expensive in the short run, do not substitute for demonstrations of alternative
technologies. Whether or not the PWR was the best reactor choice for commercial
development, what is undeniable is that the process for arriving at this choice was
neither reasoned nor deliberate; rather it resulted from conflicting priorities.
Some of the tools available to the federal government that would address the need
for variety are market-pull policies, which are designed to encourage innovation and
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technology development by creating or enhancing the market for new products. For
example, a renewable or low-carbon portfolio standard, a production tax credit for
low-carbon technologies, and a carbon price would each render the applicable low-
carbon technologies more competitive in their relevant markets. These tools can
provide broader support than others because they can apply to any technology that
performs a certain function, rather than a single chosen technology. This can be
more hospitable to innovation, since technology developers can think "outside the
box" of a chosen technology and can be subsidized to develop new ideas that were
not previously under consideration (Junginger et al. 2008; Popp 2002). The
intention of such policies is to "pull" (incentivize) new technologies into commercial
operation so that they can benefit from learning and competition and eventually
compete without subsidy. These "market-pull" policies are distinct from
"technology-push" policies, which subsidize RD&D or deployment of a specific
technology. For example, a publicly funded demonstration program is a technology-
push mechanism that subsidizes the demonstrated technology much more than any
similar technologies, which may benefit marginally by comparison from knowledge
spillover effects (Griliches 1992). A tax rebate in exchange for solar PV installation
only subsidizes solar PV, even if wind or geothermal would be more effective or
environmentally friendly in a certain application, potentially leading to wasteful or
uncompetitive choices. Technology-push policies can play an important role in the
early stage of creating options, but beyond that stage there are disadvantages to
them; the advantage that they lend to the technology they support can mask actual
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market or technical advantages of other technologies. Technology-push policies
cannot help but choose specific recipients, thus interfering with market selection.
Nuclear energy did not receive many subsidies aimed at creating market pull
during its earlier years; most government support was for research, development,
and demonstration - all technology-push tools. Once they moved beyond very basic
research, where disruptive technologies could be discovered, technology push
policies did not tend to promote variety in nuclear power development. Instead
these policies advanced a few options to the disadvantage of others. Deployment
incentives that do not favor a single technology are less likely to promote lock-in,
and so government policy should aim to be non-prejudicial wherever possible.
Assistance in research, development, licensing, and direct subsidies can be generic.
For example, by providing test facilities that are useful to new reactor fuel
development, the government could actually help to open up the market to new fuel
designs. A test facility would provide a mechanism for testing and licensing new
fuels. Since fuel can currently only be tested in today's reactors, disruptive design
changes are excluded by existing geometry and core design (Matzie 2011). By
resolving generic licensing issues and furthering technology-neutral safety codes,
government could dramatically reduce the cost and risk associated with licensing
new reactor designs. Simply supporting one or two designs (particularly traditional
ones) through the new licensing process does not resolve many issues that are
barriers for new technologies, and instead gives the newly licensed designs a
279
commanding market advantage. To counteract those advantages that have been
conferred upon certain designs in the past and those that are bound to occur in
demonstrations (because government cannot afford to demonstrate all technologies),
policymakers might explore directing stronger market incentives towards more
disruptive technologies, or those that have not received as much government
assistance in technology-push policies. Going forward, technologies that receive
technology-push support could be ineligible for market pull subsidies, and
graduated levels of subsidy could be applied so that, for example, a sodium reactor
would receive a higher production tax credit or a larger insurance subsidy for
licensing delays than would an LWR.
4.11.4 Demonstrations Projects Should Have Clear and Realistic Goals
The lack of clear goals was evident in some of the later demonstration programs.
The Clinch River Breeder Reactor, for example, was designed to demonstrate new
breeder technology readiness, commercial viability and scalability of that
technology, feasibility of licensing, and industry participation. With 77 utilities and
a handful of contractors coordinating a single reactor project based on relatively
immature technology, there were too many hurdles and too many goals for a
successful project to emerge. The Clinch River project was a failure by all accounts.
It went far over its budget and did not demonstrate any of its stated aims. By the
time construction was on the horizon, the need for the breeder reactor was in
question, but efforts to adjust the project to fit the country's new needs were
fruitless.
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By contrast, the Shippingport demonstration project was tasked only with showing
that the PWR power reactor technology was feasible and available. This was a
much more limited goal, and it was achieved on time and on budget through
Rickover's management. Demonstration projects should be designed to reduce some
uncertainty - not all of it. This lesson can be readily broadened to non-nuclear
projects of large scale. The Synfuels project and FutureGen project both suffered
from attempts to accomplish too much - particularly mixing technology
demonstration with complicated industry participation and cost-sharing.
4.12 Lessons for the Small Modular Reactor Program
The current push towards developing small modular reactor options in the U.S.
bears some resemblance to past efforts to advance nuclear power, and can benefit
from the lessons from those programs.
4.12.1 SMR Program Goals Should be Clarified
Even at this early stage, potential conflicts between stated policy goals and the
paths of least resistance are arising. In supporting U.S. manufacturing,
policymakers envision creating an SMR industry that will deploy SMRs within the
U.S., but also will export them heavily to other countries, including underdeveloped
countries. And yet, some of the proposed prototypes are to be reactors that would
provide power to DOE and military installations. Those may be a good application
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for SMRs, and supplying many DOD and DOE facilities with power could certainly
provide a sizeable market. But those applications are substantially different from
export applications as they relate to proliferation concerns, refueling, transporting
and building the reactor, operating and regulating it, etc. By focusing on U.S.
government power needs, the DOE is unlikely to drive development of a reactor that
is ideal for export markets in developing economies. To establish a goal and follow
it up with a program that does not pursue that goal is a recipe for failure.
Policymakers and DOE ought either to adjust the scope of the goal to fit the
program they wish to pursue, or to adjust the scope of the program to fit the goal
they wish to pursue.
4.12.2 Technology Lock-in Prevention is Needed
DOE's current proposal to take one or two SMR designs through the NRC licensing
process arguably would give those reactors such a large advantage over the
competition that the result might be lock-in. DOE work on generic issues, discussed
in more detail in Section 4.12.4, is less likely to have this effect. On the other hand,
large LWRs have such an advantage at this point that SMRs may need licensing
support to enter the market. Both sides of this dilemma deserve equal attention.
There are also administrative issues that would be relatively simple to correct but
that are a barrier to new smaller reactors. In particular, NRC user fees are not
based on plant size (NRC 2011), so smaller plants need to cover those costs spread
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over less revenue; user fees could have some scaling or subsidy so that they do not
effectively require plants to be very large to cover those costs.
4.12.3 Market Pull Policies Should Begin Immediately
The DOE has set forth specific "technology push" and "market pull" aspects of SMR
policy. The Office of Nuclear Energy would provide technology push by supporting
public-private partnerships to accelerate commercialization of up to two SMRs,
including cost-sharing first of a kind development and licensing activities. Market
pull would come from having the DOE and DOD enter into Power Purchase
Agreements (PPAs) with SMRs, possibly built on government sites, which would
enable easier financing.
A schedule put forth by the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy reveals a major flaw:
technology-push is to begin immediately, while market-pull is to begin only after a
construction and operating license is issued and three years after long-lead
procurement must begin. This may appear to be a small detail, but market-pull
cannot effectively "pull" unless it starts when the pulling is most helpful. Up-front
investment of valuable resources toward licensing and development efforts is hard
for a company to justify without evidence of strong market demand. Companies are
less likely to devote serious effort and top talent when there is no compelling
evidence that the market is ready for their reactor.
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4.12.4 Alternative Demonstration Licensing Methods are Needed
In its current vision, the DOE does not appear to be addressing a regulatory issue
that is sometimes referred to as the "chicken and egg problem." In general, a
reactor cannot be operated without NRC approval, but no company has yet been
able to license truly novel technology or make a novel safety case without a
prototype available to "prove" their case with experimental data. So, simply, a
reactor can't be built until it is licensed, and it can't be licensed until it is built.
There is a remedy for this conundrum - the DOE and DOD can build demonstration
and test reactors under their own safety control without the inflexible and
comprehensive regulations of the NRC. For a number of reasons, the DOE and its
partners are opting not to take advantage of this competitive advantage.
A major goal of the DOE SMR program is to reduce the costs of nuclear energy.
There are three major areas of cost reduction that may be available to SMRs. Two
will not benefit from DOE involvement: for the customer, there is less capital at risk
at one time with a smaller plant, and for the vendor, there are economies of mass-
producing reactors and parts on an assembly line. The third major opportunity for
cost reduction is in reducing the costs of building and running a reactor safely
thanks to simpler more passively controlled designs, but the cost of realizing those
benefits is a long, arduous process that requires the introduction of new licensing
methods to the NRC. DOE is not expert at manufacturing processes or business
planning, but it is expert at safely operating reactors under generous design
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envelopes that allow for changes to be made during design when they are
advantageous, and that allow for testing and data collection crucial to eventual
licensing. Without the NRC licensing presence, it is also possible to expedite the
design and build process and to avoid long delays mid-construction. The USEFC
project proposed by SRNS, industry, and others, aims to take advantage of this
method of demonstration and parallel licensing. However, this is primarily an
industry-led effort. The DOE has recently signed a Memorandum Of
Understanding with Hyperion and SRNL to cooperate in building a reactor on the
laboratory site, but with the stipulation that the reactor goes through the NRC
licensing process. Similarly, the other government proposals (TVA, DOE, and
S.512) do not explore any licensing alternatives that could expedite the process.
Achieving new licensing standards that recognize the safety advantages of SMRs
compared with large plants is likely impossible without a prototype or test reactor
to provide empirical testing data, particularly for non-LWR designs. Achieving it
for the first-mover into the market involves high up-front cost (before any revenue
can be realized) that may provide a sufficient barrier to entry to keep innovative
designs at bay. The DOE could have the most significant impact on cost reduction
by supporting some of the generic issues that pertain to licensing SMRs - both by
sharing the cost of prototypes (and/or sponsoring them outside the NRC regulatory
structure), and by assisting with the R&D needed to make new safety cases with
the NRC. The U.S. government should also subsidize the cost of the new learning
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and expertise that the NRC will require to assess these new issues. These safety
case issues include:
- How to license factories that manufacture plants
e How to treat a site with many modules - is it a large plant, or is each
additional module an additional plant?
- How to give credit for underground siting
- How to handle a single control room operating multiple units
" Whether to allow for a smaller Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), or else how
to account for the smaller source term.
Each of these and many other possibilities could make nuclear energy less costly,
but the cost of making each and every new safety case is far too high for a single
vendor to justify. DOE and the federal government can make a large contribution
here. Developing a technology-neutral licensing framework is another role for the
government, and could enable easier development of license applications for
innovative non-LWR technology.
4.13 Recommendations
How, then, might U.S. nuclear energy policy be strengthened based on this previous
experience? Here, some recommendations are put forward for improving the current
system. Alternatively, an overhaul of the current system is proposed in the final
section on policy volatility, but the ideas in this section will help to inform the
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details of any system-wide changes. The following proposals are advanced for
consideration:
Acknowledging that there are some who disagree with any and all nuclear power,
and there are some who do not fully support it, there appears to be moderately
strong consensus on at least a few points:
- New nuclear power plants should be built in the U.S., but at least the first
few cannot access capital at a reasonable cost without subsidy.
- The U.S. should continue to innovate to develop reactors that operate more
safely and at a lower lifecycle cost.
- A priority should be put on domestic manufacturing and maintaining the
U.S. status as a net exporter of nuclear power technology.
Development of an effective deployment policy began with the market-pull
incentives of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. That has been proved by the strong
industry investment in obtaining loan guarantees for building new power plants.
However, the OMB's use of undisclosed formulae and assumptions for calculating
loan guarantee costs frustrates the intent of Congress to promote new nuclear
power plant construction. Despite an apparent policy of encouraging nuclear power,
the OMB's administration of the loan guarantee program makes the loan
guarantees effectively unavailable to many; it prevents private companies in de-
regulated markets from obtaining loan guarantees, or from fully understanding how
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they can improve their projects to lower their subsidy costs. The administration of
the loan guarantees should be made more transparent and fact-based.
Nuclear energy RD&D policy should see fundamental change. The current practice
of developing public-private partnerships between DOE and industry for technology
demonstration has not fostered innovation. Instead, the DOE, sometimes with
direct Congressional involvement, has created technology-specific development
programs and asked industry to submit proposals to participate in those. Industry
players have then tailored their proposals to satisfy the technology goals chosen by
the DOE and Congress in appealing to those same bodies for public funding and
support. Congress should stop directing DOE to carry out such projects and should
instead direct DOE to pursue the broader points of consensus mentioned above,
allowing DOE more flexibility and discretion in implementing an RD&D program.
DOE can change the nuclear RD&D culture from one of catering to earmarks and
technologies chosen by Congress to a forward-thinking culture of innovation. To
begin with, DOE should provide testing facilities that will enable private industry,
academia, and the labs to perform research on disruptive innovations in fuel and
core designs and safety systems. Testing facilities for radically new fuel designs are
currently inadequate. Federal funding should also provide generic licensing
support for innovative reactors. The DOE and the NRC are the logical agencies to
carry this out. The DOE could develop safety cases that could be studied and
criticized by the NRC. The NRC could then issue regulatory guidance based on its
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findings. Both agencies should receive funding specifically directed at resolving
generic licensing issues like operation of multiple modules from one control room,
safety advantages of underground reactors, and security force requirements for
small plants; these are a major barrier to entry for innovative reactors and passive
safety features. If prototypes or test reactors are needed to accomplish this, DOE
should take the lead on that.
A two-track approach should be taken to encourage the demonstration of first-of-a-
kind reactor designs. For those designs that are evolutionary (based on well-
established fuels, coolants, and moderators), Congress should provide market-pull
incentives, perhaps generous tax advantages for the first one or two reactors built,
to compensate first-mover companies for exposing themselves to the higher
licensing risk. This policy would apply to LWSMRs, and the tax advantages could
be greater than those for the LWRs being planned under the EPAct of 2005. New
reactors that are substantially different in fuel, moderator, or coolant from
currently operating reactors cannot be NRC-licensed at a reasonable cost without
the construction of experimental facilities for technology demonstration. For these
reactors, the DOE should support the construction of experimental equipment at
government facilities. DOE should focus on technical issues for these demos, and
less on NRC licensing or commercial issues. The equipment could be used for
technology demonstration first, and would be available to support licensing efforts
at a future time; if a prototype or test reactor is deemed adequate for that, then
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costs can be reduced by avoiding a large-scale demo. Industry should collaborate to
ease technology transfer.
It is clear that over the course of development of the nuclear power industry there
were many opportunities to improve policy. It is also evident that while some
positive changes have taken place, the U.S. is in serious danger of repeating some of
its past mistakes. Current policies and proposals are poised to promote further
technology lock-in and fail to correct existing barriers to innovative technologies.
Most importantly, nuclear energy policy lacks the coherence and consistency needed
to nurture innovations and follow through on a path towards meaningful progress
in the U.S. energy supply system. The suggestions detailed above are meant to
provide some insights that might aid policymakers in improving on the past as they
consider the policies of the future. As much as anything, future success demands
policies with enough political staying power that they can be predictably carried out
for a decade or more. The next section further elaborates on this systemic problem.
The recommendations above have suggested changes that could be made within the
current DOE system to address some of the current policy failures. The next section
suggests an approach that would require a major transformation of the innovation
system, but that also outlines a possible path toward lasting and comprehensive
reform.
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4.14 RD&D Policy Volatility: A Critical System Problem and an
Approach to Correcting It
An examination of previous U.S. policy towards nuclear energy RD&D and
innovation suggests a level of volatility that goes well beyond that evident in other
areas of policy, for example: defense spending, nuclear weapons, taxes, entitlement
programs, infrastructure, education, agricultural policy, and fossil fuel support. To
be sure, there has been much disagreement and debate in these areas, and there
are frequent changes at the margins, but we have not usually seen the type of
frenetic launching and flat-line cancellation of massive programs at a moment's
notice that has been the norm in nuclear energy policy.
As suggested in the previous section, specific improvements to nuclear energy
innovation policy are possible and necessary. Nonetheless, the volatility of nuclear
energy policy is detrimental to any program of innovation and may eclipse the
benefits of incremental changes. Sustained effort, on the order of decades, is
required to bring concepts in nuclear energy to a point where they are ready to be
commercialized. Two important questions, then, are:
Why have we been unable to sustain a stable nuclear energy innovation policy?
What might we be able to do to achieve greater stability?
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4.14.1 Causes of Nuclear Energy Policy Volatility
In answering the first question, we can begin by establishing those factors that have
lent stability to other policies. In some cases, strong popular consensus on the
general thrust of policy has lent great stability, even if disagreement leads to
movements in the exact degree or direction of policy. For example, the need for a
federal system of roads and highways is supported by popular consensus. Exactly
which bridges should be built and how much should be spent on maintenance may
be at issue, but the overall policy is supported. Nuclear energy has often lacked this
strong popular support, and curiously, even when polls have suggested it has
enjoyed the support of a large majority of the general population, it has not
necessarily had the political backing one might expect. Certainly, at times, nuclear
power has absolutely lacked popular support, and that has been reflected in
policies. It is possible that the backlash against nuclear power has at times
persisted in political circles even when the population as a whole has transitioned to
a more moderate stance. In the early days of nuclear development, the public
versus private power debate caused one such discrepancy: while the populace
broadly supported nuclear power, many Republican lawmakers sought to block
federal programs supporting nuclear development because of fears that they would
expand public utilities.
Other sources of policy stability that often trump popular consensus are exogenous
inertial forces. There are at least three varieties of these. There are factors that
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are almost completely external and immutable, such as treaty commitments or prior
promises made that it may not be feasible to change. There are interactions with
other policy goals that may take priority; for example, even though President
Obama had widespread support from the Democratic majority and much of the
populace for his promise to close Guantanamo Bay within 6 months of taking office,
the overriding policy goal of national security and of maintaining positive foreign
relations, combined with the unwillingness of countries or U.S. states to have
prisoners released to their territories rendered that change implausible. The
combination of external forces and competing policy goals supported maintaining
the status quo (i.e. policy stability). One final variety of inertial force that impacts
policy is the game of unofficial quid pro quo that seems to affect capital defense
spending most obviously (Balla et al 2002). If a single category of spending (such as
defense) can be spread geographically such that many Congressional districts have
a stake in budget outcomes, it becomes very difficult to cut funding to one area
without cutting it to all of them - more often, congress seems to agree that "if you
leave my projects intact, I'll leave yours intact." This is not to say that projects are
never canceled - certainly they are. But the stability of huge capital spending
projects in the Department of Defense is in stark contrast with capital spending in
the Department of Energy (Carsey & Rundquist 1999; Knight 2008).
Another source of policy stability to be found in the NIH, NSF, and the Basic
Energy Sciences division of the DOE is the process of peer review. All of these
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organizations use some degree of scientific peer review to allocate funds among
research projects, and while the process is not perfectly apolitical or disinterested,
peer reviewers are generally not motivated by partisan arguments (Langenberg
1986-1987). It is true that overall funding is subject to the annual appropriations
process, but there is widespread political consensus that government support for
basic research is appropriate (acknowledging disagreement at the margins), and the
peer review process renders this pool of funding unfertile ground for sowing political
hay; it is nearly impossible to make a show of funding a big program that a
representative's constituents will celebrate, and nearly impossible to similarly slash
funding for a "political win."
Does nuclear energy policy have the benefit of any of these sources of stability? In
essence: no. As discussed above, there has rarely been a strong political consensus
for nuclear energy, even when a popular consensus has existed. As for exogenous
inertial forces, they certainly exist for nuclear weapons: much work has been
devoted to them even when politicians would have preferred otherwise. The
ownership of a stockpile of nuclear weapons requires an ongoing weapons program,
and arguably the existence of these weapons demands attention at all times. One
might similarly argue that the existence of today's LWRs has necessitated an
ongoing program of LWR R&D, but that argument is refuted by the actions of the
Clinton Administration in eliminating federally funded LWR RD&D in 1998 and
1999. As for the strategy that seems to have benefited DOD contractors, nuclear
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power has not benefited very much from broad geographical distribution. The
Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project was sustained beyond logic partially due to
the fact that its cancellation would have impacted constituents in many districts,
and thus cancellation was opposed by many representatives, but by and large
government-funded nuclear energy RD&D is concentrated in a handful of areas,
and does not gain much political benefit from having many dependent districts
(Cohen & Noll 1991). True scientific peer review is not used to determine which
nuclear energy projects are pursued, except where they are still in the realm of
basic sciences. DOE is a mission agency that is generally assigned 'missions' by the
current administration and Congress, and DOE chooses projects (or projects are
chosen for DOE) in support of those political missions (Sissine 2006). Generally,
these projects change whenever there is a major change in leadership in the U.S.
government, realistically every two to four years. The structure of the AEC as it
was established did not give Congress this level of control; it was conflict with the
JCAE in 1957 over appropriations that ended with the AEC ceding that control.
This system leads to projects that barely have a chance to get off the ground before
they are replaced or significantly redirected. Those projects that do last longer
(NGNP for example) are in danger of being eliminated at any time due to changing
political power or thinking, and they often meet their end this way.
4.14.2 Factors that Stabilize Policy
In the area of basic research, the current system of peer review functions relatively
well as a stabilizer. This has proved true in fusion R&D, although as fusion comes
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closer to tackling commercial issues it may run into problems similar to fission's. In
more applied R&D, and most markedly in demonstration projects, increased policy
stability is a prerequisite for a successful program.
One element of any approach should be to involve the customer in formulating
strategy. Take for comparison the DOD's RD&D program: the DOD is an end user
of the technologies that result from the RD&D it funds. The DOD has a clear
mission, and requires tools and technologies to complete it. Thus, it funds RD&D
that it believes will further its mission. The technologies that receive support are,
crucially, not primarily chosen by the companies who wish to perform the research,
by Congress, by the President (except in rare cases) or by the staff of R&D
laboratories. They are chosen by the customer who has a strong interest in seeing
that his dollars are spent wisely and that resultant products are ultimately useful.
Ideally, energy research should move toward that model. In the case of nuclear
technology, the customers are almost exclusively utilities. Other possible customers
include the DOD and perhaps eventually major industrial energy users. A reactor
vendor can arguably be a customer when it comes to subsystems, but in general the
reactor vendor is not the customer - it is the seller. In the case of nuclear energy,
congressmen are not customers, nor are individuals. If federal nuclear energy
RD&D is to produce something useful to the market, it must consult the would-be
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buyers. At a minimum, utilities and other potential nuclear energy consumers
should be brought into the decision making process.
Some would argue that it isn't appropriate to allow utilities to be at this table
unless they are contributing the bulk of the funding. That argument does not hold
up under scrutiny, because involving utilities and other stakeholders is necessary to
make the most productive use of federal RD&D dollars. The United States
Department of Agriculture's Agricultural Research Service often seeks or accepts
industry input to prioritize and direct research attention. Similarly, the
Department of Defense considers input from field officers and generals of different
branches. It is also common sense that consulting the target users of a technology
during development is a wise precaution, if only to identify barriers to entry or
other constraints that might be addressed during development if they are
discovered in time. Currently, nuclear energy RD&D funding is given to DOE
through Congress, and the consumer of final products is rarely involved. If only one
change is made in nuclear energy innovation policy, it should be to change how
projects are selected so that those choices are influenced by stakeholders, an
important subset of which are the customers.
Even if Congress were to stop directing particular energy projects and instead
appropriated into a fund whose monies would be allocated by a group of experts,
customers, and other stakeholders, the RD&D program would be vulnerable to
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volatility and politics of the appropriation process. This has been evident with the
new ARPA-E program. Congress has indeed refrained from directing ARPA-E to
fund particular projects, and has allowed significant discretion to be exercised by a
group of program managers (although not always customers). However, when
Congress has failed to pass a budget, ARPA-E has found itself trapped in a holding
pattern. One way to avoid this sort of roadblock would be to establish a fund for
nuclear energy research that would be able to continue funding long-term research
projects even when short-term political processes broke down. This fund could be
populated through the appropriations process using taxpayer dollars, but that
would not solve the problems associated with appropriations unless a substantial
endowment could be built up to insulate the fund from political volatility. Other
possible (and probably preferable) methods would be to fund it with a user fee on
electricity, or to grant utilities a substantial tax credit (not a deduction - instead up
to 100% credit) to contribute to the nuclear RD&D fund. This would in essence
allow utilities to put a portion of their federal tax bill towards the nuclear energy
RD&D fund, if they felt that would be a good use of the funds. Part of the Nuclear
Waste Fund (NWF), currently idle and held captive by Congress, could also be used
as an initial endowment, or the NWF itself could be altered so that it could be used
to support fuel cycle research under the supervision of a board of experts and
stakeholders. The RD&D fund should be established such that the managers of the
fund could allocate money to projects or purposes that were in furtherance of the
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objectives of the fund, and would not require Congressional authorization for each
allocation.
This nuclear energy RD&D fund could be extended to encompass multiple types of
energy technologies, or it could be limited to nuclear energy. It could be empowered
to undertake demonstration projects on its own, to issue loan guarantees, to partner
with private companies, etc. If large enough, it could assume responsibility for
related activities at DOE. The possibilities are numerous, and the details will be
important, particularly as they relate to creating a competitive atmosphere for
innovation - this is only meant to provide some direction. The key aims are to
reduce the volatility of nuclear energy innovation policy and to involve the end-
users in the decision-making process.
4.15 Lessons for the Broader Energy Innovation System
While the recommendations above have focused specifically on nuclear energy
innovation and policy, many of them are relevant to broader energy innovation and
climate change policy. The need for clearly defined and consensus-driven policy
goals is equally valid in all types of energy RD&D. The value of promoting variety
to prevent technological lock-in is generally applicable, but some exceptions may
exist; for example, in setting standards for smart grid communication,
standardization may be a priority.
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In the context of climate policy and the transition to a low-carbon energy supply
that has been discussed in the last two chapters, we have identified the need to spur
large investments in demonstrating and deploying new technologies. This can be
achieved by both actively encouraging investment through incentive policies and by
reducing the risks that discourage investment. From this historical study of
nuclear power, it is clear that some of the risks are policy and regulatory risks that
are exacerbated by the policy volatility surrounding energy and nuclear policy. To
reduce those risks, policymakers can drive towards consensus so that policies can be
lasting, or they can implement a program aimed at reducing the inherent volatility
of climate and energy policies, such as the one described in the previous section. It
is also important for government to settle on clear and effective regulations as
rapidly as possible to minimize regulatory uncertainty. When actively encouraging
investment through incentives, the historical evidence suggests that omitting
market-pull approaches is a grave mistake, and that a focus on technology-push
incentives encourages technology lock-in. With these lessons in mind, we can say
that policymakers should strive to include substantial market-pull policies, while
maintaining some technology-push support as well.
The most difficult of these tasks is also the most likely to encourage investments,
especially high-risk learning investments. When the typical technology risks of
learning are confounded with the risk that climate policy could change rapidly,
investors are less likely to support new energy technology. A stable policy
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environment with market-pull incentives would offer an environment in which
energy innovation could thrive.
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5 Conclusion
The world is currently facing the threat of climate change that is thought to be
caused largely by anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. The United States will
have a crucial role in any successful global greenhouse gas reduction strategy, and
also must aim to increase energy security while maximizing the reliability of the
energy system, ensuring affordability, and minimizing other environmental
impacts. Achieving these goals will require energy innovation; in Chapter 2 we
found that rapid energy decarbonization likely requires accelerating the
electrification of energy supply, and most of the current low-carbon generation
options are too costly to contribute significantly without a large increase in energy
costs.
Innovation will be needed not only to create new technologies, but also to improve
the costs, reliability, and other characteristics of technologies currently in
development and use. Chapter 1 gave an overview of the energy supply system in
the U.S. and the energy innovation process. It explored the stages of innovation
and compiled evidence from the literature that supports the hypothesis that the
stages beyond research and development, i.e., pre-commercial and commercial
demonstration, early adoption, and post-commercial learning-by-doing and
learning-by-using, will be crucial going forward, and that they are often
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underemphasized relative to the attention given to R&D. It provided an overview of
data pulled from many sources that paint a picture of the funding patterns in the
U.S. for energy RD&D from public and private sources. Public funding has fallen
sharply since the 1970s, but recovered somewhat in the past decade. Private
funding is more dismal among major players, especially in the electric power sector.
Partial deregulation of the electric power industry has driven RD&D spending to
record lows as a percentage of total sales. Since the electric power sector will need
to play an important role in any carbon reduction scheme, we set out to understand
the scale of this challenge.
Chapter 2 made use of the Kaya Identity to evaluate the transition to a lower
carbon energy system. The framework demonstrates the complementary nature of
reductions in the energy intensity of the economy and in the carbon intensity of the
energy supply system, and we were able to illustrate some possible scenarios for
CO 2 reduction and to identify the scale of the changes that would be required. It is
important to note that energy intensity reductions achieved by moving energy-
intensive activities out of the U.S. to economies with equal or greater carbon
intensity will not reduce global emissions and may even exacerbate them. We found
that even with very optimistic assumptions about low-carbon technology
installations (at rates that are unprecedented even for fossil fuel plants), business-
as-usual energy intensity reductions of roughly 2% per year would require GDP per
44
capita to fall to 1% per year in an 85% CO2 reduction scenario. To achieve 2%
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annual per capita GDP growth through 2050 with the same optimistic supply
assumptions, energy intensity would have to decline at an annual rate of about 3%.
As supply resources become more constrained, energy intensity must fall even more
quickly. The results from the Kaya Identity framework beg the questions: how
much will this cost and can it be done?
In Chapter 3 Part I, we set about answering these questions by using the IEA's
MARKAL modeling framework and the U.S. EPA's input database to estimate the
capital investment required to transform the electric power sector. This work
corroborated the conclusions of Chapter 2 in identifying the importance of
increasing energy efficiency to meet any goal without enormous capacity additions
or slowing GDP growth. We found that over 1,400 gigawatts of new low-carbon
baseload electric power will be needed by 2050 in a low-carbon scenario if energy
intensity trends follow the "business as usual" projections. We found that the
capital investments required to achieve that capacity level are about $7.5 trillion,
while in an unconstrained carbon scenario they are just over $1.0 trillion. By
placing greater emphasis on energy efficiency improvements, the investment
requirement can likely be reduced dramatically, but our method could not estimate
the actual costs of achieving increased efficiency levels. This is an area that has
seen some activity and some estimates (McKinsey & Company estimated the
upfront investment cost of reducing non-transportation energy consumption 23% by
2020 at $520 billion deployed over 10 years in its 2009 report, "Unlocking Energy
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Efficiency in the U.S. Economy"), but the problem of assessing the investment
requirements on the demand side and investigating the best policy tools for driving
that investment is an important area for future research.
In Chapter 3 Part II we focused in on innovation investments. Of the capital
investments estimated in the first part of the chapter, the portion that occurs after
demonstration and prior to the technology being brought to a competitive cost level
is subject to risks that exceed the normal level for fully commercialized
technologies. By developing a simple two-stage model of the innovation process
with three types of innovation investment to promote cost-reduction (a research
subsidy, a learning subsidy, and a production subsidy), we took a first step toward a
comprehensive innovation investment model. The model that we present provides a
method for estimating the magnitude of the innovation investment required to
bring a generic technology to a competitive cost level, as well as a tool for
policymakers to understand the cost of incentivizing that innovation under different
circumstances. When the model can be combined with relationships describing the
effectiveness of investments in RD&D and in enhanced learning on capital, fuel,
and operating costs, a model like the one developed here will be a powerful tool for
assessing policies aimed at bringing the costs of novel technologies to a competitive
level. It will allow policymakers to estimate the total costs of supporting one
technology versus another, and of using one mechanism versus another, or a mix of
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mechanisms. Such a model will also allow policymakers to study the timing of
investment requirements, and the distribution of the innovation investment burden.
The model also identified the important role that technological learning will play in
cost reduction. In several nuclear technology examples, we found that the learning
rate can dramatically affect the magnitude of the high-risk investment that is
needed. Since the availability of capital for high-risk investments of this type is
limited, it is important to reduce risks and costs rapidly. This again points to the
importance of the later stages of the innovation process, and in the last chapter we
looked at previous experience in the nuclear power field to identify ways to
effectively drive investment in new energy technologies
Chapter 4 presented an analysis of historical and present-day nuclear energy
innovation policy and nuclear technology and industry development in the U.S. We
found a destructive pattern of erratic policy and funding that discouraged private
investments and stifled innovation. We found that the tendency to use technology-
push rather than market-pull policy tools encouraged technology lock-in,
discouraged market-driven innovation, and generally excluded customers from the
process of identifying the most promising technologies for continued development.
We recommended that rather than Congress directing energy RD&D projects, a
group of experts, customers (especially utilities), and other stakeholders could be
tasked with allocating support to projects from a nuclear energy RD&D fund. Such
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a fund could be started with an electricity user fee or a legislation change and
withdrawal from the Nuclear Waste Fund. There has been an absence of clear goals
in nuclear energy innovation policy, and the policy process has not been effective in
generating consensus. Most of these issues have not yet been corrected, and many
can be readily generalized to characterize the energy innovation system as a whole.
We have presented three different approaches to understanding what the current
energy innovation system is and is not capable of, what it must achieve, and how it
can be improved to better serve current and future goals. The tools developed here
can be used to judge the impacts and effectiveness of different policy options, and
they can be improved and extended in several ways.
First, to increase the value and utility of the Kaya framework outputs, the
development of a way to translate the energy intensity reduction requirements
implied by the Kaya identity into concrete changes would allow one to compare the
trade-offs between efficiency improvement and capacity addition more easily. This
could involve allocating the required energy demand reductions among industries
and assessing the capability of each industry (aluminum smelting, concrete
production, or paper production, for example) to reduce intensity using currently
available or developing technologies. One could then estimate the cost of such an
adjustment in terms of any capital investment requirements or ongoing operational
costs.
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Next, concerning the MARKAL model, valuable future work would include
developing scenarios in which efficiency improvements are achieved without
exogenous specification of demand reductions. Developing learning characteristics
for energy technologies and implementing them within MARKAL, instead of during
post-processing, would be another useful step, and could also be extended to two-
factor learning curves. Work is ongoing in this area. It would also be worthwhile to
explore investment requirements using other modeling platforms, particularly
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models like the MIT Joint Program on the
Science and Policy of Global Change's Integrated Global System Modeling
Framework (IGSM). One part of the IGSM is the Emissions Predictions and Policy
Analysis (EPPA) model, which is a multi-region CGE model of the world economy.
EPPA has multiple sectors, but does not go into nearly the detail of MARKAL in
terms of energy supply and demand technologies. Either by working on an
extension to EPPA or by writing a script to use the features of MARKAL and EPPA
together, it would be useful to explore capital investment requirements using a
CGE model. Work to pair EPPA with MARKAL was done in a limited way for the
MIT Future of Natural Gas study, in which some EPPA results were used as inputs
to MARKAL (MITEI 2010). There are several advantages to such an approach: the
economic growth rate of regions is endogenous, so the impacts of carbon policies,
climate change, and the investment requirements themselves can be seen and
accounted for; the rising costs of energy will induce a contraction in demand (and
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impact GDP), thus leading to potentially lower investment requirements; and the
global nature of the system is captured, so that moving energy intensive activities
to new regions will not hide any emissions. Modifying a CGE modeling system to
identify such granular information would be challenging, but the output would be
informative and in many ways an improvement on the method used here.
The innovation investment model presented in Chapter 3 Part II would benefit from
many improvements. It also brings to light a related research area that merits
increased attention. Possible improvements to the model include the addition of
discounting effects, further disaggregation of the stages in the innovation process
described by the model, more refined and disaggregated characterization of cost
reduction mechanisms and related subsidy options, inclusion of a more complex cost
structure for the technology in question, and better handling of the uncertainty of
future electric power markets. Further work that is highlighted by the model
includes developing models to describe the relationships between different
innovation investments and cost reduction outcomes, and studying the impacts of
policies and other factors on the learning rate in an effort to better understand
learning and whether or how it can be influenced by policies or initiatives.
This work focused primarily on the electric power sector. Future work could extend
this by looking closely at the transportation and industrial sectors. Expanding the
historical case studies to include coal or wind power would also be informative.
309
In addition to augmenting the set of tools available for energy innovation policy
analysis, we hope that this work has persuaded the reader that meeting ambitious
energy policy goals will demand innovation on a massive scale, that the bulk of the
near-term needs will require additional focus on the later stages of the innovation
process, and that both the total investment requirement and the specific need for
investment in high-risk, early post-commercialization projects will not be met
without major changes that reduce policy volatility and increase market-based
incentives.
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7 Appendix I: Kaya Framework Details
To investigate the implications of adhering to alternative carbon emission
reduction goals, a simple framework based on the differential form of the basic
identity
C=Q x )x(xP
is applied to the energy use of the U.S. economy between 2008 and 2050. Actual
U.S. energy use in the base year of 2007 is broken down by sector and by fuel, as
shown schematically in Table 1010. Carbon emissions are calculated based on the
2006 CO 2 emission factors for each fuel/sector combination reported by the Energy
Information Administration, with the exception of biofuels, which are assumed to
have emissions 50% below those of transportation petroleum fuels.46 The emission
factors for biofuels are a subject of considerable debate, with published estimates
ranging from twice the rate of emissions from gasoline to net negative emissions.
The biofuels emissions factor assumed here is meant to serve as a conservative
estimate of what might be achievable in the near term. "Electricity" in the
residential, commercial, industrial, and transportation sectors does not contribute
to those sectors' CO 2 emissions, as electricity-related emissions are accounted for
separately in the electric power sector. The emission factors used in the framework
are shown in Table 1111.
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Table 10: Sectors and fuels represented in the Kaya framework
Sector Fuel
Residential Petroleum
Natural Gas
Coal
Biofuel
Geothermal
Solar/PV
Wind
Electricity
Transportation Petroleum
Natural Gas
Biofuel
Electricity
Industrial Petroleum
Natural Gas
Coal
Coal w/CCS
Nuclear Heat
Biofuel
Geothermal
Solar/PV
Wind
Hydro
Electricity
Sector Fuel
Commercial Petroleum
Natural Gas
Coal
Biofuel
Geothermal
Solar/PV
Wind
Electricity
Electric Power Petroleum
Natural Gas
Coal
Coal w/CCS
Nuclear
Hydro
Geothermal
Biofuel
Solar/PV
Wind
Imports
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Table 11: Default emission coefficients used in the Kaya framework
Fuel
Petroleum - Transportation
Petroleum - Industrial
Petroleum - Commercial
Petroleum - Residential
Petroleum - Electric Power
Biofuel
Natural Gas
Coal
Coal with Carbon Capture
(90%) and Sequestration
Geothermal
Wind
Solar
Nuclear
Hydroelectric
Emission Coefficient
(Million metric tons CO 2
per quadrillion Btu)
70.55
74.54
83.58
77.21
84.10
35.44
53.06
94.70
9.47
1.31
Key inputs to the framework are shown in Table 1212. The framework assumes
that energy demand in each sector grows at the same overall rate. A further
assumption is that each sector must reduce its carbon emissions by the same overall
percentage. In each sector the mix of fuels is calculated such that the sector's C02
limit is not exceeded. In the transportation sector, biofuel is the next lowest-
emission fuel after electricity, and fuel demand is met with biofuel until the CO 2
limit of that sector is reached. The remainder is allocated as electricity. In the
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commercial and residential sectors, natural gas is used to supply the allowable
carbon-emitting energy, and then geothermal heat and electricity provide the rest.
In the industrial sector, biofuel provides the carbon-emitting energy, and
geothermal heat and electricity again fill the balance. The required electricity
supply to each sector (augmented by a transmission and distribution loss factor) is
summed over all sectors and this determines the total electricity supply. The mix of
fuels to the electric power sector is then determined consistent with the scenario
assumptions such that its permitted CO 2 emissions are not exceeded.
Table 12: Key inputs for the Kaya framework
Rates of CO 2 Reduction Emissions Other
Change (% Goal Factors
per year)
- Population * % Reduction of - CCS capture - Peak to average
CO 2 emissions efficiency (%) power demand ratio
- GDP per - Base year for - CO 2  - Contribution of each
Capita CO 2 comparison reduction for fuel to the energy
(1990, 2000, biofuels generation for each
2008) versus sector
petroleum
* Energy - End year (2050
Intensity considered
of GDP here)
Once the fuel mix has been determined for the electric power sector, the framework
calculates the equivalent installed capacity required to meet the electricity demand
in that year, based on realistic or historical capacity factors and thermal-to-electric
conversion factors, as well as an assumed peak-to-average power demand ratio.
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The capacity factors used for this analysis are given in Table 1313. The peak power
demand is set at 175% of the average demand in the base case, which implies that
installed capacity must be enough to supply 175% of the average demand. This
requirement is spread among technologies proportional to their contribution to total
electricity generation. This distribution would almost certainly not be the optimal
way of meeting peak demand, but further study on the use of renewables and
energy storage to satisfy peak power demand is needed to assess this situation more
fully. The framework subsequently calculates the required installation rate for the
intervening years for a number of the technologies, where the starting years for
installing nuclear and coal with carbon capture and sequestration are adjustable.
Table 13: Default electricity generation capacity factors used in the Kaya
framework
Electric Power Source Capacity Factor
Coal 73%
Coal with Carbon Capture
70%
and Sequestration
Nuclear 90%
Hydroelectric 42%
Geothermal 90%
Solar/PV 30%
Wind 35%
This framework is a simple representation of energy-related CO 2 emissions, and
does not consider interactions between policies, the energy system, and the economy
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as a whole. As such, it is not appropriate for predicting how a policy will affect the
U.S. economy and energy system in practice, but rather is a useful tool for exploring
possible energy pathways for meeting emission goals, and for revealing pathways
that cannot meet those goals.
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8 Appendix II: SMR Reactor Options and Federal
Policy and Key Event Timeline
8.1 SMR Reactor Options Currently Under Development
Table 14: A selection of small modular reactor options currently under
development
Reactor Developing MWe Technology Country Project StatusName Companyhes of Origin
NuScale Power, Working towards 10NNuScale'nca 45 PWR USA CFR Part 52 licenseInc.
application
Babcock & Wilcox Working with TVA to
Nuclear Energy, develop project; plans to
mPower Inc.; Bechtelr' 180 PWR USA apply for DOE Public
Power Corporation Private PartnershipFunding.
SMR, LLC of Undergoing conceptual
HI-SMUR Holtec 145 PWR USA design with The Shaw
International, Group
Intention to submit
Westinghou Westinghouse 225+ PWR USA design certification
se SMR Nuclear application to NRC in
4th Quarter of 2012.
Traveling Breeder- In talks with China forWave TerraPower 100+ burner with USA first plant.Reactor DU fuel
erHyperion Lead-bismuth Exploring test reactor
Nuclear Hyperion 25 fast reactor USA licensing and DOE/DOD
Battery licensing
KAERI and
SMART KEPCO 90 PWR Korea Seeking design approval
Consortium
HTR-PM Chinergy 210 HTGR China Under construction andin licensing process
LMR (Sodium Preparing for license
PRISM GE-Hitachi 311 cooled) Fast USA application submittal;
Reactor no time estimate
4S Toshiba, CRIEPI 10 LMR (Sodium Japan Expected license
cooled) Fast application submittal in
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8.2 U.S. SMR Innovation Key Event Timeline
October 28, 2009: President Obama signs the National Defense Authorization Act
for 2010, which includes a provision that asks the Secretary of Defense to conduct a
study on the feasibility of using nuclear power for the military, and to report results
to the Congress.
February 1, 2010: Obama Administration FY2011 budget request establishes SMR
program within Advanced Reactor Concepts (also established for 2011), and
requests $39 million for the SMR program.
February 2010: DOE Office of Nuclear Energy promotes SMRs and proposes Small
Modular Reactor program
March 23 2010: Secretary Chu writes op-ed in WSJ promoting SMRs.
http://www.energy.gov/news/8782.htm
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Reactor 2012.
Proposed for floating
VBER-300 OKBM 325 PWR Russia nuclear power plants,desalination, and remote
applications
CAREM CNE voi VPower 25 PWR Argentina Under development
PBMR PBMY Pty Ltd 165 HTGR South Funding suspended
____________ _________________Africa
KLT-40 OKBM 35 PWR Russia
Under
GT-MHR General Atomics 285 HTGR USA development/licensing
through DOE NGNP
Under development for
VK-300 NIKIET 250 BWR Russia cogeneration
applications
VKT-12 OKBM 12 BWR Russia Prototyped
100- Under development -NP-300 Areva 300 PWR France conversion from
submarine use
Antares Areva 250 HTGR France Under development
BREST NIKIET 300+ Lead-cooled Russia Demonstration plantfast reactor planned
Spring 2010: DOE meets with vendors and suppliers to evaluate readiness and
R&D needs.
April 6, 2010: Richard Black from DOE Office of Nuclear Energy presents SMR
program plans to NRC.
May 19, 2010: B&W Nuclear Energy President Christofer Mowry gives testimony
before U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science and Technology
promoting the mPower reactor and SMRs in general.
Summer 2010: DOE meets with potential end-users to determine interest in SMRs.
June 29, 2010: At Platts SMR meeting, William Macon, US Army Nuclear and
Combatting WMD Agency, says that the DOD is interested in transportable nuclear
reactors and other reactors for military use. He says that the leadership is very
cautious, and does not endorse the use of nuclear power on military sites.
June 29, 2010: DOE SMR workshop takes place to develop SMR program plans.
July 2010: ANS releases preliminary report on SMR generic licensing issues.
July 14, 2010: B&W and Bechtel announce formal alliance to design, license, and
deploy the first SMR (mPower). The alliance is called "Generation mPower."
July 21, 2010: The Senate Energy Committee passes two bills by voice vote. S 2052,
sponsored by Sen. Mark Udall (CO), would authorize a DOE research and
development program that would look into small-scale reactors, as well as ways to
lower the costs for all nuclear reactors. S 2812, sponsored by Chairman Bingaman,
would require the department to develop and demonstrate in a private-public
partnership the licensing process for two small modular reactor designs.
September 1, 2010: NRC announces plans to enhance SMR licensing framework.
September 9, 2010: Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (Fluor, Northrop Grumman,
and Honeywell) and Hyperion Power sign MOU for deployment of SMRs at SRNL.
As reported in the September 27th Edition of Capitol Update, the House Science
and Technology (S&T) Committee approves H.R. 5866, the "Nuclear Energy
Research and Development Act of 2010." The measure, which was reported from the
S&T Committee's Energy and Environment Subcommittee by a voice vote in July,
would provide up to $439 million a year through 2013 to improve current reactors'
efficiency and life cycles and commercialize small modular reactors through a 50
percent public-private cost-share program.
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September 30th, 2010: ASME partners with IEEE-USA and Discover magazine to
convene a congressional briefing entitled, "The Road to the New Energy Economy:
Small Modular Reactors (SMR)."
October, 2010: SRNS releases two draft concept papers: one for the US Energy
Freedom Center, a hybrid energy park, and one for the Small Modular Reactor
Demonstration Complex within the center. The latter lists possible designs for
prototypes: EM 2 (General Atomics), IRIS (Westinghouse), NuScale, mPower (B&W),
TerraPower Traveling Wave reactor, Hyperion, PBMR, PRISM (GE), and 4S
(Toshiba). It notes that the most likely first demos are mPower, IRIS, and NuScale,
and notes that NRC licensing could be done alongside prototyping and operating,
thereby speeding up the commercial licensing process.
November, 2010: Don Moul, an executive with First Energy, says that they are in
talks with B&W about its mPower reactor, and that their first choice for capacity
addition is uprates, second is SMRs, third is large LWRs.
(http://djysrv.blogspot.com/2010/11/patrick-moore-ratchets-up-rhetoric.html)
December 9, 2010: Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee Meeting. Agenda item
"Office of Advanced Reactor Concepts - Small Modular Reactor" Dick Black gives
presentation on SMRs and DOE SMR program describing mission and specific
objectives.
December 14, 2010: Senate omnibus spending bill released. Provides for transfer of
$23 million from NGNP to SMR program and for total of $55 million for SMR R&D.
December 21, 2010: House approves stopgap-spending bill (thru March 2011).
Feb 14, 2011: President Obama's 2012 budget request includes $67 million for SMR
licensing.
March 8, 2011: Senate bill S.512, the "Nuclear Power 2021 Act," is introduced by
Senators Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.), Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska), Mark Udall (D-
Colo.), Mike Crapo (R-Idaho), Mary Landrieu (D-La.) and Mark Pryor (D-Ark.). The
legislation directs the Secretary of Energy to implement programs to develop and
demonstrate two SMR designs, one fewer than 300 MWe and one fewer than 50
MWe. This would be a public-private partnership with cost-sharing. The bill calls
for the two designs to be certified by the NRC by 2017 and for the reactors to be
licensed by 2021.
January 19, 2012: DOE issues a Draft Funding Opportunity Announcement (FOA)
for the development, licensing, and deployment (by 2022) of SMRs in the U.S. The
funding program is ultimately expected to support two projects in combination with
industry cost sharing.
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January 20, 2012: Westinghouse announces its intent to apply for the funding
opportunity with a consortium of utilities.
Feb 14, 2012: President Obama's 2013 budget request includes $65 million for a
small modular reactor-licensing program.
March 5, 2012: Hyperion Power Generation, DOE - Savannah River, and Savannah
River National Lab announce that they will cooperate to build a Hyperion reactor at
the Savannah River site. The reactor is to be NRC licensed, as required by the
Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) among the parties, and privately funded.
March 22, 2012: DOE issues Financial Assistance Funding Opportunity
Announcement based on draft FOA of January 19th.
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